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The general aim of this thesis was to investigate how and to what extent the characteristics of 
action organization are reflected in language, and how linguistic processing of these aspects affects 
the motor behavior. Even though a huge amount of research has been devoted to the study of the 
motor effects of language, this issue is very debated in literature. Namely, the majority of the 
studies have focused on low-level motor effects such as effector-relatedness of action, whereas 
only a few studies have started to systematically investigate how specific aspects of action 
organization are encoded in language.  
After a review of previous studies on the relationship between language comprehension and 
action (chapter 1) and a critical discussion of some of them (chapter 2), the thesis is composed by 
three experimental chapters, each devoted to a specific aspect of action organization.  
Chapter 3 presents a study designed with the aim to disentangle the effective time course of the 
involvement of the motor system during language processing. Three kinematics experiments were 
designed in order to determine whether and at which stage of motor planning and execution 
effector-related action verbs influence actions executed with either the same or a different effector.  
Results demonstrate that  the goal of an action can be linguistically re-activated, producing a 
modulation of the motor response.  
In chapter 4, a second study investigates the interplay between the role of motor perspective 
(agent) and the organization of action in motor chains. More specifically, this kinematics study 
aims at deepening how goals can be translated in language, using as stimuli simple sentences 
composed by a pronoun (I, You, He/She) and a verb. Results showed that the perspective activated 
by the pronoun You elicits the motor pattern of the “agent” combined with the chain structure of 
the verb. These data confirm that the motor system is early affected by language processing, 
suggesting that it is specifically modulated by the activation of the agent‟s perspective. 
In chapter 5, the issue of perspective is specifically investigated. In particular, this study aimed 
at determining how a given perspective (induced for example by a personal pronoun) modulates 
motor behaviour during and after language processing. A classical compatibility effect (the Action-
sentence compatibility effect) has been used to this aim. In three behavioural experiments this 
study investigated how the ACE is modulated by taking first or third person perspective. Results 
from these experiments showed that the ACE effect occurs only when a first-person perspective is 
activated by the sentences used as stimuli.  
Overall, the data from this thesis contribute to disentangle several aspects of how action 
organization is translated in language and then   affects overt actions performed during or after 
linguistic processing. This constitutes a new contribution to the field, adding lacking information 
on how specific aspects such as goal and perspective are linguistically encoded. In addition, these 
studies offer a new point of view to understand the functional implications of the involvement of 
the motor system during language comprehension and this has a variety of implications also for 
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My hand is pointing to you, I see your foot kicking a ball, “Andy gave the pizza to 
Bob”. Are these actions? Are these actions but at different degrees?  
An actual action, an observed action, a sentence. My basic assumption is that all 
these are actions and are to some extent comparable. More, I suggest to assume that they 
share a basic mechanism which allows us to study them together and at an inter-subjective 
level.  
The focus of our studies is on language, but assuming that language is a form of 
action itself. Language and action are then considered as systems which can be translated 
one into each other, and continuously come in dialogue. This approach is supported by 
assuming an embodied perspective, where the brains-bodies interactions constitute the 




0.1. Language and actions 
We all communicate through action and through language, but typically a neuro-
linguistic perspective has assumed these processes as separate and tended to see verbal 
language as primary and based on abstract cognitive processes with nothing to share with 
the motor system. A recent shift in perspective has led to several studies investigating the 
role of the motor system during language processing. The basic idea is that a mechanism of 
motor resonance is active very early during language processing, so that this process 
effectively contributes to language understanding.  
But what remains of the experience of action after and before language? The 
experience of language is experience of action in the sense that you can have a linguistic 
experience of actions, even of actions which are not part of your motor repertoire. At least 
you know the structure, the syntax of motor acts or part of it, you know the form of the 
action to which you can attribute a different meaning if you are able to perform that action 
or not. In any case, there is always a sense for that action, which you can recognize and 
understand as meaningful.   
If language translates action organization, then it can be re-activated even if I am 
talking to you of an action you have never performed. In this perspective different aspects 
of action organization may have different effects on overt motor behaviour, as they 
differently influence our social relations. In this view, experience is not the external 
referent of language, but language actively translates our experiences of action, changing 
experience itself, for example introducing different points of view on it.  
This mutual translation between experience and language is then engaged in 
determining processes of motor resonance and/or motor simulation not only during action 
observation but also during linguistic processing of actions. 
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Experience emerges at the intersection of different relations, depending on various 
aspects, which can be singularly embodied or even socially embodied, overcoming the 
limits of the single body-brain system.  
Action, each action, can be re-articulated through its configuration of points of 
view: from different perspectives, internal or external, action itself changes as an object of 
description. 
Consider the role of a mechanism of motor resonance during action and language 
comprehension, which is the argument of this thesis. In this case two “actions” are coupled 
and compared, at least one actually acted and another one just linguistically described. 
These two actions are coupled since they are supposed to share a common neural activity 
(even if at different degrees) so that the result is a direct coupling between execution and 
linguistic re-activation of an action (see chapter 3). No form of mediation seems to be 
implied. But we have to consider that the same action can be re-articulated through specific 
configurations and points of view, so that the action emerges in a dynamical way. This is 
made possible also by the definition of limits (internal-external, self-non self) and of 
thresholds. Thanks to this process an action emerges and acquires meaning, as a specific 
configuration defined as the intersection of different networks of relations.  
Let‟s schematize this process as follow.  
First, we have an action performed and realized (for example the action of grasping 
an object) with a specific configuration: the hand approaches the object with a specific 
direction and movement parameterization, the object has given properties , the action is 
situated in a particular environment and so on.  Subsequently, under a specific aspect, point 
of view and pertinence, this first configuration is re-defined by another set of relations, that 
is for example the set of relations which refer to the position of an external observer from a 
specific perspective.  
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The same configuration can be translated in a linguistic configuration, where 
specific aspects are selected while neglecting others.  For instance, some linguistic devices 
(pronouns, adverbs, verbs themselves) act to translate the actual action: the hand 
approaching the object quickly or slowly, with a precision grip or a force grip, in a specific 
time, space, with a peculiar rhythm and trend.  This allows the action to be translated in 
verbal language, in a sort of “action observation” of different order respect to the usual 
visual observation. The “linguistically observed” action acquires meaning as given of a 
specific direction (sense) and of a goal, that is a value for someone or something. 
This motor pattern is then translated into a specific neural configuration which 
codes some of the possible parameters and aspects defining action itself as a whole. For 
example, an action emerges differentially because of the effector used to perform it, hand 
or foot, which correspond to a specific description in the motor cortex. This configuration 
is coupled and compared with the one that would lead to the actual execution of that 
action. The configuration of the potential action depends on the others, on how the first 
action has been specifically built up, depending also on the agents‟ motor habits and 
practices. 
At this stage, it is possible to verify this motor activation through motor tasks. For 
instance, asking a person to grasp an apple or a cherry after reading of someone grasping 
something. The specific motor pattern activated by the sentence “Giovanni was grasping a 
pen” affects the subsequent execution of an action if this last action shares some aspects of 
the one conveyed through language. For instance, grasping a pen typically requires to use 
the hand with a precision grip. Then, actually grasping a cherry should be more likely to be 
influenced by the sentence with respect to grasping an apple. The extent to which the 
linguistic action is detailed surely is a critical component of how the motor effect can be 
detected, as well as the expertise required to perform an action: we normally share the 
ability to grasp objects, but just some of us can correctly perform more skilled actions. A 
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crucial point – both from an experimental and theoretical point of view – is then to clearly 
define which aspects of action we are investigating and which components of motor 
behaviour we expect to be affected (i.e. planning, execution, temporal sequence of actions 
and so on). 
0.2. Goals definition and motor chains  
A critical role in defining an action is played by the so-called goal of an action. 
The recent definition given by Gallese (2009) where goals are defined in terms of 
“value for the system”, and are structured along an axis of valence, can be very fruitful.   
However, we need to consider goals not strictly as the “aim” of a single subject or the final 
effect of her actions. In fact, we need to achieve a more general definition of goal, if we 
extend it to the domain of intersubjectivity.  
From this point of view, goals cannot be reduced just to the final end state of an 
action, or to the intention of a subject; rather they are what stands for the “value” of an 
action. Broadly considered, the notion of value can refer to the social value, to the value 
for an individual in a given situation, or it can reflect the value of a single motor act (sub-
goals) with respect to the action in which it is embedded. This open definition of goal 
allows treating action organization at a very general level, where goals can be dynamically 
modulated through another basic mechanism which received much attention recently: the 
structure of actions in motor chains (see chapter 4).  
Motor chains rely on the idea of motor acts (i.e. the act of grasping) as coded both 
per se with specific parameters and with respect to the chain in which they are embedded 
in order to perform an action and to achieve a goal. For instance, the motor act of grasping 
can be embedded in the chain with the final goal to put a piece of food in a container or to 
take it to the mouth.  In this sense, each motor act depends on the one that immediately 
precedes it and all depend on the final act which leads to goal achievement. These 
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sequences of motor acts can be of different complexity, and several sequences can be 
combined together.  
What is relevant is that each action is defined by a goal and a motor chain, but it is 
just a syntactical description of that action, that is the other parameters such as the 
kinematics are differently defined and probably coded by different neural structures. In this 
sense this constitutes a basic description of action which is easily translated from actual 
performed actions, to verbal language, gestural pantomimes, pictures and more. This is 
particularly due to the fact that  if chains constitute the syntax of actions, then the roles in 
the chains (such as Subject/Object) are empty and they are locally fulfilled for a single 
action.  
This elaboration of motor chains permits to assume them as the basic mechanism 
which allows for the passage between the single level of embodied processes and the level 
of intersubjectivity. The empty actantial roles can be easily fulfilled by more than a single, 
even by a group, in defining just locally their position. In this sense a motor chain is a 
mechanism which accounts both for single-body processes and for intersubjective 
relations. More, it supports our idea of a continuous translation between different 
languages and systems. 
0.3. Experimental contribution: the structure of the thesis  
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate how and to what extent the 
characteristics of action organization are reflected in language, and how linguistic 
processing of these aspects affect the motor behavior. This issue is still very debated in 
literature, although a huge amount of research has been devoted to the study of the motor 
effects of language. Large part of these studies did not systematically focus on specific 
aspects of action organization in order to investigate their translation in language, being 
more interested in low-level motor effects such as effector-relatedness of action.  
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After a review of previous studies and of the neural candidates to support motor 
resonance (chapter 1) and a critical discussion of some of them (namely the emergence of 
facilitation vs interference effects, chapter 2), the thesis presents three experimental 
chapters, each devoted to a specific aspect of action organization.  
In chapter 3, I present a kinematics study designed in order to disentangle the 
effective time course of the involvement of the motor system during language processing.  
In particular, the aim was to distinguish the specific effect of timing on actions with 
different degrees of complexity and with different goals 
In chapter 4, a second kinematics study is presented, with the aim to examine the 
interplay between the role of motor perspective (agent) and action organization in motor 
chains, verifying its behavioral effect on an overt action required as response. This study 
aimed at deepening how goal can be translated in language, using as stimuli simple 
sentences composed by a pronoun (I, You, He/She) and a verb. The basic assumption is 
that language encodes goals at different levels: not only at the very general level of goals 
as abstract entities, but at the specific level of goals as concrete entities relying on 
sequences of motor acts or simple actions.  
In chapter 5, the issue of perspective is specifically investigated, focusing on its 
role  in language comprehension. In particular, this study aimed at determining how a 
specific perspective (induced for example by a personal pronoun) modulates the motor 
behaviour during and after language processing. A classical compatibility effect (the 
Action-sentence Compatibility Effect) has been used to this aim. In three behavioural 
experiments I  investigated how the ACE is modulated by taking first or third person 
perspective.  
In chapter 6 I critically discuss the results from our studies, aiming at unifying their 

















1. Embodiment and motor resonance during language processing 
 
According to the recent theories on embodied and grounded cognition (Barsalou, 
1999; Glenberg, 1997; Zwann, 2004) meaning construction is grounded on perceptually 
simulating the information that is presented to the comprehender. In other words, 
according to these theories, meaning is the outcome of our interactions with the world. In 
the first part of this chapter I will review studies supporting the idea of a functional 
involvement of the motor system during language processing. Together with a presentation 
of the studies I discuss their position into the current debate, with the possible criticisms 
and weak points. In the second part of this chapter I review studies about the possible 
neural substrates of processes of motor resonance active during action observation, 












1.1 The motor system as part of linguistic processing 
The involvement of the motor system in language processing is supported by both 
neurophysiological and behavioural studies. Neuroimaging studies have shown that action-
related linguistic material such as sentences describing actions or visual presentation of 
single action-words activate the motor cortex in a somatotopic manner (Hauk, Johnsrude, 
& Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 2001; Tettamanti et al. 2005). 
Tettamanti and colleagues (2005) performed an fMRI study presenting sentences 
describing concrete actions performed with different body parts (mouth, hand, leg) and 
asking participants to silently read those sentences. During the listening task the authors 
found the activation of a left fronto-parieto-temporal circuit with a critical somatotopic 
activation in the premotor cortex. Interestingly, no effect in the primary motor cortex was 
found. Overall, the data confirmed that a passive reading task activated circuits involved in 
the actual execution of actions with different effectors, thus showing that also processing 
concrete sentences relies on the same somatotopic organization of actual actions. Crucially, 
the authors found also an activation of the pars opercularis of the left inferior frontal gyrus 
(Broca‟s area), but independent from body parts. This suggests that the activation of this 
area is related to a more abstract coding of action, which does not rely on the somatotopic 
organization of motor areas. In this experiment Tettamanti et al. used sentences and a 
passive task, and; in addition they used a methodology that did not allow for fine-grained 
temporal information: all these elements constitute a confound in interpreting the data. 
Namely, their results does not allow stating whether the effects are related to action 
language processing per se, or whether they are the result of an explicit imagery performed 
by the participants. This is a crucial point and constitutes a debated issue in literature. In 
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this case, the use of sentences was probably more likely to induce also imagery effects, 
while the use of single words should be more related to pure processing effects.  
Supporting information is given by other studies with different stimuli, as for 
instance single action words in a study by Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller (2004) and on 
action-related sentences in the study by Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni 
(2006).  
Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004) performed an event-related fMRI study 
presenting words referring to face, arm or leg actions (e.g. lick, pick, kick). Participants 
were required to silently read those words. This passive reading led to the activation of 
different sectors of motor and premotor areas, controlling motor acts performed with the 
same effectors of the presented words. They showed, then, that a somatotopic, effector-
related activation, of motor areas accompanies the reading of action words. Differently 
from Tettamanti and colleagues, in this study single words were used, with no additional 
contextual cue which could more likely trigger motor imagery. On the contrary, the 
effector-relatedness of word semantics was stressed, since this constitutes a very basic 
element to describe an action.  
Aziz-Zadeh and coworkers focused their experiment precisely on a comparison 
between action execution and linguistic processing of the same actions, specifically for 
actions performed with the hand. Their data showed that the same sectors of the premotor 
cortex active during action observation were also active during the comprehension of the 
same actions described in sentences.  
However, no study directly compared execution observation and language, so that it 
is hard to state to what extent the three conditions effectively overlap. More, it is not 
possible to establish with imaging data the degree of activation of the premotor areas, 
which is possibly higher and more complex during the actual execution of action, and 
probably differ also among the visual observation and the linguistic processing.  
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Data from these fMRI experiments were obtained with a relatively low-level 
processing of actions words, that is no deep semantic processing of action words or 
sentences was required. However, as already stated, the degree of involvement of the 
motor system and its effective contribution to meaning understanding remains unclear. 
This is due also to the poor temporal resolution of imaging techniques: it remains 
ambiguous at which stage of language processing the motor activation occurs. In addition, 
a possible confound is given by the presence of an M1 activation in some studies (Hauk et 
al. 2004), and its absence in other studies (Tettamanti et al. 2005, Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006). 
Since all these studies used a silent reading task, probably the different effect was not due 
to the task used (i.e. lexical or semantic). A possible explanation could be given by the fact 
that Hauk and colleagues presented action words and not sentences, whereas Tettamanti 
and Aziz Zadeh‟s studies presented action sentence compared to abstract sentences in one 
case (Tettamanti) and to methaporical sentences (and action observation) in the other. It is 
possible then that processing of complete sentences did not directly involve relatively low-
level activation in M1, while recruiting a strong effector activation but together with a 
more abstract representation given by the premotor cortex (determined for instance by the 
effector and by the goals typically accomplished with that effector). On the contrary, 
simple words recruited also these sectors, relying on a stronger effector-dependent 
understanding of verb meaning.  
The fMRI studies surely contribute in disentangling the spatial localization of the 
effects of language on the motor system. However, due to their low temporal resolution, 
they do not give sufficient information on the exact timing of this effect, that is they do not 
clarify if the involvement of motor areas effectively contributes to language processing. In 
fact, a strong argument in favor of this causal relation would be the presence of early 
activations of motor areas. Several neurophysiological and behavioral studies have recently 
tried to disentangle the exact timing of these activations.  
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Large part of these studies rely on the same assumption of a somatotopic activation 
of motor areas during language processing similar to the one observed during action 
observation and execution. They generally agree, then, on the idea that action words and 
sentences are mainly accompanied by strong effector-dependent activations.  
Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi (2005) used magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
to study the effect of listening to action verbs during a distraction task, which did not 
directly involve the recruitment of semantic information. Action words referred to face or 
leg actions were presented, and the brain activity of participants was recorded using high-
density MEG. Shortly after word recognition as autonomous lexical item, an activity in the 
superior temporal (130 msec) and inferior frontocentral areas (142-146 msec) was 
detected. Face and leg actions differently activated the two areas: face-related stimuli 
activated inferior frontocentral areas more strongly than leg words, whereas the reverse 
was found at superior central sites (170 msec). The authors interpreted these results as a 
confirm of the somatotopy implied by the motor actions described by the verbs.  
Data in support of this interpretation come from a recent TMS study by the same 
authors. Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi (2005) stimulated hand and leg areas in 
the left emisphere 150 ms after word onset using single pulse TMS below threshold. 
Participants read arm and leg-related words and meaningless pseudo-word presented in 
written form. They had to respond with a lip movement to meaningful words, refraining to 
respond to pseudo-words. Data from the lexical decision task confirmed a somatotopic 
activation of motor areas, detectable in a facilitation of effector-related muscles during the 
presentation of the corresponding action words. This study suggests an early involvement 
of the motor system during language processing, in showing that motor effects are 
detectable at 150 ms after word onset. However, since 150 ms already correspond to the 
timing of lexical-semantic access it is not completely clear whether motor resonance 
simply facilitated a lexical task or if it effectively contributed to the task, preceding it. It is 
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worth noting, however, that the timing of the effect in this study is not consistent with an 
explicit imaging strategy performed by the subject (such strategy does not seem useful in 
this task) and neither with a post-understanding imaging of actions, which should take 
much longer than 150 ms and should occur after full comprehension of the word. 
The early involvement of the motor system is confirmed by other physiological and 
behavioral data coming from a TMS experiment by Buccino et al. (2005). These authors 
showed an interference effect during listening and reading of effector-related action verbs, 
as detected in the MEPs recoded from muscles of the corresponding effector. That is, 
MEPs amplitude decreased for hand muscles with hand-related verbs as compared to foot-
related verbs, and the reverse was true as well. The behavioral data with the same stimuli 
and with a lexical decision task showed the same interference effect. This study is 
consistent with data on the somatotopic activation of the motor system during language 
processing similarly to action observation, thus confirming an early rectruitment of motor 
areas when listening or reading to action verbs. However, this study differs from other 
TMS and behavioral experiments in showing facilitatory effects: this issue will be 
discussed in greater detail in the second chapter of the thesis.  
The imaging and physiological data reveal that motor areas are involved early 
during lexical-semantic task, thus suggesting that this involvement is part of the linguistic 
processing. The timing of these effects is consistent with the idea that the motor 
involvement is not a product of conscious imagery, but signal of early processes of motor 
resonance involved in language understanding. In this sense, reading an action verb, 
observing the action the verb describes, and performing the same action should share the 
same neural substrates. In this sense, the activation of action-related areas should produce 
effects detectable also at a behavioral level. That is, a linguistically-induced motor 
activation should modulate the overt motor behavior according to some aspects of the 
presented stimuli. A huge amount of data is now available in this field. A precursor in this 
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field was a study by Gentilucci, Bertolani, Daprati, & Gangitano (2000). In this study, and 
specifically in one of the experiments of this study, the authors demonstrated the effect of 
single Italian words on motor responses. In fact, reading words referring to the size of an 
object, e.g. “GRANDE” (big) or “PICCOLO” (small), evoked the motor programs related 
to grasping  big or small objects, thus inducing effects on the motor response of reaching 
and grasping an object. The effect was specifically found on the grasp component of 
movement, that is on the maximal finger aperture. The authors suggested that this effect 
relied on the semantic content of words referring to objects, thus influencing action 
planning and execution. Specifically, they suggested that planning of the response action 
was interfered by the word presented on the object. However, the effect found on a grasp 
aperture suggests that not only an effect of action planning was present, but that action 
words influenced also the online control of actions as happens for other properties of 
objects, such as size, volume and similar.  
A similar experiment was performed by Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon 
(2004), but suggesting that the semantic information interfered with motor programs rather 
with online control of action. They tested this hypothesis by using nouns denoting concrete 
objects, associated with a specific hand aperture – in this sense their stimuli were not 
explicitly referred to size.  
Participants were required to read a single word presented on a computer screen 
and then reach and grasp for blocks of different sizes. Words referred to either small or 
large objects (e.g. “GRAPE” or “APPLE”). Data from participants‟ performances in the 
motor response showed that reading the name of an object with a characteristic size 
interfered with the planning of a grasping movement. Glover‟s study confirmed that word 
referring explicitly or implicitly to size (as one of the possible properties of an object) 
influenced an overt motor response required after reading these words. However, this does 
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not explain whether it is possible to have this effect without the concurrent planning of a 
motor task, that is outside a motor context.  
A more recent study by Boulenger et al. (2006) aimed at disentangling the timing of 
the effect of single words on overt motor behavior. Two experiments used as stimuli letter 
strings appearing at a different timing with respect to movement onset: in a first 
experiment, the letter string appeared after the onset of a reaching movement, in the second 
experiment the letter string was presented as go-signal for movement execution. 
Participants had to decide whether the string was a word or a pseudo-word: they were 
asked to complete the reaching movement in case of a word in the first experiment, and to 
start and perform the movement in the second experiment.  
The results showed that action verbs affected overt motor behavior: within 200 ms 
after movement onset, processing action verbs interfered with a concurrent reaching 
movement (effect detected on wrist peak acceleration). On the contrary, a facilitation was 
found in the second experiment: that is wrist peak acceleration increased with action words 
as compared to nouns. This effect was evident 550-580 ms after word onset.  
A similar facilitatory effect was found in a behavioral experiment by Lindemann, 
Stenneken, van Schie, & Bekkering (2006).  
In this experiments participants made lexical decisions in a go-no go task, after 
preparing a specific action. That is, participants had to prepare to pick up a magnifying 
glass and bring it to the eye, or to pick a cup and bring it to the mouth. A letter string was 
presented after action onset: target words were eye and mouth. The preparation of a 
congruent action (e.g. pick up the glass for eye) facilitated  the lexical decision on the 
associated word. The authors suggest that preparing for an action activates semantic 
information about that action, which primes a concurrent lexical decision task. 
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All the studies reviewed in this first section refer to single action words or simple 
word combinations. However, there is evidence for processes of motor resonance both at 
the phonological level and at the more complex level of sentence processing.  
The idea that motor resonance mechanisms are active during phonological 
processing is not new. A crucial role of the motor system during speech perception was 
explicitly assumed by the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman. Cooper, 
Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967). According to this theory, “the objects of speech 
perception are the intended phonetic gestures of the speaker, represented in the brain as 
invariant motor commands” (Liberman & Mattingly, 1985).  
Recent neuro-physiological studies confirmed this theory with experimental 
evidence. In particular, Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino, & Rizzolatti (2002) used TMS over 
the motor cortex, and specifically the sector controlling tongue muscles, to investigate the 
effects of single pulse stimulation during listening to Italian words and pseudo-words. 
Words and pseudo-words contained a tongue-trilled, double-r sound, or a non-trilled, 
double-f sound. MEPs recorded from tongue muscle showed an increased amplitude for 
listening to double-r stimuli than double-f stimuli. This was dependent on the use of the 
tongue to produce the double-r sound. These data suggest then that phoneme production 
and phoneme  listening activate the same muscles, that is that execution and “observation” 
of linguistic phonemes rely on the same motor processes.  
These data were extended by the same authors in a recent study (D‟Ausilio et al., 
2009), in which the functional relevance of the motor activation during speech processing 
was specified – hence confirming the motor-somatotopy of speech perception.  
At the level of sentence processing, effects of motor resonance have been 
extensively found using sensibility judgment task. During this kind of task participants 
normally evaluate sentences which share one or more characteristics with the motor 
response used to perform the action, that is for instance response away or toward the body, 
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up or down, hand shape and so on.  The assumption is that participants are facilitated when 
performing response actions congruent with the motor processes involved in the actions 
linguistically described by the stimuli-sentences. The effect is mainly detected by using 
Reaction Times or Reading Times measures, that is measuring how “fast” participants are 
in responding after sentence understanding. 
A well-known effect is, in this sense, the so-called ACE (Action-sentence 
Compatibility Effect, discussed in detail in chapter 2).  
This effect relies on the compatibility between movement direction embedded in 
sentences (“Close the drawer”) and the direction of response used by participants to ask 
whether the same sentences made sense or not. The finding was that action-compatible 
responses were faster than action-incompatible responses, hence the action-sentence 
compatibility effect,  ACE (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). The ACE was found not only for 
imperatives, but also for descriptive sentences of two types: double object (e.g., Mike 
handed you the pizza) and dative constructions (Mike handed the pizza to you). Moreover, 
the effect was also found for abstract transfer sentences, such as Liz told you the story. 
However, this effect emerged on late responses, as characteristic of the semantic judgment 
which required the full presentation of sentence and response movement began when the 
sentence had been already completely understood. The effect of motor resonance, then, is 
rather different from the one obtained with other methodologies. However, it gives us a 
crucial contribution to understand the nature of stimuli capable to evoke motor resonance 
or not – this will be the issue of chapter 2 and of chapter 5. 
As showed in this review, the available data on motor resonance connected to 
linguistic processes do not fully disentangle this issue. On the contrary, the data emerging 
from different techniques, stimuli and tasks, sometimes differ, making it hard to merge 
them in a unifying view. This is part of the current debate on the “necessity” of the motor 
system for language understanding. In summary, two hypotheses are debated: the first 
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assumes that language understanding completely relies on symbolic, amodal mental 
representations (e.g., Fodor 1975). Following this approach, the meaning of language 
derives from an arbitrary correspondence between abstract symbols and their 
corresponding extensions in the world. According to this view (the „disembodied‟ 
hypothesis, see Mahon & Caramazza 2008) motor activations accompanying language 
understanding are completely irrelevant for semantic analysis. They are consequent to 
processes similar to those leading the “Pavlovian dog to salivate when it hears the bell” 
(Mahon and Caramazza 2008) and are automatically elicited in conditions similar to those 
produced in S-states, as defined by Jeannerod (2001). The second hypothesis („embodied‟ 
hypothesis) assumes that language understanding does rely on processes of embodiment 
(Lakoff, 1987; Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou 1999; Pulvermüller, 2002; Zwaan, 2004; Gallese 
&Lakoff, 2005; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Based on this view, language understanding 
implies the involvement of the same neural systems used to perceive or to act. This is in 
agreement with the assumptions of the Semantic Somatotopy Model proposed by 
Pulvermüller (see Pulvermüller 2005; for a review, Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2008). 
Together with these two radical approaches, the debate has been recently enriched by new 
intermediate positions. On one side, Mahon and Caramazza (2008) assume that motor 
representations can access and contribute to the full representation of a concept (the 
grounding by interaction hypothesis). On the other side, Fischer & Zwaan (2008) gave the 
provisional conclusion that the current research demonstrates that “motor resonance results 
in a deeper, higher resolution, comprehension” of a concept, so that motor resonance at 
least enhances comprehension of language. However, Mahon & Caramazza (2008) 
postulate higher level for amodal conceptual representations as compared to motor 
representations, whereas Fischer & Zwaan (2008) postulate that the motor representations 
are complementary to concept and language understanding. 
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Data from neurological patients are used by the different authors both to claim the 
functional relevance of the motor system and its complementary role together with other 
abstract representations of concepts. A primary criticism of embodied theories and motor 
resonance is given by the fact that patients with motor lesions and dysfunctions do 
commonly preserve some form of language comprehension. However,  it is possible that 
the preserved ability to understand language (and in other cases, actions) remains at a low-
level, which does not preserve a deep understanding of language.  
In a recent study Boulenger et al. (2008) studied Parkinson‟s patients, showing 
deficits in performing overt actions. These patients showed also an abnormal lexico-
semantic processing of action verbs. On the contrary, this abnormal processing was not 
present for concrete nouns. Under Levodopa treatment, that is when normal motor 
functions are restored, the same patients increased their performances during lexical 
processing of concrete nouns and action verbs. These data suggest that probably different 
processes – also at a motor level – are involved during processing of action verbs and 
concrete nouns. Moreover, they demonstrate that the presence of disrupted motor functions 
leads to a limited processing of action verbs. This suggest that, whilst a superficial form of 
comprehension is present, a deeper understanding of actions  is impaired together with the 
motor functions. Bak and colleagues (2001) confirmed this hypothesis, showing 
electrophysiological evidence that motor neuron disease leads to a consistent and selective 
impairment for comprehension and production of verbs, as compared to nouns. 
1.2 Action through execution, observation and language  
The increasing amount of research on mirror neurons and specifically on a possible 
mechanism directly matching action observation and execution offers a valid (and 
intriguing) candidate as it immediately induced many scholars to see in them the neural 
substrate of the processes of motor resonance during language comprehension. However, 
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actual action execution/observation and linguistic processing of described actions are 
similar but  do not completely overlap. Hence, we have to bear in mind this preliminary 
distinction. This has been underlined by other authors, for  instance Buccino et al. (2005), 
claiming that action observation is inherently richer than linguistic description, since some 
aspects of action (i.e. temporal constraints) cannot be activated through linguistic devices.   
My own position slightly differs: while I agree with a distinction between the two 
kind of observation, real and linguistic, II think of the two as qualitatively different but not 
in terms of primacy of one over the other.  We all have experience of how our 
communication (not only verbal) often relies on what is left unsaid, pre-supposed, or not 
completely described. In some cases this leads to mis-understandings, but more often our 
social interactions are successful despite (or thanks to) this. On the contrary, observing an 
action does often rely on incomplete situations, in which much is unseen and unknown. 
However, again, we can usually understand what is going on and successfully adapt our 
behavior, but in some cases we can‟t have a complete understanding of the situation. The 
same is true, nevertheless, for action execution: I can have the complete motor control of 
an action and of its goal, but I can act in an opaque situation, which does not allow me to 
completely control the effects of my action.  
In sum, the assumption that several translations occur among execution, 
observation and language leads us to the consideration that differences between these 
modalities are not given, but constantly vary across situations. In this sense, there may be 
cases where language is capable to capture and translate more aspects than what visual 
observation could do. In other words, the differences are of degrees and modalities, and not 
of absolute primacy of one form of action over the others. Bearing this in mind, I will now 
discuss how studies on action observation and in particular on mirror mechanisms  may 




1.3  Is there a neural basis for motor resonance?  
The largest part of the available data on a mirror neurons comes from studies with 
non-human primates, specifically the macaque monkey, which allow for single-cell 
recordings.  
Mirror neurons are referred to neurons, generally found in sectors of the ventral 
premotor cortex, which become active for instance when the animal executes an action 
with the hand and when it observes the same action performed by another individual 
(Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996). Recently, Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, & 
Gallese(2003)recorded discharges in the premotor area F5 of monkeys both from mirror 
neurons during lip-smacking – the most common facial gesture in monkeys – and from 
other mirror neurons during mouth movements related to eating. This suggests that non-
vocal facial gestures may be indeed transitional between visual gesture and speech. Mirror 
neurons in monkey have been also recorded in the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule 
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 2002), and neurons activated only by the 
observation of movements of different body effectors were recorded in the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) region (Perrett, Mistilin, Harries, & Chitty, 1990). The presence of a 
mirror system (involving different sectors of the premotor cortex and of other connected 
areas as well) in the monkey premotor cortex the mirror system has been demonstrated 
primarily for reaching and grasping, although it also maps the sound of certain movements, 
such as tearing paper or cracking nuts, onto the execution of those movements (Kohler et 
al., 2002). According to Rizzolatti et al. (1996) and Gallese et al. (1996) the mirror 
neurons‟ activity is involved in action representation. This motor representation, by 
matching action observation with execution, would constitute the basic mechanism to 
understand actions. In this way, individuals are able to recognize the meaning and the aim 




Mirror neurons, then, rely on the motor repertoire of the actor/observer, coding 
motor acts (i.e. grasping) given of a specific goal. The idea that what is coded is the “goal” 
of a motor act has been confirmed by several studies aimed at identifying the degree of this 
mirror-activation.  
Umiltà et al. (2001) showed that half of the mirror neurons in F5 discharge during 
action observation also when the final part of the movement is occluded. Interestingly, 
these neurons do not discharge when the final part is precluded to vision and the monkey 
knows that no object is present. This suggests that, at least in monkeys, the simple 
pantomime of an action without a target object does not lead to a mirror activity. At the 
same time, other studies (Kohler et al., 2002, Keysers et al., 2003) demonstrated that these 
neurons are capable of a certain degree of abstraction. In fact, part of the F5 mirror neurons 
discharge not only when the action is actually observed but also when only the sound (the 
effect) of the actions is presented, for instance when the monkey hears the sound of the 
action to “crack a nut” but does not actually see the action. Recently, Ferrari, Rozzi, & 
Fogassi (2005) showed that the goal of the action is the crucial element for this mechanism 
to be activated: in fact, they recorded F5 neurons which discharge not only when mirroring 
an action executed with the hand or the mouth, but also when the monkey observed the 
experimenter grasping a piece of food with a tool. Interestingly, some of the recorded 
neurons showed a selectivity of discharge specific for the grasp with a tool. The very basic 
link between observation and execution is then the goal of the action, which is necessary 
and sufficient to evoke a mirror response in F5 neurons. 
The importance of goals imposes to rely not only on premotor areas to investigate 
the articulation of mirror activity in the monkey brain: what recently emerged is the idea 
that an extended mirror neuron system (MNS) is present in the monkey brain, involving 
also areas coding a more abstract representation of action, for instance parietal areas. 
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Assumed that single motor acts are goal-specific, actions are constituted by 
sequences of motor acts with different degrees of complexity. Action is then characterized 
by an overall goal (e.g. eating), on which all the motor acts and their single goals depend 
(e.g. reaching-grasping the food, bring it to the mouth). A recent study by Fogassi et al. 
(2005) showed how this chained organization of actions is coded in the monkey inferior 
parietal lobule IPL.  The same authors (Ferrari et al., 2003) had already showed that IPL 
contains neurons showing a mirror discharge, being then called parietal-mirror neurons.  
In this study, motor neurons  in the rostral sector of the (IPL), showed a discharge 
selective for the same motor act (e.g. grasping) when embedded in different sequences, 
hence actions with different goals. In the execution condition, the monkey had to (1) reach 
and grasp a piece of food and then bring it to the mouth, or (2) reach and grasp a piece of 
food and then bring it to a container. In this sense, the first motor act was the same, but the 
final goal of the action was different, being in one case eating and in the other placing. In a 
series of control conditions, the authors showed that the difference in neurons discharge 
and their goal-specificity cannot be explained by the kinematic differences in actions 
execution. In addition, the neurons with mirror activity, hence discharging both for action 
execution and observation, showed a similar pattern of goal-dependent action observation. 
Hence, some of these neurons specifically discharge for a single motor act only when 
embedded in the action of eating and not in placing, and the reverse as well.  
Authors‟ claim is then that the representation of motor acts in IPL is dependent on a 
chain organization of actions, which is active both during observation and execution. This 
parietal mechanism is then hypothesized as being involved in action understanding, 
specifically in understanding the motor intention of others as specified by the goal of their 
action. What remains unsolved is how a specific chain is selected: the authors suggest that 
the context in which the action is performed and the object target constitute two critical 
cues to understand actions and hence to activate different chains. However, the parietal-
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specificity unlikely acts alone, but it is probably part of a more complex system, involving 
also the premotor cortex. In fact, since IPL has direct anatomic connections to the vPMC – 
this would support the idea that the parietal coding of goal influences the next stages of 
action organization. More, vPMC and IPL share a similar organization of receptive fields, 
thus it is likely that they share also the coding of motor acts specifically dependent on the 
action in which they are embedded. 
1.4 A mirror mechanism for language? 
Large part of the available data postulating a MNS for humans comes from imaging 
studies, aimed at individuating structures in the human brain subserving the same 
processes observed in the monkey brain (see for instance Decety & Grezes, 1999; Grezes 
& Decety, 2002; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001).  
A study by Buccino and colleagues (2001) seems of particular relevance for our 
topic. This fMRI study  showed a somatotopic organization in the premotor and parietal 
cortices when observing movements of different body parts. This somatotopy corresponds 
to that found when the same body parts are actually moved, confirming that similar areas 
are recruited while observing and acting with specific body parts.  
The network underlying action observation in humans, as shown by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, includes premotor cortex, parietal areas and 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Buccino et al., 2001; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & 
Rizzolatti, 1996; Iacoboni et al., 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 1996) predominantly in the left 
hemisphere (Grezes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Grafton et al., 1996; Iacoboni 
et al., 1999). 
This might suggest that action observation activates only high-level motor 
representations. However, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies suggest that 
action observation can directly influence the final cortical stage of action control in the 
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motor cortex. When people observe actions involving a particular group of muscles, 
responses to TMS in those same muscles are specifically facilitated (Baldissera, Cavallari, 
Craighero, & Fadiga, 2001; Fadiga, Fogassi, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Maeda, Kleiner-
Fisman, &Pascual-Leone, 2002; Strafella and Paus, 2000; Patuzzo, Fiaschi, & 
Manganotti,2003). These results suggest a process of motor resonance
1
 based on a direct 
correspondence between the neural codes for action observation and execution. 
The mirror circuits may have multiple functions (see for a review Rizzolatti and 
Craighero, 2004): for instance a mirror system may be involved in understanding the 
meaning (and the goal) of actions (Gallese et al., 1996). Consequently, it would allow for 
the implicit strategy of putting oneself “in the shoes of the agent”. In other words, the 
observed action would activate within the observer's brain the same mechanisms that 
would be activated were that action intended or imagined by the observer (Gallese and 
Goldman, 1998). Similar processes could be involved in understanding how to interact 
with an object or, in other words, in extracting affordances from the observation of others‟ 
behavior. According to Gibson (1979), the affordances, i.e. the possibilities of action on an 
object, are provided by the visual representation of the object. Tucker and Ellis (2001) (see 
also Borghi et al., 2007) proposed that evoking affordances requires also the partial 
activation of the motor pattern required to interact with the object. Gentilucci and collegues 
suggested that affordances are motor representations of interactions between effector and 
object (Barbieri, Buonocore, Bernardis, Dalla Volta, & Gentilucci, 2007; Gangitano, 
Daprati, & Gentilucci, 1998; Gentilucci, 2002; Gentilucci, 2003). Grasping an object, 
indeed, requires the selection of a particular type of grasp and, when the hand approaches 
the target, the fingers are shaped (grasp opening phase) and then closed on the object 
(grasp closing phase). Kinematic studies (Chieffi and Gentilucci, 1993; Gentilucci et al., 
                                                 
1
 The use of motor resonance is here preferred for coherence with the rest of the thesis. However, many 
authors use the term “motor simulation” to refer to these processes.  
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1991; Gentilucci, Toni, Chieffi, & Pavesi, 1994; Jeannerod, 1988; Milner and Goodale, 
1995) showed that intrinsic object properties, such as size and shape, influence both the 
selection of the type of grasp and the implementation of the grasp kinematics, i.e. the 
activation of affordances. In a recent study (Gianelli et al. 2008) we showed that 
observation of different kinds of grasp produced an effect on a successive reaching-
grasping movement, depending on a covert imitation the observed action. The effect was 
stronger when vision of the target and of the hand was precluded. Three additional 
experiments showed that the type of observed grasp influence the perception of object size. 
The results suggest that imitation evoked by the mirror system is involved in planning how 
to interact with an object and in the estimation of the properties extracted for sensory-
motor integration.   
A limitation in referring to these studies with respect to language is – as stated 
before – the fact that action observation and linguistic “observation” do not overlap. In this 
sense, it is possible that the activations of a fronto-central system for action observed in 
studies on language and in studies on action observation do not play exactly the same role 
in the two processes. Language translates action in a manner that re-articulates action 
itself, as a consequence it is possible that the same area has a different relevance depending 
on local cues, such as perspective. Furthermore, action organization seems to involve a 
very broad circuit which does not only involve the “classic” M1 and PMC typically 
addressed in motor resonance studies. Other areas, such as the parietal ones, are probably 
involved. This is a crucial point in this thesis, since one aspect specifically investigated is 
connected with action organization in motor acts, that is in chains. Since parietal sectors 
showed to be devoted to this aspects, it is likely that inducing a deep processing of goals 
and motor sequences activates a broad circuit involving this area in addition to the purely 
motor ones.  
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Critically, we have to consider that we do not have only motor but a variety of 
experiences, and that language can describe other aspects than the motor ones. In this 
sense, further research will have to consider the fact that we have multimodal experiences 
and hence multimodal descriptions of actions are capable to be activated by language. This 
seems to be in line with the theoretical proposal of Barsalou (1999) to consider concepts as 
multi-modal mental simulations. Concepts directly, or words referring to these concepts, 
should re-activate the traces of previous concrete experiences of these concepts: that is, 
visual experience, tactile experience, motor experience and so on. This would correspond 
to the activation of the corresponding areas. This is a broader definition of experience and 
consents  to go beyond the purely motor level of experience. Even if this is not the specific 
focus of the thesis, this multi-modal description of actions has to be taken into account. 
However, this theory does not specifically give account nor does it consider aspects such 
as perspective or goals. Further research should integrate these aspects in a coherent 
framework. 
 
1.5 The role of Broca’s area in action  
Broca‟s area, for long time conceived uniquely as a language-related area, seems to 
be involved – and with a crucial role – in the processes of action execution and 
observation, as well as during language production and understanding.  
The ventral sector of the human premotor cortex is formed by two areas: the ventral 
part of area 6a alpha and Brodmann‟s area 44 (BA 44, Vogt & Vogt, 1919). BA 44 and BA 
45, which occupy the opercular and triangular parts of the inferior frontal gyrus, form the 
Broca‟s region (Broca, 1864; Amunts et al., 1999). Classically, both ventral BA 6 and BA 
44 were thought of as areas controlling oro-laryngeal movements, but with a different 
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specialization and selectivity. The most lateral part of BA 6 was considered to be 
responsible for the motor control of oro-laryngeal movements, regardless of the movement 
purpose, whereas BA 44 was considered to be the main speech motor area. Indeed, it is 
well known that BA 44 is involved in encoding phonological representations in terms of 
mouth articulation gestures (Paulesu, Frith, & Frackowiak, 1993; Demonet et al., 1992; 
Zatorre, Evans, Meyer, & Gjedde, 1992). Since Broca‟s region occurred only in the 
evolution of the human brain, the search for homologies between Broca‟s region and 
ventral premotor areas of non-human primates is somehow difficult. It is interesting to 
note, however, that von Bonin and Bailey (1947) on the basis of their cytoarchitectonic 
studies suggested a homology between BA 44 and premotor area FCBm. The latter area 
occupies the most rostral part of monkey ventral premotor cortex, and its location basically 
corresponds to that of area F5 in the parcellation proposed by Matelli et al. (1985). These 
authors studied the macaque monkey‟s frontal agranular cortex by means of enzymatic 
method and found that F5 has a character transitional between granular and agranular 
cortices fitting well with that of FCBm, that according to von Bonin and Bailey (1947) has 
some aspects similar to those of the agranular frontal cortex but others, as an incipient IV 
layer, proper of the rostral granular cortex. Thus, F5 should represent the enzymatic 
counterpart of FCBm. The homology between area BA 44 and the rostral sector of monkey 
ventral premotor cortex has been recently revised by other authors (Petrides and Pandya, 
1994; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). According to a different view, however, a homology has 
been suggested between the areas 44 in monkeys and humans (Petrides, Cadoret, & 
Mackey, 2005). Neuronal recording and intracortical microstimulation showed that area 44 
in monkey is involved in the control of oro-facial musculature. However, it is interesting to 
note that Nelissen, Luppino, Van Duffel, Rizzolatti, & Orban(2005) using the fMRI 
technique found sectors of monkey premotor and prefrontal cortices (including area 44 as 
defined by Petrides et al. , 2005), which were active during the observation of grasp 
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actions. Specifically, the anterior regions responded to more abstract features of grasp 
actions and to presentation of objects, probably coding their “graspability”. Up to now, 
however, no fMRI study has been conducted to demonstrate that these anterior regions, 
active during grasp observation, respond also to grasp execution with hand and mouth, 
being therefore endowed with a mirror system. 
Further support to the proposal about a homology between BA 44 and area F5 
comes from a series of neuroimaging studies, which have demonstrated that the role of 
Broca‟s area 44 is not restricted to speech production but that this area contains also a 
motor representation of hand/arm movements. Indeed, Broca‟a area is involved in the 
execution of distal movements. Binkofski et al. (1999) found activation of BA 44 when 
subjects manipulated complex objects avoiding covert naming of them. In contrast, when 
naming was explicitly required during manipulation the activation focus was located in the 
pars triangularis fitting entirely into BA 45. In addition, Broca‟s area is activated also by 
the observation of distal movements. Rizzolatti et al. (1996) observed activation of this 
area when comparing observation of grasps with observation of objects targets of grasp. In 
another study (Buccino et al., 2001) the observation of transitive (i.e. acted upon an object) 
and intransitive (i.e. mimicked upon an object) actions of the hand, such as grasping an 
object, determined two areas of activation, one corresponding to the pars opercularis of 
IFG and the other located in the precentral gyrus. Interestingly, there was activation also to 
the observation of mouth movements, such as biting a piece of food, which partially 
overlapped the hand representation. However, the activation was more ventrally located 
than that found during mouth observation. BA 44 was activated also when participants 
observed human silent speech (Buccino et al., 2004). 
Activation of the inferior frontal cortex was found also during overt and covert 
production of gestures (Bonda, Petrides, Frey, & Evans, 1995; Parsons et al., 1995;  Decety 
et al., 1994), especially during mental rotations necessary for hand recognition (Parsons et 
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al., 1995), during mental imagery of grasping movements (Decety et al., 1994, Grafton, 
Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996a; Grafton, Fagg, Woods, & Arbib, 1996b), during 
preparation of finger movements on the basis of a copied movement (Krams et al., 1998), 
during imagery and performance of visually guided movements (Binkofski et al., 2000; 
Toni, Rushworth, & Passingham, 2001), and during imitation of distal movements 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999). Since Broca‟s area is activated by the production/observation of 
speech as well as by the execution/observation of hand/arm gestures, it is possible that the 
two systems controlling hand and mouth interact in the same area. Specifically, Gentilucci, 
Bernardis, Crisi, & Dalla Volta (2006) hypothesized that Broca‟s area is also involved in 
translating aspects of activated representations of arm gestures into mouth articulation 
gestures. These aspects may concern the goal (Buccino et al., 2001; Buccino et al., 2004) 
and/or the intention of actions.  
In sum, the role of Broca‟s area seems to be strictly linked to how actions are 
structured, hence to the organization of sequences of motor acts to achieve a goal. 
However, the role of this areas does not seem to be to code a specific aspect of action, such 
as for instance the single motor act. More plausibly, since Broca‟s area is involved in a 
great number of domains, this area likely operates at the general level of organization of 
hierarchical structures (language, action, but also music as discussed by Fadiga, Craighero, 
& D‟Ausilio, 2009). It is possible then that Broca‟s area is part of a larger network, which 
is involved in many processes classified as “mirror”.  
The role of Broca‟s area could be to give a “syntactic” structure of actions, which is 
the “empty” structure which is fulfilled with the contribution of other areas in specifying 
for instance a specific goal, sequence of motor acts, agent, target object, kinematics of 







2. Between facilitation and interference 
As seen in chapter 1, a huge amount of studies provides evidence in favor of claims 
about the involvement of the motor system during language processing. Part of these 
studies focused on the neural correlates of motor resonance, that is they aimed at showing 
which areas are involved in processing action-language. At the same time, several studies 
have focused on how the motor system is modulated: this was made possible mainly by 
behavioral and kinematics measures, as well as with TMS paradigms where a certain 
temporal resolution is possible. However, the direction of how the system is modulated is 
not coherent nor agreed across different studies; some studies found facilitation effects 
whereas other found interference effects, leaving unsolved the question. A possible 
explanation is that, even in continuity of approach and sometimes of techniques, these 
studies substantially differ from the point of view of experimental procedures, tasks, 
measures. A review of some of these results will be helpful, since the thesis mainly focuses 









2.1 Facilitation and interference in TMS studies  
With respect to imaging studies, TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation) studies 
allow scholars a deeper understanding of how the somatotopic modulation of motor areas 
is involved in language processing. This is mainly due to the possibility to capture effects 
with a higher temporal resolution and precision due to the good spatial resolution.  
Despite these advantages of TMS, this technique is equivalent to others in 
depending largely on the modalities of stimulus presentation and on the task required to 
participants. In addition, the time-course of TMS-induced effects is largely dependent on 
the exact timing of TMS stimulation. Specifically, for single-pulse TMS (the most 
common paradigm used in the studies we are reviewing) the time of stimulation with 
respect to stimuli onset and offset is crucial, and it is even more crucial for linguistic 
stimuli. Finally, a critical aspect of the experimental procedure is constituted by the 
decision between the use of a passive task (e.g. silent reading) or of an active task (e.g. a 
concurrent motor response required together with motor stimulation) 
2.1.1 Facilitatory effects during a production task 
A first study reporting facilitatory effects was performed by Oliveri et al.(2004). In 
this study, two different kinds of stimulation were combined, single- and paired-pulse TMS 
over the left primary motor cortex (M1) to test the hypothesis that M1 is activated during 
the retrieval of words (nouns and verbs) associated with specific actions. As discussed by 
the authors, single-pulse TMS is an useful technique to both measure and modulate the 
neural activity in the motor cortex. In fact, TMS stimulation acts at the level of 
corticospinal excitability. This modulation can be measured through the simultaneous 
recording of motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in peripheral muscles chosen as targets. 
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However, the authors chose to couple this stimulation with a paired-pulse TMS. Paired-
pulse stimulation is useful to overcome some difficulties in interpreting data from single-
pulse MEPs measures.  
According to Oliveri and colleagues, “In paired-pulse TMS, a conditioning 
stimulus (CS) below the threshold intensity needed to elicit an MEP is followed at short 
interstimulus intervals (ISIs) by a suprathreshold test stimulus (TS). At ISIs of 1–5 msec, 
the CS results in MEP inhibition, while longer ISIs of 7–20 msec produce MEP 
facilitation. This modulation of MEP size takes place at the cortical level and is thought to 
reflect the activation of separate populations of inhibitory and excitatory cortical 
interneurons without affecting spinal circuits. Therefore, paired-pulse TMS provides a 
reliable index of motor cortical activation.” (p. 375) 
Single-pulse and paired-pulse TMS were applied while participants performed a 
transformation task, that is they produced action-related and non-action verbs (e.g., “To 
throw” vs. “To ignore”) and nouns (e.g., “ball” vs. “cloud”). MEPs induced by TMS were 
recorded from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle. The task was designed as follows: 
first, a linguistic stimulus was presented (a verb, a noun) then after 250 ms the word 
disappeared replaced by a symbolic cue. This cue indicated what kind of transformation 
the participants had to perform:  producing the word in singular or plural form in the case 
of nouns, producing the word in third-person or plural for verbs. 
The results showed that  the activity in the motor cortex increased for actions words 
as compared with non-action words. However, no difference between grammatical 
categories (i.e. nouns and verbs) was found. Interestingly, an effect of TMS condition was 
present. Specifically, processing of action-related words – as compared to non-action 
words - induced greater facilitation of MEPs only at the ISI of 10 ms .  
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For what concerns the timing, these effect were obtained applying the stimulation 
500 ms after stimulus onset. Crucially, the increase of motor cortex excitability was found 
applying TMS 500 ms after stimulus onset, that is 250 ms after the appearance of a 
symbolic cue which acted as instruction for the task. In sum, the facilitatory effect was 
dependent on the type of stimulation and was present for action words regardless of 
grammatical category.  
Given the paradigm used, the effects found can be classified as purely facilitatory. 
However, this kind of study differs from others since it uses a production task. In that case, 
access to the semantic content of action words was limited to a window of 250 ms, in 
which participants had to prepare for  the following task, mainly recognizing whether the 
word was a verb or noun. This kind of task stressed, on the one side, the distinction 
between nouns and verbs, but on the other did not require participants to access a deeper 
comprehension of word meaning. In this sense, the data are not completely comparable to 
other experiments using linguistic tasks or motor tasks.  
In addition, what seems problematic about this study is that the final facilitatory 
effects were found in a rather specific hand muscle (FDI), but linguistic stimuli were not 
classified on motor criteria, such as for example effector, goal, kinematics. The only 
distinction was grammatical (nouns-verbs) and just partially action-related, being very 
broad. Kicking has a broad congruence with throw being an action verb, but the two 
actions largely differ for what concerns effectors and action organization. In this sense, the 
facilitation observed was possibly due to the sum of multiple factors. Similar confounds 
were present for nouns, which described object with dissimilar characteristics.  
A possible explanation would be that action words triggered a motor activation at a 
very general level, thus facilitating the production task under specific conditions. The study 
does not allow us to disentangle whether this was due to specific aspects of the verbs and 
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nouns used. A further explanation could refer to the timing of the experimental procedure: 
first, a general motor activation is induced by action words – which are then easy to access 
and take in memory – which then is translated in a facilitatory effect after TMS. This 
would result by the sum of an unspecific activation which is maintained by TMS over a 
threshold which is detectable on MEPs recordings. This activation primed the consequent 
“motor” task of producing a word. This is consistent with the timing of the effect which 
arose 500 ms after stimulus onset. However, the timing is not easily comparable with other 
studies: effective processing of the word is probably only for the first 250 ms.  
Summing up, this study showed interesting facilitation effects, however they do not 
fully contribute to disentangle whether and how the activation of motor aspects of action-
related words contributes to comprehension and then production of those nouns.  
2.1.2 Facilitatory effects induced during a lexical-decision task 
A facilitation effect is reported also by Pulvermüller, Hauk, & Ilmoniemi(2005), in 
another TMS study. The authors used in this case a lexical decision task, where 
participants were requested to respond with a lip movement only to words and refraining 
from moving with pseudo-words. Words were arm-related and hand-related words, like 
“pick” or “kick”. Words and pseudo-words were presented for 100 ms and TMS was 
delivered 150 ms after stimulus onset.  A single pulse TMS was applied on different sites: 
arm or leg area of the left primary motor cortex (M1). In addition, the right motor area for 
leg and hand, and a sham stimulation, were used as control condition. 
With respect to the Oliveri et al.‟s study the timing of the stimulation is quite 
different, TMS occurring presumably during the phase of lexical-semantic access to word 
meaning.  In addition, the stimulation is site-specific accordingly to the verbs selected as 
stimuli: since arm and leg words were used, arm and leg sites in the dominant hemisphere 
were stimulated. In addition, only a single pulse TMS was applied and no MEPs were 
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recorded as a measure of motor facilitation of arm or leg muscles. As a measure of 
facilitation the accuracy and latency of mouth responses were recorded and analysed.  
Furthermore, a different selection of stimuli was made: whereas Oliveri and 
colleagues classified words as action or non-action words, and grammatically as nouns or 
verbs, in this study Pulvermüller and colleagues used action-related categories. That is, 
words were grammatically distinguished by pseudo-words, but they were internally 
divided into arm and leg-related words. Yet, no fine-grained distinction was made with 
respect to the effector used or the goal (arm actions can evoke different uses of the hand, 
whilst foot actions probably do not). In addition, no distinction is mentioned for other 
grammatical categories.  
Results showed that TMS on the left arm area led to faster lexical decision times 
with arm words, whereas leg area TMS led to faster RTs with leg words. Facilitation 
effects were not found in control conditions, when TMS was applied in the right 
hemisphere and during sham stimulation.  
As suggested by Papeo and colleagues (2009), it is possible that in this case TMS 
pulse acted as a semantic prime, thus facilitating the lexical decision task in a way that was 
specific for stimulation site. However, responses to arm-words slowed down mouth 
responses, in according with an interference effect due to the proximity of arm-face areas. 
This suggests that the effects of arm vs. leg words are not comparable, while they produce 
effect into the action-category itself. That is, arm responses may be slower depending  on 
the kind of motor task, so that the facilitation effects emerged later. However, a possible 
confound in reading these data is given by the fact that a mouth recording was made and 
no MEPs data were collected (since the stimulation was above threshold). In this sense it is 
hard to disambiguate how the facilitation effects on RTs are mouth-dependent or indicate a 
pure facilitation of the motor task (or interference only related to arm-words).  
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Finally, even if RTs were collected, this study is hardly comparable with behavioral 
studies implying the same measure. This is in reason of the TMS effect which appeared to 
be different depending on the representation of arm-leg-mouth in the motor cortex. Further, 
the effect seems to be variable in short times, becoming a facilitation effect only in the late 
phases of movement execution (bearing in mind that  no motor effect was measured on 
arm and leg muscles). Would this effect be suppressed by using different stimulation 
intensities, or would this interference-becoming-facilitation be confirmed? An useful 
suggestion is certainly that the observed facilitation effects emerge very early after 
stimulus onset, probably occurring during the lexical-semantic processing of words. This 
emerges even in presence of a lexical task which did not directly imply deeper semantic 
understanding of words. This confirms that at early stages of word processing only some 
aspects of action emerge, such as for instance the effector used to perform an action. 
2.1.3 Late facilitatory effects on semantic and syllabic tasks 
In a recent experiment Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati(2009) used TMS on the 
primary motor cortex to verify at which stage of semantic processing motor effects occur, 
revealing facilitatory effects. Stimuli were hand and non-hand actions, presented in the first 
singular person (“I stir” vs “I think”). Words were classified on the action category, but 
also taking into account the use of different effectors (not only hand) for actions verbs.. 
The authors used single-pulse TMS (supra-threshold) over the hand area of M1, in 
order to elicit and record MEPs from the right FDI muscle. The timing of stimulus delivery 
was varied in three experiments, with delays of 170 ms, 350 ms and 500 ms post-stimulus, 
according to different stages (lexical, semantic, post-conceptual stages) of language 
processing. In addition, two tasks were performed: in the first semantic task participants 
were required to decide whether the presented word was action-related or not (so explicitly 
referring to action); in the second, a syllabic segmentation task, which presumably was 
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independent of deep language processing. Together with MEPs, RTs and accuracy were 
measured.  
Results showed that participants‟ performance was faster and more accurate when 
processing action verbs with respect to non-action verbs in the experiments were a 
semantic decision was required. However, a specific modulation of M1 activity was 
revealed only when stimulation was delivered late, that is 500 ms after stimulus onset. 
Activity in M1 as revealed by MEPs recording increased with action words and decreased 
with non-action words. In addition, a specific effect for hand-words was observed, being 
only M1 hand area stimulated. 
The claim of the authors is that these results, while confirming that language and 
motor system interact, demonstrate that this interaction occurs only when more abstract 
conceptual representations are activated. In this sense low-level motor programs are not 
activated. In addition, they suggest that the decreased activity in M1 observed with a TMS 
delay of 350 ms may be the effect of an inhibition of motor processes that were not 
required by the task, suggesting a strategic use of the motor system. In this sense a 
facilitation effect is claimed to explain the results at 500 ms, and an inhibition at 350 ms. 
The general conclusion of the authors is that these data can be accounted by a motor 
imagery explanation, in which it is not M1 which activates motor resonance during lexical-
semantic processing, but on the contrary it is the motor activation at post-conceptual levels 
that activates M1.  
A potential confound in these data is given by the pool of verbs used as stimuli. 
First, they were distinguished only in action and non-action verbs, with a sub-category of 
hand-verbs and non-hand verbs. The categorization between action and non-action is 
stressed by the kind of semantic task used: participants in fact were asked to decide 
whether a verb was action-related or not. Furthermore, the sub-category of action verbs is 
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composed as hand-verbs vs. all that is not hand verb. In fact, there we find foot actions 
(“walk”), whole body actions (“dance”), very complex actions in which the hand is also 
involved (“crawl”). As noted for other studies, there is not a clear semantic distinction 
between actions, neither following semantic criteria nor motor related ones, such as 
effector, goal or typical kinematics. Altogether, this potentially limits the interpretation of 
the present data, since the claimed no-effect in M1 could have been due not to an effective 
absence of effect, but to the competition of more effects which did not lead to a visible 
modulation of MEPs. The facilitation of M1 observed at 500 ms post-stimulus would be 
then not the only effect on this area – as stated by authors – by the final effect of a more 
complex process. In other words, the final facilitation effect is the result of previous 
competing effects due to the activation of very different motor programs. We should also 
remark that MEPs were recorded from a single hand muscle (FDI), typically involved in 
proximal movements: again no control was made in order to avoid this confound, since not 
every hand verb involved this muscle and a large part of non-hand actions did not involve 
this muscle. The data discussed in the first part of this chapter from imaging studies about 
the somatotopic organization induce us to be very cautious when experiments do not take 
into account the significant differences into the general “action” category. And 
consequently the different levels of action organization and hence understanding at which 
an action or action verb is processed.  
It is worth noting that verbs were used in the first person. This is interesting as this 
is a quite neglected aspect in discussing the presence of facilitation or interference effects. 
To me, this is on the contrary one of the crucial aspects to disentangle these effects. The 
first person pronouns (hence a “I do”) perspective is not automatically  a first person 
perspective. In fact, reading a sentence were an “I” is involved could be seen as more 
external with respect to sentences using “You”, pronoun which directly calls the 
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participant into action. Hence, this external perspective could induce no or little and thus 
less detectable motor effects. This aspect will be discussed in the experimental chapters.  
Finally, authors of this study assumed that an involvement of the motor system 
during the very first stages of linguistic processing is detectable measuring M1‟s activity 
and reaction times. This assumption is based on the idea that low-level motor programs 
should be activated, but it does not take into account the fact that it is possible that a 
similar effect is present in the premotor cortex. A similar involvement of an area with a 
more abstract coding of action and action goals is shown by a study performed by 
Tettamanti et al. (2005), where no activity in M1 was detected, whilst PMC activity was. 
This could explain the late effect and it is coherent with the semantic task required. A 
possible strategy for subjects is to distinguish between action and non-action verbs using 
the typical goal of an action and hence its effects. This would induce a more abstract 
coding which is not linked to low-level aspects such as the effector, hence the potential 
involvement of premotor cortex. This effect could be present in early stages of action 
processing, being however not fully detectable by this task. When the effect of M1 
emerges, it is a late effect, which – as precisely authors state – could follow word 
understanding. In this sense, the timing of processing would go from the more general 
(goal) to the more specific (effector), which is not coded automatically and per se but 
depending on action effects.  
In conclusion, it is possible that both an interference turning into facilitation effect 
is here detected, but also that a different timing of involvement of different motor areas is 
active.  
2.1.4 Interference effects during a passive task 
In contrast with these studies which generally found facilitation effects, a TMS 
study by Buccino et al. (2005) showed an interference effect.  
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Single-pulse TMS was delivered in distinct experimental sessions either on the 
hand and foot/leg motor area in the left hemisphere. These areas were stimulated (with an 
intensity of 120 % of the motor threshold) while participants listened to sentences 
describing hand or foot actions. As controls, an equivalent number of abstract sentences 
was used. Action sentences described actions performed with the hand or the foot on an 
appropriate object, in the third-person form but omitting the personal pronoun (e.g., 
“cuciva la gonna”, “he sewed the skirt”). All abstract content sentences expressed an 
abstract action on an appropriate object (e.g., “amava la patria”, “he loved his land”). All 
verbs were formed by three syllables and were conjugated in the third person of the past 
tense. The use of past tense allowed to build up the verb by adding the suffix “va” to the 
verbal stem. The same stimuli were acoustically presented in blocks of 45 sentences (hand 
OR foot OR abstract) repeated in two experimental sessions, the two sessions differing for 
stimulation site.  
TMS stimuli were given at the end of the second syllable of the verb, hence before 
the participants had access to the predicate of the verb.  
MEPs were recorded from hand (right opponens pollicis OP, first dorsal interosseus 
FDI) and foot (tibialis anterior and gastrocnemius) muscles. This timing of stimulation was 
chosen to correspond to 500-700 ms after sentence onset, thus allowing participants to 
fully process and understand the verb, even without the specification of the object. In this 
sense hearing “cuci-“ before TMS stimulation would be sufficient to understand the verb 
(hence activating some motor aspects, such for instance the effector), whereas the second 
part “-va la gonna” would specify the action.  
Participants were instructed just to listen carefully to sentences: no  explicit motor 
or lexical response was required.  
Results showed an effector-specific modulation of MEPs recorded from hand and 
foot muscles. That is, MEPs recorded from hand muscles were modulated by listening to 
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hand-action sentences, while MEPs recorded from foot-muscles were modulated by 
listening to foot-action sentences. The modulation is interpreted as an interference effect, 
since MEPs amplitude was reduced. Authors‟ claim is that a specific modulation of 
different sectors of the motor cortex is involved in processing hand- or foot-related 
sentences, probably depending on a specific modulation of the mirror neuron system. For 
hand muscles, no significant interaction between sentences and muscle is reported, while 
for foot muscle only the tibialis anterior was significantly affected by sentence type. 
These interference-like data appear in contrast with the results of previous TMS 
studies performed similarly stimulating M1. A partial explanation for the difference with 
other TMS studies relies on the pool of stimuli used, since a clear distinction between 
hand-related and foot-related verbs is made. In addition, verbs were not presented in the 
infinitive form, but in the form of third-person past tense, which likely activated more 
specific aspects of action (such as the agent, the time of action). The presence of the object 
does not seem to be the major difference, since it was presented at the end of the sentence, 
while TMS stimulation and MEPs recording occurred before object presentation. In this 
sense, if effector-related motor programs were active, these programs could be (i) multiple 
and partially incomplete (i.e. all the possible configurations of the hand to sew present in 
the motor repertoire) or (ii) rely on the typical movements used to sew. The two 
possibilities are probably equally possible, since as said the effect occurred early in 
sentence processing. However, both for hand- and foot-verbs, some actions are more 
typically coded with a specific sequence of movements (even in absence of the object) like 
the already cited “sew”, while other actions open a wider range of possible movements 
(like “cut”). This is not superfluous, since activating different motor programs likely 
activates different muscles normally used to execute them.  
Another critical element is the use of the third person and of the past tense. The use 
of past tense is perfectly justified by the paradigm, but it is possible that this induced a 
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different modulation as if the present tense was used. More crucially, the use of the third 
person likely induced a framework different from the one activated if another person or the 
infinitive form were used. Specifically, the interference effect could rely on the activation 
of an external perspective, were the modulation of the motor cortex is different from the 
one obtained by inducing a first-person perspective. This external perspective is reinforced 
by the use of the past tense, and supported by the absence of an explicit task. 
On the contrary, Buccino and colleagues explain this interference effect comparing 
it with the results obtained with action observation, where an increase of MEPs amplitude 
is obtained. Buccino‟s claim is that action observation is inherently richer than listening to 
simple sentences, considered as agent and context neutral. In this sense action observation 
directly activated only one specific motor program correspondent to the observed action, 
whereas language would activate a global understanding of the action, linked to a sub-
threshold activation of multiple motor schemata. These motor schemata likely inhibited 
each other, then producing the interference effect. This explanation is certainly plausible, 
however it does not clarify why this interference effect emerges. Yet, it does not clarify the 
degree of effector-specificity of the modulation: is it just the superficial activation of the 
effector or the activation of some other aspects like for instance the typical use of that 
effector, the kinematics and so on? The blocked designed used, where each type of verb 
was presented alone, supports the idea that the effector-specificity depends on the explicit 
strategy of subjects to use the effector to distinguish among different kinds of verbs.  
The presentation in blocks together with the use of the third person likely induced a 
general frame for each block: on the one side, the “hand” or “foot” or “abstract” frame, on 
the other side the activation of an observational point of view. If this is true, the two 
contributed to generate the interference effect. If subjects activated, for example, the 
effector hand this would pre-activate the correspondent M1 sector before the verb and 
TMS stimulation. Then, verb understanding would rely on this pre-activation, so that it is 
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unlikely that a more specific processing of the effector was not present. Probably, some 
aspects of typical effector use were also activated, and this specificity lead to the recorded 
interference effects. In this sense the spread of activated motor programs was probably 
larger for hand actions (seen the internal difference among the verbs used) and more 
limited for foot actions. This is supported by the fact that hand-actions did not show a 
muscle-specific modulation, while a modulation for only one muscle was present for foot-
actions (specifically the muscle involved in actual performance of the foot-actions). Foot 
actions were – as discussed – more specific and the same verbs were repeated more often.   
The interference effect then would arise when M1 effector-specific activation is 
modulated by the activation of possible motor programs of the presented actions. In other 
terms, if motor resonance occurred, this depended on specific aspects of actions (effector 
use, typical movements, goals) which were not controlled in this study. Hence, no specific 
prediction on which of these aspects were active is possible. The coding of some of these 
aspects – for instance action goals – do not involve directly M1: it is arguable then that the 
findings of this study probably depend not only on the activation of low-level motor 
programs, but by the activation of action goals which engage the premotor cortex (and 
probably parietal areas). This would support that the early modulation of the motor system 
is not due to an imagery process, but it is effectively part of language understanding, since 
goals are a substantial part of action meaning. Indeed, the modulation is induced by a deep 
processing of semantics aspects of action sentences. 
Since no actual movement was required, it is not possible to have information on 
which phase of motor planning or execution would be affected if motor responses were 
required. In fact, the presence of motor responses likely induces a limitation in potential 
motor programs activated during sentence processing. Some of the questions emerged in 
this discussion are partially clarified by a behavioral experiment performed by the same 
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authors. I will discuss of behavioral and kinematics results in the next section of this 
chapter.  
Summing up, the TMS studies we reviewed seem hardly comparable, but suggest 
that a specific timing of facilitation – interference effects is crucial. In addition, type of 
stimuli and task seem to deeply influence the emergence of the two effects.  
It seems possible that interference effect arises earlier, then evolving in a 
facilitation effect once the sentence is completely processed. This would explain the 
differences in timing obtained in these TMS experiments. It is worth noting, however, that 
it is possible that the two effects, interference and facilitation, are equally present in 
different phases of sentence processing. Whereas the first interference is produced by a 
deep semantic processing, the facilitation effect is induced once the sentence is completely 
disambiguated and just a specific motor program is active. This would explain well-known 
compatibility effects such as the Action-sentence compatibility effect. In this sense the way 
stimuli and experiments are designed is crucial: for instance, an ambiguous use of 
infinitive verbs can be disambiguated by the context of response or by the motor response. 
In this sense it is more likely that a motor resonance depending on one specific motor 
program arises in these cases, so inducing facilitation. On the contrary, when motor 
processes are more ambiguous they cannot be all processed in deep terms, so that 
necessarily motor resonance must rely (i) on a typical motor program depending on general 
goals, or (ii) on an incomplete resonance effector-dependent, with no other specificity. It is 
unlikely that (ii) would affect a deep understanding of sentence meaning, being less useful 





2.2 Modulation of the motor system during overt motor behavior: reaction times and 
kinematics 
Similarly to TMS studies, an increasing amount of behavioral studies has focused 
on interference and facilitation effects during language processing. Iwill review in this 
chapter some examples, which are useful to discuss this issue at a behavioral level. 
Together with purely behavioral experiments I review kinematics experiments, which are 
particularly useful: first, they are comparable with the studies I will present in chapter 3 
and 4; second, they give us additional information on the timing of the modulation of the 
motor system, following specific phases of movement planning and execution. 
2.2.1 .The ACE effect  
A well-known facilitation effect is surely the so-called ACE, Action-sentence 
Compatibility Effect. This effect was originally reported by Glenberg and Kaschack 
(2002), then replicated and extended by several studies assuming the embodied cognition 
point of view. Even not fully physiologically explained this is an interesting example of 
facilitation effects directly measured by movement execution. 
In the original study by Glenberg and Kaschack participants were required to 
perform a sensibility judgment about sentences implying a specific movement direction. 
The implied movement direction was equally divided: half of the sentences implied a 
movement of the arm toward the body, half a movement of the arm away from the body. 
Participants responded by moving the arm away or toward the body to press two buttons, 
in a body-centered system of response.  
Sentences were both abstract (“Liz told you the story”) and concrete (“Andy gave 
you the pizza”) descriptive sentences. In addition, the imperative form was presented. To 
cover all the possible syntactic constructions of English, the descriptive sentences 
presented both the double-object construction (“Andy gave you the pizza”) and the dative 
construction “Andy gave the pizza to you”). The use of the personal pronoun YOU, which 
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could be either agent or recipient of the action, directly called the participant into action 
(this aspect will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5). The dependent variable was the 
time it took to participants to read the sentence and release a central button (starting 
position) to reach the button to make the sensibility judgment. This measure is then a sum 
of reading time plus sensibility judgment, but not only. This time includes also movement 
planning while reading sentences. The three aspects are surely interacting, so that planning 
a movement away or towards likely affects the task more than a simple button-press with 
no other movement execution. From a strictly motor point of view, then, the focus is on 
movement planning and on its very early effects on movement execution (button release).  
The results showed a compatibility effect both for concrete and abstract sentences, 
and for the imperative form as well. That is, participants were faster in responding to 
sentences whose implied motion was compatible with actual movement direction. 
Responding to a sentence like “You gave Andy the book” was then faster when responding 
moving away from the body (like in the act of “giving”) than responding in the opposite 
direction. The same was true for sentences where YOU was receiving and the movement 
was towards the body.  
The facilitation arises then from the congruency between movement embedded in a 
sentence and movement direction, mediated by the typical motor schema we use: giving 
something implies moving away from the body, while receiving implies a movement 
towards our body. Interestingly, this is true also for abstract sentences like “Liz told you 
the story”, which the authors claim to be grounded in bodily experience as the concrete 
sentences are.  
Reading these data from the point of view of motor control gives us some hints to 
compare them with other experiments.  
First, given the body-centered set-up of the experiment, it is likely that when 
reading sentences participants automatically pre-activated the hand. Second, reading 
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sentences implying movement directions modulated hand activation by means of activating 
typical motor programs of moving away or toward the body. It is plausible that this 
activation of the two motor programs was induced by the specific setting in which the 
experiment took place: in other words, reading “Andy gave you the pizza” can be seen as 
the motor program of Andy moving away from his body,  or as Andy moving towards your 
body. Since the response system was strictly body-centered the second motor program was 
reinforced, being a movement towards your body. The facilitation effect is coherent with 
this hypothesis, supported also by the fact that in a control experiment using a different 
response configuration (the index being already in position on the button away or toward) 
the authors found a very little evidence of ACE.  
The facilitation effect probably relies on the activation of hand-related motor 
programs away or toward the body, but as stated also by the authors not at the level of 
detailed motor planning. The effect was produced by the sentence as a whole and occurred 
later with respect to the effects we saw in the TMS studies. However, since judgment time 
is a “late” measure, being itself an effect of different processes, a discussion of the ACE in 
terms of timing and in comparison with other techniques is hard to make. It is worth 
noting, however, that into the debate on ACE a significant contribution has been made by 
Borregine & Kaschack (2006), who verified the presence of the effect with auditory 
stimuli, using a go-no go paradigm and different delays with respect to sentence onset (50, 
500 or 1000 ms). They showed, using a reduced version of the original sentences, that the 
ACE is a very short-living effect: 50 ms are sufficient for the facilitation to disappear. 
Indeed, the effect tends to modify itself till reversing, even not significantly, with 
augmented delays of go-signal after sentence onset. A difference of this study is that the 
measured dependent variable was a sum of reading time and movement time, that is the 
time it took participants to read the sentence, decide if responding or not and then move to 
the button away or toward on a keyboard. The conclusion of the authors is that the ACE is 
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present only when the response movement occurs during sentence processing, so that the 
magnitude of the effect is maximal and significant at 50 ms delay (150 ms the difference 
mismatch RT – match RT), decreasing and modifying, but not significantly, over time.  
It is possible that the paradigm elaborated by Borregine and Kaschack captured the 
last part of the ACE effect on movement execution, but failing in investigating how and 
when the effect changes. In fact, it is not clear when the effect disappears and how fast the 
magnitude decreases.  
A further criticism to the ACE as an effective measure of motor resonance, and in 
general of motor effects of language processing, has been made recently by Fischer & 
Zwaan (2008). Since the original effect was found both on concrete and abstract sentences, 
Fischer & Zwaan hypothesized that two factors were active in inducing the final 
compatibility effect:  
-  an action-specific motor resonance, evoked by individual words or word 
combinations  
- a more general motor resonance evoked by the linguistic construction.  
According to these authors, the ACE on concrete sentences would be the result of 
an interaction of the two factors. In particular, the responsible for the second form of 
resonance could be the dative construction used in some sentences, that implied a motor 
schema away-toward associated with a particular linguistic construction. This is coherent 
with what we discussed about the ACE as a facilitation effect. In addition, they suggest 
that the second form of resonance is responsible for the effect on abstract sentences. This 
will be taken into account in the chapter 5 of this thesis, were a revision and extension of 
the ACE is made using French sentences.  
In sum, the ACE is an interesting example of compatibility/facilitation effects, but 
with some major criticisms that we need to take into account. Overall, also these data 
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confirm that motor resonance is a very complex phenomenon with large contextual 
dependencies.  
2.2.2 The ACE revised: the Linguistic Focus Hypothesis 
Recently, Zwaan and colleagues (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006  Taylor & Zwaan, 2008; 
Zwaan, Taylor & De Boer, 2010) aimed at extending and at the same time specifying the 
ACE with a different paradigm, with the general aim to demonstrate the plausibility of a 
proposal of Linguistic Focus Hypothesis (LFH). A brief discussion of this works will be 
helpful to complete the discussion on the ACE, as preliminary to chapter 5.  
According to the LFH motor resonance may arise in correspondence with any part 
of a sentence (not only a verb, but also pronouns, adverbs etc) which disambiguate the 
meaning of an action. That is, the linguistic focus must be on action in order to produce 
motor resonance.  
This has been verified using a reading-by-rotating paradigm: participants read 
sentences by turning a knob, being each sentence divided in segments. This allowed to 
verify which segment induced motor effects on the rotation movement.  
Taylor and Zwaan (2008) verified whether motor resonance was influenced by the 
adverbs used in sentences, being a specification of how the action was performed. 
Examples of stimuli are “He sat/next to/a lamp/which he/turned on/quickly” and “Behind 
the/TV, he/grabbed the/cable/which he/unscrewed/quickly”. The first involved a clockwise 
movement, the second a counterclockwise movement. Manipulating the rotating direction 
match and mismatch conditions were produced – similarly to the original ACE. The 
prediction was that as long as the action is within linguistic focus, then motor resonance 
occurs. However, as soon as the focus shifts the simulation shifts along with it. In this 
sense LFH makes very precise predictions in where to localize facilitated motor processes 
during language comprehension.  
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Indeed this prediction was confirmed by the results of this study. In fact, recording 
reading times, they showed a match advantage which is present not only in reading the 
segment containing the verb but also when the focus shifts to the adverb. A control 
experiment using agent-modifying adverbs (e.g. happily, nervously) demonstrated that the 
facilitation effect is no longer present when the linguistic focus is no longer on action but 
on the agent. This excluded the possible confound given by a spread of the effect from the 
verb segment to others. However, these data confirm the facilitation effect with a very 
specific paradigm, thus supporting the idea that the ACE does really depend on spatial 
constraints which radically influence its development. Valuably, these data show that the 
facilitation effect is tied to the elements of a sentence which specify the action but that the 
effect is not restricted to the verb.  
2.2.3 Interference effects during semantic tasks 
A contribution to the facilitation-interference issue has been given by another series 
of similar experiments performed by Buccino et al. (2005), Sato et al. (2008), Scorolli & 
Borghi (2007). I will review these studies together since they all focus on effector-
dependent effects.  
Buccino and colleagues performed a behavioral experiment with the same pool of 
sentences used in the TMS experiment described above. In this second experiment 
participants were required to respond either with the hand or foot to concrete verbs, and to 
refrain from moving in case of abstract verbs. As go signal a circle on a computer screen 
changed color from red to green in correspondence with the second syllable of the verb, 
replicating the timing of TMS stimulation. A group of participants responded pressing a 
key with the hand, while another responded pressing a key with the foot. Results on RTs 
showed an interference effect compatible with the MEPs recorded in the first experiment: 
RTs were slower when the hand responded to hand verbs, and similarly RTs were slower 
when the foot responded to foot-verbs. The data thus confirm the effects found in the first 
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experiment, adding a behavioral measure. However, the design was slightly different so it 
is not fully comparable. First, the verbs were presented randomly (exp 2) and not in blocks 
(exp 1), but participants responded with only one effector, either the hand or the foot. 
Second, the effector-related properties of the stimuli were highly stressed, given the 
random presentation of all the types of verbs: the use of the body and specifically of one 
effector is part of what distinguishes concrete and abstract verbs. Third, the timing of the 
go-signal is slightly different from the one used in TMS, so that RTs measures and MEPs 
probably focus on two consequent phases but not on the same phase.  
This considered, it is worth noting that the interference results are confirmed by a 
behavioral measure. This can be explained again as due to the activation of competing 
verb-related motor programs, which in turn interfered with the actual motor program used 
to respond. However, the very simple movement used and the absence of any other 
recording than RT does not clarify at which stage of motor planning/execution the 
interference effect arises, so that the previous criticism we made are still unsolved.  
In a follow-up study by the same group (Sato et al., 2008), the task-dependency of 
the interference effect was investigated. In three experiments a go-no go paradigm was 
used. Participants were required to respond with their right hand to action verbs, related to 
the hand (“to applaud”), the foot (“to walk”) or to abstract content (“to love”). Verbs were 
presented in the infinitive form. Stimuli were presented acoustically or visually, to 
different groups. The experimental manipulation regarded both the task and the delivery of 
the go-signal.  
In experiment 1, they used a semantic task with an early delivery of the go-signal. 
Participants responded pressing a knob with the hand to concrete verbs, and refrained from 
moving with abstract verbs. The distinction concrete-abstract was considered as a deep 
semantic processing of the verb. The foot was not used in this case as effector. A group of 
participants responded to stimuli presented acoustically: the go-signal (a red-to-green 
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circle) was delivered in correspondence with the isolation point (i.e. the disambiguation 
point) of the verb, that is during verb processing. The second group responded to stimuli 
presented in written form. In this case the go-signal (color change) was delivered 150 ms 
after verb onset, which is considered a sufficient time to fully understand the verb.  
In experiment 2, a delayed go-signal was delivered. For the auditory modality, the 
go-signal appeared either at the isolation point (early delivery) or 1000 ms after the 
isolation point (delayed delivery). In the visual modality, the go-signal appeared either 150 
ms (early delivery) or 1150 ms (delayed delivery) after the onset of the verb. The task was 
the same as in experiment 1.  
In experiment 3 the task focused on lexical decision: participants were required to 
give a response when the stimulus was a word and to refrain from moving when the 
stimulus was a nonsense word. Participants gave again their response moving the index 
finger to press a knob. The stimuli were presented only in the visual modality, with the go-
signal delivered 150 ms after verb onset.  
Results on RTs showed that different effects were obtained manipulating the task 
and the delivery of the go-signal.  
In experiment 1, slower responses were found for hand-related verbs as compared 
to foot-related verbs. The effect was present in the two modalities, with the difference that 
responses in the visual presentation were slower than in the auditory one. On average, this 
difference between modalities was of 120 ms (significantly). Indeed, this did not affect the 
magnitude of the effect which was similar in the two modalities.  
In experiment 2, the early go-signal confirmed the difference between verb types 
and modalities, while the delayed go-signal made these differences disappear.  
In experiment 3, though an early go-signal was used, no effect of verb type was 
found with a lexical decision task.  
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The claim of the authors is that the difference between different tasks confirms that 
the task used in behavioral experiments is crucial to induce interference or facilitation 
effects (or no effects at all).  
When a rather deep semantic processing is required, then the interference effect is 
found. Using a lexical-decision task did not affect the motor response. However, the effect 
remains untested on foot responses and on more complex motor tasks, thus leaving 
unsolved the question on which stage of motor planning is affected. Similarly, the lexical-
decision task was not tested for a delayed delivery of the go-signal: would the timing be 
coherent with a “late” ACE effect? 
What remains a possible confound is the use of verbs in the infinitive form, were 
little information is given, so leaving ambiguous the action. In this context, where 
participants had to make a fast semantic decision (at the IP or 150 after onset) and effector-
related verbs were randomly presented, it is implausible that the verb activated a great 
variety of related motor programs. It is more plausible that the most typical motor program 
is activated, thus interfering with the actual motor program used to respond with the hand.  
This is coherent with the recorded values of RTs. Other measures like kinematics could 
allow to disentangle the nature of this effect: this is the focus of chapter 3.  
A further extension of the results obtained by Buccino et al. (2005) was performed 
in a study by Scorolli & Borghi (2007). The authors presented a combination of nouns and 
verbs referring to hand, mouth and foot actions. Nouns and verbs were presented with pairs 
of nouns and verbs, referring either to hand and mouth actions (e.g. to unwrap vs to suck 
the sweet) or to hand and foot actions (e.g. to throw vs kick the ball). Participants were also 
presented with an equal number of non-sensible pairs and they were required to decide 
whether the combination made sense or not. Half of them responded by saying “yes” into a 
microphone, whereas the other half responded by pressing a pedal. They were asked to 
refrain from responding in case of nonsense combinations. Results showed that a 
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facilitation effect was present on RTs in response to mouth and foot-related sentences as 
compared to hand-related sentences in case of congruency between the effectors – mouth 
and foot – involved in the motor response and in the sentence. The task is more similar to 
the one used by Glenberg and Kaschack (2002) than to the one by Buccino et al. (2005) 
and by Sato et al. (2005). In this sense it is a deep semantic decision task, probably deeper 
than the one used as concrete-abstract decision. But it is a late semantic task. In fact, the 
verb was presented for 200 ms, then it was substituted by the noun and then participants 
were asked to respond whether the combination made sense or not. In this sense, the 
recording RTs relied both on verb processing and nouns processing alone, and then in 
processing their combination. This could have slowed down RTs then delaying the motor 
effect, making the facilitation effect plausible but ambiguous about the undergoing motor 
processes. Then, it is possible that with a different paradigm with earlier response would 
have induced interference effects similar to the ones presented by the group of Buccino. 
The results are however in line with a linguistic focus approach: the nouns is effectively 
the part of pairs which disambiguates the meaning. In this sense, it is possible that a first 
effect is due to verb comprehension which remains for the nouns and then appears in the 
motor response. However, seen the short life of similar effects recorded with other 
techniques, it is plausible that the effect observed by Scorolli & Borghi is due to the final 
effects of a previous motor activation which changes differently according to the phases of 
linguistic processing and motor planning. Yet, given the difference between the two motor 
tasks used, the verbal production of YES and pressing a pedal, the two are unlikely to be 
similarly affected. Asymmetric results obtained for hand and foot actions, where foot 
sentences are faster not only with the pedal but also with the microphone, are probably 
result of this confound. But the two responses are asymmetric also given the fact that hand 
and mouth are strictly interconnected (see for a review, Gentilucci, Dalla Volta, & 
Gianelli, 2008), and their representation in the motor cortex are proximal and partially 
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overlapped. On the contrary, foot actions and foot responses are mainly independent by 
other effectors. Since this aspect was not taken into account the available data do not allow 
us to go further on this considerations.  
2.2.4 Modulation of the motor system at different stages of verb processing 
A kinematic study by Boulenger et al.(2006) investigated the fine-grained 
kinematics of reaching movements executed during or immediately before language 
processing, giving information useful to clarify the direction and the evolution  of motor 
resonance as detectable in overt motor behaviors. Two experiments constituted the study. 
In the first experiment participants were requested to perform a reaching movement and a 
letter string was presented right after movement onset. In the second experiment 
participants performed the reaching movement after letter string presentation, since the 
presentation was used as go-signal. That is, in the first experiment participants performed 
the reaching movement during language processing, so that an effect on motor planning is 
not possible. In the second experiment language processing occurred at the same time of 
motor planning.  
Stimuli consisted of 42 verbs (all in the infinitive form) describing actions 
performed hand/arm, leg and mouth/face, and 42 nouns, describing concrete entities (e.g. 
stars) that cannot be manipulated. The pool was completed by an equivalent number of 
pseudo-verbs and pseudo-nouns. Subjects were required to perform a lexical decision task, 
which is not supposed to induce a deep understanding of verbs and nouns. The procedure 
was as follows: participants seated with the hand in pinch position, then required (after a 
visual go-signal) to leave the position in order to reach and grasp a cylindrical object in 
front of them. Leaving the starting position triggered stimulus presentation. Participants 
were then required to decide if the presented string was a word or a pseudo-word: in case 
of a word they had to carry on the movement, otherwise they had to stop the movement 
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and come back to the starting position. The kinematics of this reaching-grasping movement 
was recorded.  
In the second experiment the same stimuli were presented, but the go-signal 
corresponded to the letter string. In case of a word, participants had to reach and grasp the 
object, in case of a pseudo-word they simply had to lift the hand on the starting position.  
The results showed that action verbs significantly affected overt motor behavior as 
compared to nouns. In the first experiment, when the lexical and motor tasks were 
executed in parallel, processing action verbs interfered with the concurrent reaching 
movement. This was evident in early kinematic parameters, namely the peak of wrist 
acceleration, which occurred later and was smaller. This is a signal of initial muscular 
contractions, but no other parameter was significantly modulated. This is interpreted by the 
authors as an early interference effect detectable about 200 ms after movement onset.  
In experiment 2, the same words facilitated movement execution when processed 
before movement onset. This effect became evident 550-580 ms after word onset, and the 
effect was again detectable in wrist peak acceleration and namely in the latency of this 
peak. The effect was more pronounced for hand/arm verbs, which corresponded to the 
effector used in the motor task. However, this effect was not significant, and the 
experiment was not explicitly designed to make this effect emerge.  
Since no other kinematic parameter, but wrist peak acceleration, was significant it 
is hard to state that in experiment 1 movement planning was interfered by the lexical task. 
For instance, no effect on wrist peak velocity was detected, while peak velocity is a crucial 
parameter for movement planning, which would give much more information about how 
motor planning and/or execution is interfered. Seen the data from Buccino and colleagues 
(who used similarly verbs in the infinitive form) it is unlikely that a simple lexical decision 
task involved a deep semantic processing of the presented verbs. Thus, it is unlikely that 
the interference effect arose from a deep involvement of the motor system. However, the 
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involvement is undoubted and confirms to be very praecox. At the same time, it is 
plausible that this involvement was not enough to affect deeply movement planning and 
execution, as showed by the absence of clear effector-specific effects. It is possible that 
this relies also in the presentation of the infinitive form of verbs, which is ambiguous and 
as stated before relies probably on a very schematic and general definition of action. That 
is, a general motor program related to the verb was activated, but incompletely leading to a 
short-living interference effect which just transiently competed for resources with 
movement planning. It is worth noting that participants were always required to start the 
reaching movement, in other words the hand was always pre-activated and ready to 
perform the reaching movement. Then, it is implausible that this repeated movement can 
be deeply interfered by a verb presented at movement onset – this partially explains the 
absence of modulation of peak velocity in experiment 1. The modulation of the 
acceleration peak is then probably linked to a form of on-line interference on movement 
execution, which does not involve movement planning. Probably processing verbs led to 
an unspecific motor activation which transiently interfered movement execution.  
In experiment 2, participants, similarly, always responded with the hand. However, 
in one case the reaching movement was started and completed, in the other this movement 
never started, depending on the presence of a word or a pseudo-word. But similarly an 
effect on wrist peak acceleration was detected. Since presumably verb processing occurred 
before movement planning, then it is plausible that this effect on acceleration is effectively 
the product of an effect on movement planning and not on on-line execution. That is, the 
hand was similarly pre-activated but in a very unspecific manner which did not plan before 
word onset the reaching or the lifting movement. Then, once the word is processed, the 
motor activation supports movement planning and execution. However, the delay at which 
the effect emerges, and then disappear after the acceleration peak, does not fully support 
the idea that movement planning is deeply affected. Again, it is possible that – despite the 
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lexical task – a form of semantic processing of the verb is automatically activated, but this 
did not involve specific aspects (effector, goal etc) of action which are more likely to 
emerge with more complex tasks.  
Nevertheless, these data are interesting in supporting the idea that even in lexical 
tasks the motor system is involved – as denied by other authors like Buccino and his group. 
Similar results using the same paradigm were obtained by Nazir et al. (2008), while 
Boulenger et al. (2008) extended these results using a combined EEG and kinematics 
paradigm, showing that even displaying subliminally action words interferes with motor 
planning. 
But summing up, the effective involvement of the motor system, and the degree of 
involvement, depending on stimuli, linguistic and motor task, remains unsolved. The same 
can be said for what concerns the debated issue of interference/facilitation effects. Some 
answers to these and other questions (and new questions) are discussed in the experimental 












 was designed in order to disentangle the time course of the motor 
effects produced by linguistic stimuli, namely action verbs with different goals. In 
addition, the aim was to investigate whether overt actions with different degrees of 
complexity are differently affected by linguistic stimuli depending on the aspect they share 
or not with the linguistic actions (e.g. effector, goals, kinematics). The results of previous 
neurophysiological and behavioral studies suggested that processingof verbs related to 
different bodily effectors relies on corresponding somatotopic activations in motor cortex. 
The present behavioral study aimed at further investigating this issue by determining 
whether and, in affirmative case, at which stage of motor planning and execution effector-
related action verbs influence different actions executed with either the same or a different 
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3.1. Introduction  
As shown, a large amount of neurophysiological and behavioral results suggest that 
language processing activates motor areas, depending on the semantic content of the 
word/sentence presented. 
In particular, neuroimaging studies have shown that action-related linguistic 
material such as sentences describing actions or visual presentation of single action-words 
activate the motor cortex in a somatotopic manner (Hauk, Johnsrude, &  Pulvermüller, 
2004; Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel,  2001; Tettamanti et al. 2005). ERP (Shtyrov, 
Hauk, & Pulvermüller,2004) and MEG (Pulvermüller and Shtyrov 2006) studies confirmed 
that action-words related to different effectors activate specific loci in the brain and this 
activation occurs early after stimulus presentation. Similarly, in a TMS study Buccino et al. 
(2005) found interference effects of the listening/reading of effector-related action verbs on 
MEPs recorded from muscles of the corresponding effector. Altogether, these results are in 
agreement with the assumptions of the Semantic Somatotopy Model proposed by 
Pulvermüller (see Pulvermüller,2005; for a review, Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2008). 
The model predicts that processing verbs implying actions with the use of a specific 
effector activate the corresponding cortical areas which control those actions when actually 
performed. The model assumes that the relation between verbs and motor areas is properly 
semantic and it is clearly involved in language comprehension. 
In this line, behavioral studies (Buccino et al., 2005; Sato, Mengarelli, Riggio, 
Gallese, & Buccino, 2008) showed that a semantic decision on effector-related action verbs 
interferes with RTs of simple motor responses (i.e. pressing a key) executed with the same 
effector. The authors interpreted these results as due to the fact that the listener/reader 
automatically activated the motor program(s) related to the verb in order to understand its 
meaning. These motor program(s) interfered with the pressing-the-key movement executed 
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with the same effector, slowing down RTs. However, the authors did not report whether 
the interference affected the time to pressing-the-key beginning or also the actual execution 
of the movement. In other words, it is unclear which phase of the movement, planning or 
execution,  the action verb interfered with.  In addition, Buccino and colleagues used a 
rather unspecific motor task, focusing on the effector used to perform it, without taking 
into account that actions (i.e. reaching-grasping) could be differently modulated with 
respect to simple movements (i.e. pressing a key).  
In a kinematic study, Boulenger at al. (2006) found that processing action verbs 
interfered with a concurrent reaching movement when the word was presented after 
movement onset. By contrast, the same words facilitated reaching movements when 
processed just before movement onset. The action verbs induced variation in the 
acceleration peak of the actual reach occurring about 200 ms after movement onset; this 
suggests that an incomplete activation of the verb-related motor program, probably 
involved in language comprehension, affected the initial execution of the actual action. The 
activation was incomplete likely because it was inhibited by the planning of the actual 
action.  In fact, a covert activation of the entire motor program related to the verb, i.e. a 
complete activation, would have affected successive kinematic landmarks like peak 
velocity. Peak velocity (i.e. the last kinematic landmark of the ballistic phase) is the main 
parameter resulted from the planning of the action. It is greatly affect by the external 
factors under which the movement is executed; for example, peak velocity of arm 
transitive  actions is greatly influenced by extrinsic and intrinsic target-object properties 
(Gentilucci, Toni, Chieffi, & Pavesi, 1994; Jeannerod, 1988). Consequently it can be more 
susceptible to effects of covert activation of verb-related programs. In  addition, the 
movement phase successive to peak velocity (the deceleration phase) is mainly executed 
under visual control and the kinematic parameters poorly reflect the results of movement 
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planning. Consequently, the deceleration phase can be poorly affected by the verb-related 
action planning. 
An aborted (i.e. incomplete) activation of a motor program in response to action 
verb presentation unlikely reaches the threshold for a deep comprehension of the verb 
meaning.  For example, unspecific motor activation of the hand after presentation of hand-
related verbs affects the beginning of the action, but this is not sufficient to conclude that 
the meaning of the word has been completely  and deeply understood. In contrast, a 
complete activation of a motor program likely reaches the threshold for comprehension of 
the verb meaning because it contributes to understand the goal of the action. Indeed, the 
goal of the action can be completely understood only when the consequences and the 
effects of the action are recognized; this necessarily requires movement parameterization, 
i.e. how to reach the final state of that action (see below).  We assume that movement 
parameterization is the activation of those kinematic rules, which govern that action, rather 
than the modulation of kinematic parameters as a function of contingent conditions. For 
example, the kinematic rules governing the reach action establish how the arm kinematics 
is modulated as a function of extrinsic and intrinsic object properties (Gentilucci et al., 
1994). The fact that the meaning of a word can affect the kinematic rules of an action 
executed simultaneously to word presentation is supported by experimental evidence. 
Gentilucci and colleagues showed that the automatic reading of verbs (Gentilucci, 2003) 
and adjectives (Gentilucci and Gangitano 1998; Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, & 
Gangitano, 2000) modified the kinematics of another action congruently with word 
meaning. 
The presents study aims at determining whether the semantic decision on effector-
related action verbs influences, and at which stage of motor control, actions executed with 
the same or different effector. Action verbs were selected depending on the effector used to 
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typically perform those actions. All actions involved the hand or the food: the hand actions 
involved the use of one acting hand, while normally foot actions involved the two feet and 
generally the entire body moving.  Participants were required to toexecute actions with 
their right hand or foot in response to presentation of action-related verbs since the 
interaction between actions (i.e. verb-related actions and actual actions) rather than 
between actions and simple movements (i.e. verb-related actions and pressing-a-key) 
allowed to determine better the degree of motor activation in language processing. The 
basis assumption of this work is that the complete activation of action programs related to 
a verb is a necessary (even if not sufficient) condition to effectively understand the full 
meaning of that verb. Complete activation of action program(s) in response to verb 
presentation (i.e. programs in  in which movement is parameterized) should affect the main 
kinematic parameter of another action, i.e. peak velocity. In contrast, incomplete motor 
activation should affect only the initial phase of the action, for example peak acceleration 
as observed by Boulenger et al. (2006). Indeed, incomplete activation could be easily 
blocked by the control of the actual action. This was verified in experiments 1 and 2 in 
which we used, as previously Sato et al. (2008) did, a go – no go paradigm requiring 
participants to execute intransitive (i.e. internally driven, experiment 1) and transitive (i.e. 
acted upon an object, experiment 2) actions in response to verb presentation. We required 
the execution of transitive as well as intransitive actions because, usually, the actions 
related to verbs can be guided by objects as well as they could be internally driven. Then, 
in experiment 3 we used a paradigm of effector-choice in order to verify whether the 
semantic decision on effector-related verbs also influenced the initial activation of the 




Fig 1 Experimental procedures followed in the three experiments 
3.2 Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 aimed at determining whether the semantic decision on effector-
related action verbs interfered with an internally driven (intransitive, i.e. whose final state 
is internally established) action executed with the same effector. All actions involved by 
the verbs showed a typical goal (i.e. writing), whereas the overt action performed did not 
show an external goal and did not involve acting with the environment or an object. 
3.2.1 Methods 
Participants 
Sixteen (7 females and 9 males, aged 20-27 years) right-handed (according to the 
Edinburgh Inventory; Oldfield, 1971) volunteers participated in experiment 1. All of them 
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were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The Ethics Committee of the Medical Faculty 
of the University of Parma approved the study.  
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
The participants sat in front of a table on which their hand was placed in pinch 
position. The stimuli were thirty Italian verbs in the infinitive form: ten verbs expressed 
hand-related actions (e.g. “to sign”), ten expressed foot-related actions (e.g. “to walk”), and 
ten expressed an abstract content (e.g. “to think”). They were the same used in the study by 
Sato et al. (2008) and were matched for syllable number, word length and lexical 
frequency (see Appendix for details). All the verbs were acoustically presented through a 
pair of headphones (BEHRINGER hps 3000). Each verb was recorded from an Italian 
native male speaker and digitized in an individual sound file at a sampling rate of 32-kHz 
with 16-bit quantization recording by means of the software SASLAB (Avisoft). For each 
sound file, the isolation point (Marslen-Wilson, 1990) was detected on the stimulus 
spectrogram using the Praat software (Institute of Phonetic Sciences - University of 
Amsterdam). This procedure allowed us to determine the precise time when the verb could 
be correctly identified. The three verb categories were matched for duration (average 
values: 1.40, 1.41 and 1.39 s for hand-related, foot-related and abstract verbs, respectively) 
and for interval between the beginning of the acoustic presentation and the isolation point 
of the verb (average values were 0.68, 0.68 and 0.64 s for hand-related, foot-related and 
abstract verbs, respectively). The participants were instructed to listen carefully to the 
verbs and either to execute an internally driven action (see below), as fast and accurately as 
possible when the verb expressed a concrete action, or to refrain from responding when the 
verb expressed an abstract content (go – no go paradigm). Each trial started with a red 
circle (diameter of 6 cm) presented at the center of a 17 inches PC monitor distant 80 cm 
from the participant. After a variable delay of 800-1200 ms (in order to avoid a response 
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habituation), a verb was acoustically presented. When the color of the circle changed from 
red to green in coincidence with the isolation point of the word the participants were 
required to open their right thumb and index finger by an arbitrary amount; however, they 
were required to maintain this amount constant through all the experimental session. The 
thirty verbs were quasi-randomly presented in a single experimental session. 
Data recording and analysis 
Movements of the participant‟s right hand were recorded using the 3D-
optoelectronic SMART system (BTS Bioengineering, Milano, Italy). This system consists 
of six video cameras detecting infrared reflecting markers (spheres of 5-mm diameter) at a 
sampling rate of 120 Hz. Spatial resolution of the system is 0.3 mm. Recorded data were 
filtered using a linear smoothing low pass filter, i.e. a triangular filter where each value 
was the weighted mean computed over 5 samples (window duration 33.3 ms). 
We used two markers attached on the tip of the index finger and the thumb. We 
analyzed the time course of the distance between the two markers placed on the two 
fingertips in order to study the finger opening. We measured the following parameters: 
time to response beginning (TRB, i.e. the time from the isolation point to the beginning of 
finger opening), peak velocity of finger opening, time to peak velocity of finger opening, 
maximal finger aperture and time to maximal finger aperture. We chose to analyze peak 
velocity of finger opening since we aimed at verifying whether the main and temporally 
central parameter of this act was affected by the parameterization of the action related to 
the verb. 
The first frame when the variation in distance between the two fingertips was 
greater than 0.3 mm (spatial resolution of the system) in two consecutive frames was 
considered the beginning of finger opening, whereas the first frame when the variation in 
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distance between the two fingertips was less than 0.3 mm in five consecutive frames was 
considered the end of the finger opening. 
Data Analysis  
For each dependent variable of each parameter, we calculated the skewness (SK) 
and its confidence interval (95%, CI) in order to test whether the distribution was normal. 
Then, ANOVA was carried out on the mean values. The within-subjects variable was 
effector-related verb (hand vs foot). Since multiple comparisons were performed, we 
applied the Bonferroni adjustment to the P-values for significance testing. Consequently, 
the significance level was fixed at P=0.01. For each significant variable and interaction we 
calculated also the effect size (η2). Only the parameters that reached significance are 
discussed in detail, the other measures are reported in Appendix. 
3.2.2. Results  
TRB was not affected by the effector-related verbs (mean value: 411.0 ms), 
whereas peak velocity of finger opening was (the distributions of the dependent variables 
were normal, F(1,15)=9.0, P<.01, η2 = 0.4). The movement was slower in response to 
hand-related verbs than foot-related verbs (Fig.1). The mean values of time to peak 
velocity of finger opening and time to maximal finger aperture were 80.7 and 260.3 ms, 
respectively; that is peak velocity of finger opening approximately occurred at 31.0% of 




Fig.2 Effects o f the processing of hand -re la ted and foo t -re la ted verbs on peak ve loci ty 
of f inger  opening in Experiment 1  and peak velocity o f  arm during reaching -grasping in 




3.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 aimed at determining whether in the same semantic task used in 
experiment 1 effector-related action verbs interfered with an externally driven (transitive, 
i.e. acted upon an object) action executed with the same effector. In this case the overt 
action is given of a goal, in which a specific chain of motor acts is activated: reaching to 
grasp and object, take and replace it. The sequence is quite complex, so that it is supposed 
to involve a more complex motor planning, which could be less or differently modulated 
by linguistic stimuli. 
3.3.1 Methods 
Participants 
Fifteen (9 females and 6 males, aged 20-25 years) right-handed (according to the 
Edinburgh Inventory; Oldfield, 1971) volunteers participated in the experiment. 
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure were the same as in experiment 1. When the color 
of the circle presented on the PC monitor, changed from red to green in coincidence with 
the isolation point of the word the participants were required to execute two actions in 
sequence that consisted in reaching-grasping and removing with their right thumb and 
index finger, a transparent (Plexiglas) cylinder (diameter of 6 cm and height of 2 cm) 
attached on the PC monitor in correspondence of the red/green circle by means of a light 
magnet. The height of the cylinder center from the table (on which the participant‟s hand 
was placed in pinch position) was 26 cm, whereas the 3D distance of the cylinder center 
from the fingertips was 36 cm. The cylinder center and the participant‟s fingertips were 
 80 
 
aligned along the participant‟s midsagittal plane. The thirty verbs were quasi-randomly 
presented during the experimental session. 
Data recording and analysis  
Movement recording was the same as that in experiment 1. We used three markers 
attached to the tip of the index finger, the thumb, and to the wrist of the participant‟s right 
hand in order to study the kinematics of the reaching-grasping action. We analyzed the 
time course of the distance between the two markers placed on the two fingertips to study 
the grasp. The grasp time course starts with the hand in pinch position, and is constituted 
by a finger opening phase till a maximum (maximal finger aperture) followed by a phase 
of finger closing on the object (Jeannerod, 1988). The measured grasp parameters were the 
following: TRB of grasp, grasp time, maximal finger aperture, and time to maximal finger 
aperture. The kinematics of the marker placed on the wrist was used to study the reach. 
The measured reach parameters were the following: TRB of reach, reach time, reach peak 
velocity and time to reach peak velocity. We chose to analyze maximal finger aperture and 
reach peak velocity since we aimed at verifying whether the main and temporally central 
parameters of the grasp and reach were affected by the parameterization of the action 
related to the verb. The methods to calculate beginning and end of reaching-grasping is 
described elsewhere (Barbieri et al. 2007). 
Data analysis 
Data analysis performed on the reach and grasp kinematic parameters was the same 
as in experiment 1. We applied the Bonferroni adjustment to the P-values and, 
consequently, the significance level was fixed at P = 0.006. Only the parameters that 




3.3.2. Results  
TRBs of reach and grasp (i.e. the times from the isolation point to the beginning of 
the reach and the grasp: 389.0 and 432.0 ms, respectively) were not affected by the 
effector-related verbs, whereas reach peak velocity was (the distributions of the dependent 
variables were normal), F(1, 14)=11.3, P=.005, η2=0.5. As in experiment 1, the hand 
movement was interfered by the hand-related verbs (Fig.1). The mean values of time to 
reach peak velocity and reach time were 249.2 and 648.8 ms, respectively; that is reach 
peak velocity approximately occurred at 38.4% of the total time of reach. No other 
parameter reached significance. The finding that the grasp was not affected by the effector-
related verbs can be explained by considering that the grasp requires greater attentional 
resources in the control of the finger opening/closing as compared to the control of the arm 
during approaching the target. Consequently, the attentional request could make the finger 
control refractory to interference of the actions activated by the effector-related verbs. 
3.4 Experiment 3  
In Experiments 1 and 2, the peak velocities of finger opening and reach, which 
occurred at 31–38% of the movement execution, were influenced by the semantic decision 
on abstract and concrete verbs. They were interfered by hand-related action verbs. The fact 
that the main parameter of the action, i.e. peak velocity, was affected suggests that the 
activation of the motor program elicited by action verbs was complete. The activated 
program interfered with the parameterization of the velocity of the actual action. However, 
the beginning of the action, i.e. TRB, was not affected by the activation of the verb-related 
motor program. We reasoned that the parameterization of a movement follows a first phase 
of effector activation, which occurs before action beginning. The finding that the effects of 
a possible reciprocal influence between effector activations (hand vs. hand and hand vs. 
foot) was not observed at movement onset can be explained by the fact that only the hand 
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was actually moved in both the experiments. Consequently, the hand could be already 
activated at trial onset and could be less sensitive to the influence of the activation of the 
effector related to the action verb. To solve this problem, we designed Experiment 3 in 
which we used an experimental paradigm that required the choice of the effector used for 
the response. In such a way, either the hand or the foot could be actually moved in the 
same experimental session. Thus, an activation of both hand and foot at trial onset, i.e. 
before verb presentation, was unlikely, and this could allow reciprocal influence between 
activation of the actually moving effector and that related to the action verb. 
3.4.1 Methods 
Participants 
Fifteen (8 females and 7 males, aged 22-28 years) right-handed (according to the 
Edinburgh Inventory; Oldfield, 1971) volunteers participated in the experiment. 
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
Apparatus was the same as in experiments 1 and 2. The participants placed their 
right hand in prone position on the table and their right foot on a low basement. We 
presented the concrete verbs only, but the presentation was the same as in experiments 1 
and 2. The participants were required to respond to the verbs by lifting the tip of either 
their right index finger or their right foot by an arbitrary amount, but constant through the 
experimental session, like in experiment 1. Specifically, the index finger was extended 
while the hand palm rested on the table or the foot was extended while the heel rested on 
the basement. In one block of the same experimental session the participants were required 
to respond to the hand-related verbs with their hand and to respond to the foot-related 
verbs with their foot (compatible condition), whereas in the other block the effector use 
was reversed, i.e. they responded to the hand-related verbs with their foot and responded to 
the foot-related verbs with their hand (incompatible condition, effector-choice paradigm). 
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This paradigm of effector-choice substituted the go-no go task of the first two experiments. 
This allowed a direct comparison of foot and hand verbs, but without the constraint of 
having always one effector (namely the hand) pre-activated has being the only one used in 
the motor response. Using both the foot and hand we forced participants to process action 
verbs focusing on the effector and at the same time we increased the possibilityprobability 
to have a modulation of the effector used for the motor response. The two blocks were 
counterbalanced across participants. In each block 10 concrete verbs (5 hand-related verbs 
and 5 foot-related verbs) were quasi-randomly presented. In each block the verbs were 
different and were counterbalanced across compatible and incompatible blocks presented 
to the participants.  
Data recording and analysis 
Movement recording was the same as in experiments 1 and 2. We used four 
markers: two markers were attached to the tip of the index finger and on the tip of the foot 
of the participants. The other two markers were placed on the table plane and on the 
basement. They were aligned with the markers attached on the effector tips and were used 
as reference points. We analyzed the time course of the distance between the marker 
placed on the tip of the effector (either index finger or foot) and the corresponding 
reference marker. The measured kinematic parameters were the following: TRB of the 
effector (either the index finger or the foot), peak velocity of effector lifting, time to peak 
velocity of effector lifting, maximal effector height, and time to maximal effector height. 







ANOVAs were performed on the mean values of the measured kinematic 
parameters. The within-subjects variables were the following: effector (hand vs foot) and 
effector-related verb (hand-related verb vs foot-related verb). In all analyses, paired 
comparisons were performed using the Newman-Keuls procedure. We applied the 
Bonferroni adjustment to the P-values as in experiments 1 and 2: the significance level was 
fixed at P=0.005. The other analyses were the same as in experiments 1 and 2. Only the 
parameters that reached significance are discussed in detail, the other measures are 
reported in Appendix. 
3.4.2 Results  
TRB (i.e. the time from the isolation point to the beginning of the effector lifting) 
was affected by the interaction between effector and effector-related verb (the distributions 
of the dependent variables were normal, F(1,14)=24.9, P<.001, η2=0.6, Fig.2). A 
facilitation effect of the effector-related verbs on the choice of the effector was observed in 
the compatible condition. Specifically, the post-hoc analysis showed that the hand-related 
verbs induced a decrease in TRB of the hand responses and conversely foot-related verbs 
induced a decrease in TRB of the foot responses (Fig.2). In contrast, in accordance with the 
results of experiments 1 and 2, the kinematics of the hand and the foot lifting were 
interfered by the hand-related and foot-related verbs, respectively. Peak velocity of effector 
lifting (the distributions of the dependent variables were normal, F(1,14)=27.1, P<.001, 
η2=0.7) and maximal effector height (the distributions of the dependent variables were 
normal, F(1, 14)=23.9, P<.001, η2=0.6) were affected by the interaction between effector 
and effector-related verb. Post-hoc analyses showed that the two parameters were 
interfered when the foot moved in response to foot-related verbs, and conversely, when the 
hand moved in response to hand-related verbs (compatible conditions; Fig.2). Maximal 
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height was also affected by effector (F(1,14)=142.8, P<.00001; η2=0.9). It was greater 
when lifting the foot than the index finger (Fig.2). 
Fig. 3 
Effect of hand-related and foot-related verbs respectively on the kinematics in Experiment 3. TRB time to 




 3.5 Discussion  
The results of the present study show that, in a semantic task, manual intransitive 
and transitive actions executed in response to acoustical presentation of hand-related verbs 
slowed down in comparison with presentation of foot-related verbs. According to Buccino 
and colleagues (Buccino et al., 2005, Sato et al.,  2008) these data can be interpreted as 
activations of manual motor programs in response to hand-related verb presentation, which 
interfered with manual responses. Since peak velocity was affected, the hypothesis about a 
complete activation of motor programs related to verbs can be supported (see 
“Introduction”). The verb-related motor program was completed, and it interfered with the 
parameterization of the actual action velocity.  
Effects of the verb-activated motor program on the reach final phase (deceleration 
phase) were not found probably because the execution of this phase is mainly under visual 
control of the spatial relationships between hand and target (Jeannerod, 1988) and 
consequently less susceptible to influence due to the planning of another movement, i.e. 
the verb-related motor program. The results of the present study differ from those of the 
study by Boulenger et al. (2006) in that an interference effect was found only initially in 
the latter, whereas in the central part (30-40%) of the execution in the present one. This can 
be explained by the fact that a semantic task was required in the present study, whereas a 
lexical task was required in the study by Boulenger et al. It is likely that the semantic task 
required a complete activation of the verb-related action in order to understand completely 
the verb meaning, whereas the lexical task did not require any access to the specific 
meaning and content of the verb: it required just to understand whether the letter string was 
a word or a pseudo-word. This could induce an incomplete activation of the verb-related 
action, which was easily blocked by the actual action before the activation reached the 
threshold for complete comprehension of the word meaning. This incomplete activation 
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may also explain why the authors failed to find a significant difference between the effects 
of verbs related to hand actions and verbs related to non-hand actions. In other words, the 
incomplete hand activation induced weak interference, which was not significantly 
different from possible weak effects induced by the activation of other effectors. In 
agreement with the data by Boulenger et al., the results of the present study show that the 
verb-related motor program facilitated the initial activation of the actual action. The 
facilitation effect observed on TRB can depend on the fact that initially the 
parameterization of the actual action is in fieri and consequently the verb-related motor 
program contributes to the activation of those muscles, which are involved in both the 
verb-related and the actual action programs. Only once completed, the program of the 
actual action competes with the verb-related motor program. This initial facilitation seems 
to be at odds with the data by Scorolli and Borghi (2007) who found, on the contrary, 
facilitation at the end of presentation of sentences related to actions. However, this 
facilitation might be due to rebound consequent to the fact that the participants were 
required to start moving after presentation of the noun predicate of the action verb, i.e. 
when possible interference effects were suppressed (see chapter 2 for an extensive 
discussion of this issue).   Why should the complete covert activation of motor programs 
related to verbs be necessary to understand their full meaning? We proposed that in order 
to understand the exact meaning of an action verb, the goal of the action related to the verb 
should be understood. In turn, in order to understand the goal, the consequences of the 
action should be represented; this necessarily requires movement parameterization. For an 
example, in order to understand the verb “to grasp” the goal of the action should be 
understood, i.e. “to take possession” of an object, but to this purpose also the consequences 
of the action should be represented: an object held in the hand and how to reach this final 
state. In other words, the type of interaction of the hand with the object should be activated 
(the affordance, Barbieri, Buonocore, Bernardis, Dalla Volta, & Gentilucci, 2007) and this 
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implies the activation of the kinematic parameterization of the verb-related action. 
However, the actions related to verb meaning can be multiple: for an example “to write” 
can activate programs of writing either using a pen or a PC keyboard. However, writing 
with a pen or a keyboard share the same goal, which informs all the meaning of the action. 
What is different it is the single sequence of movement we use to accomplish it. We 
propose that the most habitual action is activated. However the activation of multiple 
programs cannot be excluded a priori, although it is unlikely. In fact, if different programs 
are tentatively activated the activation should be incomplete because the simultaneous 
parameterization of different movements executed with the same effector is impossible. 
Our data rule out the possibility of incomplete activations. Consequently, only one 
program, probably the most typical and habitual one, was activated.    
In our case, the congruence between effector-related verb and effector actually used 
was reinforced by the fact that hand-action verbs were selected as mainly describing 
unimanual actions. However, stimuli were not specifically balanced for this aspect, so we 
can just make some general considerations on this point.  
A possibility is that different use of the effector during the overt motor response 
(i.e. involvement of the other hand during bimanual tasks) would have likely affected 
movement parameterization and execution in a different way.  For instance, presenting 
unimanual and bimanual action verbs would have induceinduced different motor 
activations and hence differently affect the execution of bimanual and/or unimanual 
reaching tasks, depending on the different use of the effector. In this case, more fine-
grained kinematics aspects of action would have been activated. However, we 
hypothesized that what induces motor effects is the overall goal, with a complete activation 
of motor programs related to the action-related linguistic stimuli. In this sense, bimanual or 
unimanual actions may share their overall goal, but not the fine-grained aspects of the 
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motor act which compose them. In this sense, it is reasonable that what effectively 
modulates the motor planning and execution is the final goal (i.e. the distal aspects of 
action representation in the terms of Hommel et al., 2001) rather than the more proximal 
aspects.  
In this sense, presenting bimanual action verbs and asking for unimanual motor 
responses, or the reverse, could be an interesting study to investigate the different effect of 
goals and effector parameterization on overt motor responses.  
Take for instance the case of “grasping” with the overall goal of “taking possession 
of an object”. Grasping may be possible with one hand and with two hands as well. In this 
sense, the two actions would have a broad congruence in terms of goal, while differing for 
the kinematic aspects of action. This is particularly true in cases, like ours, in which the 
verbs are presented in infinitive form and without any cue on the object – grasping would 
be then interpreted depending on the required motor response.  
If it is the goal which affects the motor behavior, then we should expect that 
presenting only bimanual or only unimanual verbs in contrast with foot verbs, and 
requesting a congruent motor response (i.e. reaching-grasping with one or two hands), 
likely would induce a modulation of the actual action depending on the overall goal and on 
a typical motor parameter associated with it. On the contrary, presenting bimanual and 
unimanual verbs together and requesting to respond with a congruent or incongruent 
response, probably would activate more fine-grained distinctions in which the goal itself is 
modulated depending on the typical kinematics through which it is accomplished. 
Experiments following this line would help to disentangle the contribution of proximal and 
distal aspects of action in producing effects of action-language on motor behavior. As in 
our study, the effect wouldwill be stronger in the reaching phase, which is also known to 
be differentiated depending on the subsequent motor acts: reaching to grasp with one hand 
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is not the same motor act as reaching to grasp with two hands. This aspect will be more 
deeply discussed in the next chapter. 
The results of our study are also relevant for the actual debate about the role of 
processes of motor resonance during language comprehension.  
In summary, two hypotheses are debated: the first assumes that language 
understanding completely relies on symbolic, amodal mental representations (e.g., Fodor 
1975). Following this approach, the meaning of language derives from an arbitrary 
correspondence between abstract symbols and their corresponding extensions in the world. 
According to this view (the „disembodied‟ hypothesis, see Mahon and Caramazza, 2008) 
motor activations accompanying language understanding are completely irrelevant for 
semantic analysis. They are consequent to processes similar to those leading the 
“Pavlovian dog to salivate when it hears the bell” (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008) and are 
automatically elicited in conditions similar to those produced in S-states, as defined by 
Jeannerod (2001). The second hypothesis („embodied‟ hypothesis) assumes that language 
understanding does rely on processes of embodiment (Lakoff, 1987; Glenberg, 1997; 
Barsalou, 1999; Pulvermüller, 2002; Zwaan, 2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Zwaan and 
Taylor, 2006). Based on this view, language understanding implies the involvement of the 
same neural systems used to perceive or to act. This is in agreement with the assumptions 
of the Semantic Somatotopy Model proposed by Pulvermüller (see Pulvermüller 2005; for 
a review, Hauk et al. 2008). Together with these two radical approaches, the debate has 
been recently enriched by new intermediate positions. On one side, Mahon and Caramazza 
(2008) assume that motor representations can access and contribute to the full 
representation of a concept (the grounding by interaction hypothesis). On the other side, 
Fischer and Zwaan (2008) gave the provisional conclusion that the current research 
demonstrates that “motor resonance results in a deeper, higher resolution, comprehension” 
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of a concept, so that motor resonance at least enhances comprehension of language. 
However, Mahon and Caramazza (2008) postulate higher level for amodal conceptual 
representations as compared to motor representations, whereas Fischer and Zwaan (2008) 
postulate that the motor representations are complementary to concept and language 
understanding. 
In the present study, we found that the activation of the action program related to 
the verb was complete: this suggests that the goal and the consequences of the action were 
understood. This is in favor of the hypothesis that the activation was involved in fully 
understanding the meaning of the verb. In addition, the effects of the action program(s) 
related to the verb were visible at the beginning of the execution of the action, i.e. 450 ms 
after verb presentation. This time is compatible with the activation of motor programs 
nearly simultaneously to verb presentation and their successive interaction before 
completion. This early activation supports the idea that the observed effect is not a by-
product of motor imagery occurred in the post-understanding stages of linguistic 
processing. A late imagery would probably affect also the last part of the reaching phase 
and the grasping component (in experiment 2) as well. This was not the case. On the 
contrary, early reaching parameters were affected: this supports the idea that the activation 
of language-induced motor processes preceded or was at least accompanied the phase of 
motor planning of the motor response. Furthermore, our stimuli were simple verbs in the 
infinitive form: they are unlikely to induce very fine grained processes of motor imagery, 
since we did not provide an agent, and object, a context to deeper interpret the verb. That is 
why we hypothesized that the typical goal and motor program associated with a verb in our 
motor repertoire is activated. Moreover, the motor program is activated from the 
perspective of an agent, since no other element was provided to discriminate this aspect. 
This makes our stimuli very different from an image or a video, which provide an external 
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observation of an action, condition that probably induces a different activation of motor 
processes, in being more locally constrained. The same can be said for the lack of a direct 
object: the presence of an object would have likely induced the activation of more specific 
kinematics depending on the characteristics of the object. In this case probably other 
phases of movement could have been affected.  
Similarly, an automatic spreading activation similar to a Pavlovian process without 
any specific utilization of the motor representation, as proposed by the „disembodied‟ 
hypothesis (see Mahon and Caramazza, 2008), should be liable to extinction. This was not 
observed. Consequently, we suggest that the motor activation is involved in language 
understanding. This is in agreement with neurological data showing that pathological 
changes in frontal areas due to motor neuron disease produced deficits more pronounced in 
comprehension and production of verbs than nouns (Bak, O'Donovan, Xuereb, Boniface, & 
Hodges, 2001). Our data indicate that the motor activation is used to understand the goal of 
the action related to the verb, by means of representations of the consequences of the 
action. This is in favor of the hypothesis that the relation between verbs and motor areas is 
properly semantic and it is involved in language comprehension. 
3.6  Conclusions and general discussion  
In this first study I showed that the activation of motor processes during language 
comprehension is at least double-folded and relies on different aspects of action 
organization. 
 First, it can be involved in a more superficial understanding of the verb, related for 
instance to the effector typically used to perform that action. This relationship between 
motor areas controlling the effector (i.e. hand or foot) emerges at a semantic, but rather 
unspecific level. That is, the effector involves the semantics of an action, but does not 
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disentangle other aspect of actions such as for instance how we commonly perform them 
using a given effector. At this level, writing or cooking are similar in involving the hand as 
effector, but they largely differ for the use of that hand.  
However, we know well that they are inherently different, so that writing involves 
specific muscles and cooking others. In this sense, we can identify a deeper semantic level, 
where , different kinds of hand-actions differ for what concerns their goal, and 
consequently for the way we perform those actions and coordinate movements in order to 
accomplish that goal and produce some effects on the world. At this level we can also 
consider the social modulation of goals, thus considering how social interactions can be 
described by (action) language, for instance depending on action sequences implying the 
presence of others as we are going to discuss in chapter 4. This deeper understanding is 
often crucial from the point of view of social interaction: as stated before, “observing” an 
action linguistically implies processing different aspects of an action, depending on the 
context, on our goals, on our needs to perform (actually or linguistically) other actions to 
respond.  In this sense, the motor activation contributes to this full understanding, thus 
leading to comprehend the goal of the action, and the final effects of it depending on the 
way it is performed. In addition, this process is definitely fast and occurs at the very first 
stages of language processing. In this sense, it cannot be a by-product of other processes, 
but it is effectively part of them.  This confirms it as a process with a social function and 
relevance, since it occurs depending on the context of interaction, for example the context 
in which a verb is used. This process contributes to define language itself as a form of 
action: our words and sentences produce concrete, motor effects on the people we are 
interacting with. We use some aspects of action to act linguistically, by activating 
effectors, action goals, and, as I will show later, perspectives. In this sense, language is 
 94 
 
crucial in its function to help us to share actions with other people, not at the level of 
abstract cognitive representations, but at the level of the motor experience. 
Our data suggest that, together with the goal of an action, the motor programs to 
perform that action are activated. This is not in contrast with our proposal that what is 
linguistically translated is the goal of the action. In fact, even if the goal is hierarchically 
more general than the kinematics of action, the way (how) we perform an action is crucial 
to pursue the specific goal of a that action. As said before, the actions of writing with a pen 
or with a keyboard share the goal to “write a letter” and the effector we use, but how we 
accomplish that goal is different. In this sense, the kinematics aspects of action are 
fundamental to identify the goal, and this is part both of our bodily experience, being the 
agents of an action and having this action in our motor repertoire, and of our social 
(linguistic) experience. This is certainly true for the simple actions described in the verbs 
from this study, and for all the stimuli this thesis used.  We all share the basic experience 
of grasping or of writing. However, in our everyday life we often perform very complex 
and skilled actions, at different degrees of ability. In this sense, several unsolved 
pointspojnts remain: 
- Does the linguistic description of skilled actions (from the fluent use of technology 
to dancing) activate motor processes similarly to the basic actions of our motor 
repertoire? That is, do they activate fine-grained motor aspects or more general 
aspects (i.e. goals but not the fine-grained kinematics)? Do they activate the former 
only for the people having an expertise of those actions?  
- At the level of motor effects, do these actions affect only experts or also novices? If 
using skilled actions as responses, are they more or less interfered with respect to 
simple actions such as reaching and grasping an object?  
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All these points are still unsolved and constitute a possible future development in 
this field. This first study I report suggests that linguistic stimuli differently affect 
motor planning and execution according to the linguistic task and to the motor task 
used as response. That is, motor aspects of linguistic described actions interact with 
some parameters of different overt actions. I will show in the next experiment how 
other aspects of action organization similarly interact.  
In this way we expect to give account of how we can linguistically manage actions, and 
linguistically “act” as suggested above: we can have a linguistic experience of actions we 
have never performed and similarly we experience actions of which we do not have a 
linguistic description or name. In the case of linguistic experience of actions never 
performed, we can have a certain degree of understanding of different aspects of that 
action, but probably not the fine-grained kinematics of the way to perform it. Think of the 
situation of a friend who is describing her last match as kick-boxer describing and naming 
her single moves, and you never performed it and maybe neither saw a match. She can 
linguistically describe her experience so that you can at least partially understand.  
The contrary is true as well: we can have the bodily experience of an action, hence 
of its kinematics, but we have not the linguistic experience of it – since our language does 
not provide an exact verb to describe it. In some cases other linguistic devices (i.e. 
adverbs) or constructions (paraphrases) allow us to communicate and explain that action. 
Alternatively, we can refer to other languages in which the exact term is used.   
Summing up, in all the situations described above we have experiences, bodily 
experiences, in which our body and brain is continuously involved in interaction with other 
actors, humans or not, and this leads constantly to a redefinition of what is experience and 
what is “action” for us. Language contributes in modeling our experience, and in being 
modeled by experience itself, in a process of translation from the one to the other. For this 
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reason, other aspects than goals can be stressed and become more relevant: this is the case 














4. The perspective of the agent and action chain organization  
This second study has been designed in order to examine the interplay between the 
role of motor perspective (agent) and action organization in motor chains, verifying its 
behavioral effect on an overt action required as response. As stated in the Introduction, we 
aim at determining how language is capable to translate some aspects of action 
organization and to investigate the behavioral effects and possibly the functional role of the 
re-activation of these aspects during language processing. In this sense, we demonstrated in 
the first study that the goal of an action can be linguistically re-activated, modulating a 
motor response. Moreover, the action goal, expressed by language, seems to modulate 
early motor planning and just marginally action execution. We demonstrated also that 
other aspects of actions – such as for example the effector – can be similarly activated 
depending on the context, the task and the kind of motor response. In this sense, we 
postulated that different levels of linguistic action understanding affect an overt action, 
depending on the aspects of an action activated in a specific context. This is true for our 
first experiments, where the effect vary depending on the task, and it is true as well during 
our daily interactions. My assumption is that a linguistic motor activation is not only part 
of the semantic content of a word, but has a complementary role in making language itself 
a form of action. 
This second study 
3
moves from the first and aims aimsat deepening how goals can 
be translated in language. We assume that language encodes goals at different levels: not 
only at the very general level of goals as abstract entities, but at the specific level of goals 
                                                 
3
 This study was performed in collaboration with Anna M. Borghi, Università di Bologna. The paper is 
submitted as Gianelli, C., Borghi, A.M., I grasp, You give. When language translates actions. (submitted to 
Language and Cognition). 
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as concrete entities relying on sequences of motor acts or simple actions. For instance, the 
action of “giving” would not be coded only for its goal, but also for the motor sequence it 
involves (e.g. reaching-grasping an object and then reaching another person to give it, 
moving the hand away from the body). In addition, we investigated the role of motor 
perspective taking: does taking my perspective or the perspective of another person vary 
the motor effects of a verb?  In addition, does assuming a specific perspective interact with 
goal-dependent action organization?  
4.1 Introduction  
The basic assumption of our study, in keeping with the embodied and grounded 
cognition views (Barsalou, 2008; Fisher & Zwaan, 2008; Rueschermeyer, Pfeiffer, & 
Bekkering, 2009), is that the activation of the motor and sensorimotor cortices during 
language processing is not just a side-effect but effectively contributes to language 
comprehension. The majority of previous studies have focused on whether words activate 
their sensorimotor referents, without taking into account the different degree of specificity 
conveyed for instance by an infinitive verb with respect to a complete sentence. Namely, 
none of the previous studies  has sufficiently taken into account how motor activation are s 
modulated depending on the perspective induced by the linguistic stimulus.  The  novelty 
of this study consists in focusing on how action sentences can translate the relationship 
between self and others (humans or not, such as objects) and how these relationships may 
reflected in detectable motor effects. If I hear or read “You gave him a pen”, I do not only 
refer to the action I can perform with my hand. The action of giving implies a relationship 
both with an object and with another agent, and this very fact results in a specific action 
organization which includes an overall goal (the other person should obtain an object) and 
at least two different motor acts, grasping an object and giving it to someone else. This 
study investigates specifically how and to what extent the action organization resulting 
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from the interplay of different goals and different kinds of relationship with objects is 
translated in language, and has a coherent behavioural effect.   
Goal-relatedness of action has recently received much attention, both from a 
theoretical and from  an experimental point of view. As recently stated, goals are defined 
in terms of “value for the system” (Gallese, 2009). In our interpretation, goals cannot be 
reduced just to the final end state of an action, or to the intention of a subject; rather they 
are what stands for the “value” of an action. Broadly considered, the notion of value can 
refer to the social value, to the value for an individual in a given situation, or it can reflect 
the value of a single motor act (sub-goals) with respect to the action in which it is 
embedded. This open definition of goal allows us to treat action organization at a very 
general level, where goals can be dynamically modulated through the structure of actions 
in motor chains. The proposal of motor chains was first advanced in the framework of 
monkey studies. Fogassi et al. (2005) found, for instance, that some neurons fired when 
monkeys performed the act of grasping when bringing an object to the mouth, others fired 
when grasping was embedded with the action of bringing an object to a container. Similar 
effects were recorded for action execution and observation. The notion of motor chains 
was used to explain the effect of these parietal neurons firing differently depending on 
whether a single motor act (e.g. grasping) was embedded in two motor chains 
characterized by two different goals. The idea that actions have a chained organization has 
been then extended to humans, with an imaging study by Iacoboni et al. (2005).  The 
functional relevance of motor chains has been then revealed by study on autistic spectrum 
disorders (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Fabbri-Destro, Cattaneo, Boria, & Rizzolatti, 2009; Boria 
et al., 2009). These results show that a mechanism of motor chains constitutes one of the 
basic structures of the motor system. A chain of motor acts is informed by the final goal of 
action; motor acts are organised in the chain so that each of them depends on the 
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successive and all depend on the last. Goals characterize both single motor acts and actions 
as a whole. 
Of course, action organization cannot be reduced to the motor acts which compose 
it. Specifically, an action implies at least one actor, either human or not. An actor can 
assume dynamically all the possible roles provided by a given situation: he/she can be 
agent, patient, subject or object of the action, depending on the relations which are 
activated by that specific action. Both goals and actors represent important constitutive 
parts of the action as a whole. We hypothesize that language is capable to translate the 
interplay between goals and actors, and that this information is re-activated when 
discourses or simple sentences are processed.  
This study has been designed in order to examine this interplay verifying its 
behavioural effect on an overt action required as response. To this aim we constructed very 
simple sentences composed by a pronoun and a verb, with the intent to disentangle the 
contribution of the two components (agent perspective, action organization).  
Personal pronouns (such as I, You, He) have at least a double role: they allow us to 
understand who is performing an action (the agent) and if there is someone else (e.g., 
object, patient) involved in the action. Telling somebody a story starting with I or with He 
can be very different as it might change perspective, hence to emphasize some aspects of a 
situation while neglecting others. The perspective we adopt while understanding language 
is of crucial importance in the development of social interactions. Curiously, however, 
pronouns have not been extensively investigated in the recent studies focusing on the 
motor grounding of language. Therefore we can rely only on a few linguistic studies 
(MacWhinney 2005) and on some studies on action observation (Jackson, Meltzoff, & 
Decety, 2006; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003; Schütz-Bosbach, Mancini, Aglioti, & 
Haggard, 2006; Gianelli, Dalla Volta, Barbieri, & Gentilucci, 2008; Bruzzo, Borghi, & 
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Ghirlanda, 2008), which differently underline the crucial role of perspective, in particular 
of our own perspective.  
Overall, these studies mainly rely on the visual perspective (egocentric vs. 
allocentric perspective), while our work focuses on perspective as induced by linguistic 
pronouns. This is a crucial point: static pictures or videos, and certainly direct observation 
as well, directly convey a specific perspective, using the body of the “observer” as 
reference. Language contains a double potentiality : first, to use linguistic devices to 
convey perspective (e.g. pronouns), second, to use these devices to re-articulate 
perspective just linguistically. “I” is not strictly a fist person perspective, “You” can be a 
first person as well depending on the way reading/listening are located into a specific 
interaction. The same distinction between external and internal perspectives fails to give a 
complete account of how language can build up perspectives. Furthermore, it fails in 
giving account of how we can embody our motor perspective from different points of 
view. 
Our study aims at opening this field of investigation, starting by studying the 
different motor effects produced by the personal pronouns.  
Namely, we used the three singular personal pronouns, I You and He/She (io, tu, 
egli), in Italian. The complementary issue of goals and motor chains has been addressed 
selecting two categories of verbs, that we called action verbs and interaction verbs (AVs, 
IVs) (e.g., grasp vs. give), which differ according to various dimensions. First, the two 
categories differ for the relations they describe and involve: in one case the direct relation 
subject-object, in the other the at least triadic relation subject-object-other subject. Second, 
they differ for how these relations imply different goals: AVs are actions which may stand 
alone and whose final goal might be the manipulation of the object, whilst IVs directly 
imply the interaction with another person. Third, they differ as to the organization in motor 
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chains: AVs and IVs share the motor act of reaching-grasping an object, while they differ 
for the last act of the sequence, the one which determines all the others, which might imply 
or not the presence of another person. Thus, even if the first motor act is common, it is 
embedded within two different goals. If chained organization is reflected in language, then 
the kinematics parameters of the motor acts should differ according to the kind of verb. 
Two different hypotheses can be advanced.  
The first is that language structure reflects the action structure. If this is the case, 
then while reading simple pronoun-verb pairs we should activate more the first person 
pronoun, corresponding to our own perspective. Therefore, we should either find an 
advantage of the first person perspective (typically associated with “I”) or no modulation 
due to perspective at all, as while reading we would be able to simulate all perspectives in 
the same way. More specifically, the “I” pronoun would be the one which is mostly 
modulated by the difference between action and interaction verbs. 
A second possibility is that when we understand a sentence we reactivate an inter-
subjective situation, such as for example a conversational framework. This could happen 
even if in our study word pairs were presented in a written rather than in an acoustic form. 
If an inter-subjective framework is activated, this would mean not only that language 
builds on the action structure, but that it also modifies and constrains it. If this is the case, 
then we predict a modulation of the 2nd person pronoun (“YOU”), followed by the 1st 
person pronoun (“I”), and no modulation of the third person perspective, given that in a 
conversation the 3rd person perspective is typically the most external. It is true that the 1st 
person is not used to refer to us (in quality of listener), but the 3rd person typically is not 
involved in the conversation at all, whereas the person speaking in 1st person necessarily 
is. Therefore, we predict a modulation of the different action goals (AVs and IVs) referred 
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to the perspective which is directly advocated in a conversation (YOU), a less marked 
modulation with the “I” perspective and no modulation with the He perspective. 
 In our experiment participants were required to grasp an object while reading a 
sentence (see figure 1). This allowed us to investigate the development of the effect of 
sentence processing on the overt action of grasping (which has its own goal, of course), 
through the analysis of its fine-grained kinematics aspects, which are much more 
informative than simple RTs.  Our aim was to disentangle the final effects of the two 
components, pronouns and verbs, and at the same time to understand how their effects are 
combined producing a modulation of various phases of movement kinematics.  
4.2 Methods 
Participants 
Twelve women, aged 18-28, participated in this study. All participants were right-
handed, native Italian speakers and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
were naive as to the purpose of the experiment and gave their informed consent to the 
experiment.  
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a sound-proof room. Participants sat in front of a 
laptop, whose LCD monitor was set on a temporal resolution of 60 Hz. The distance 
between hand and monitor was of 60 cm. Participants started placing their right hand on 
the table in a pinch position. The target of the subsequent reaching-grasping movement 
was a mouse, placed in line with the hand of the participant, at a distance of 33 cm. The 
final position for the mouse movement was set at 50 cm. The hand movement was 
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performed on the right of the laptop, at a distance of 5 cm. This allowed participants to 
easily perform the movement and look at the video.  
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of 10 Italian verbs referring to manual actions (see “Appendix”, 
table 2). We selected five proper “action” verbs, which involved a direct relation subject-
object (e.g., to grasp) and five inter-action verbs, involving at least a relation subject-
object-subject (e.g., to give). Sixteen students evaluated these verbs on two 7 point scales, 
one aimed to rate how much the verbs implied a relation subject-object, the other how 
much the verbs involved another person. An ANOVA performed on the mean ratings 
(considering 2 types of verbs and 2 type of ratings) showed a significant interaction (F 
(1,15) =15, 2, MSe = 21.39,  p=.001) between verb type and rating. As predicted, “action” 
verbs obtained higher values as referred to the object, whilst “interaction” verbs obtained 
higher values in the subject. Two other independent groups of ten students evaluated the 
same verbs on two 7 point scales for concreteness and abstractness. An ANOVA 
performed on the mean ratings (considering 2 types of verbs and 2 scales) showed that in 
general our verbs were evaluated as more concrete (F (1,9) = 22.296, MSe = 14.16, p= 
.001), as we expected since we focused on choosing verbs with a specific action-
relatedness. A significant interaction of verb type and scale was also detected (F(1, 
9)=25.857, MSe = 29.93, p = .001). The evaluation of IVs tends to be constant along the 
two scales, (M = 4.36 vs M = 3.82), whereas AVs tend to be evaluated higher in the 
concrete scale (M= 5.8 vs M = 2.88). However, a post hoc test revealed that AVs and IVs 
do not significantly differ in the abstractness scale, but they differ only in the concreteness 
scale. This was expected, since we selected AVs as specifically related to object interaction 
and manipulation, whereas IVs imply a relation with another subject which can be 
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considered as more abstract. Furthermore, IVs are often related to abstract sentences or 
expressions, which could explain a tendency to associate them with more abstract contexts.  
For each verb we identified the isolation point (IP), intended as the minimum part 
of the verb required to understand it and to differentiate it from other verbs with similar 
root. Verbs were then balanced for syllables, length, isolation point duration, and 
frequency.  
Each verb was presented in written form in three singular persons (I, YOU (2
nd
 
person), He/She) of the Italian past tense. In Italian the pronoun is often omitted, as the 
verb contains information on the person. In our case, using both the pronoun and the past 
tense, we obtained a double reference to the agent. The final set of stimuli comprised 10 
verbs, each presented once in each of the three persons. We inserted also 10 catch-trials, 
i.e. verbs in the same tense as the others but incorrect for the correspondence verb-subject, 
e.g., “io portava”: in this case the explicit subject is a first person pronoun while the verb 
refers to the third person.  With catch-trials participants were required to refrain from 
completing the movement. We obtained then a single block of 40 trials.  
Experimental design 
Each trial started with a fixation cross (1000 ms). Then the pronoun was shown for 
500 ms, followed by IP of the verb (e.g., “prend”) displayed for 500 ms. Subjects were 
required to pay attention to both the pronoun and the verb, and once they recognised the 
verb they had to start moving as fast as possible to reach for and grasp the mouse in front 
of them. During the movement the verb was completed with its suffix (e.g., “evo”) (500 
ms). This time was sufficient to accomplish the movement at about the same time in which 
the complete sentence “io prendevo” (I took) was presented (time limit of 500 ms). 
Participants held the hand on the mouse till they decided whether the sentence was correct 
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or not. If correct, they had to click on the left button and then move the mouse to the final 
position. Otherwise, they had to refrain from moving.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Experimental procedure 
 
Data recording and Kinematic Analysis 
Movements of the participant‟s right hand were recorded using the 3D-
optoelectronic 
SMART system (BTS Bioengineering, Milano, Italy). The SMART system consists 
of three video cameras detecting infrared reflecting markers at a sampling rate of 60 Hz. 
Spatial resolution of the system was768x576 pixel. Recorded data were filtered using a 
moving average filter. We used three markers, one applied on the wrist, and the other two 
on the nail of the index and of the thumb finger respectively.  
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We considered two components of movement, reaching and grasping, and for each 
of them we identified different parameters. We avoided considering the act of  
giving/placing of the mouse due to the high variability of the performed movements.  
For the reaching component we analyzed the behavior of the marker placed on the 
wrist. We considered two types of parameters, one concerning times and the other velocity 
and acceleration. For the first, we measured reach time, time to peak velocity, time to peak 
acceleration, % of time to peak velocity (with respect to the reach time), % of time to peak 
acceleration. Since percentage is normalized with respect to the total reach time, this 
measure can be informative as to the distribution and homogeneity of movement. For the 
second, we analyzed the latency of velocity and acceleration peaks.  
To analyze the grasp component we considered the time course of the distance 
between the two markers posed on the index and on the thumb finger. We considered the 
following parameters: grasp time, peak velocity of finger opening, maximal finger 
aperture, time to maximal finger aperture and percentage of time to maximal finger 
aperture. We divided movement components following (Gianelli et al., 2008) using similar 
rules and conventions to define the various parameters. 
Data analysis 
ANOVAs were conducted on the mean values of participants‟ reaching-grasping 
and mouse-moving parameters, considering as within-subjects variables Verb (AV vs. IV) 
and Pronouns (I, YOU, HE).  For each significant parameter we calculated also the effect 





During the act of reaching we observed a significant interaction Verb-Pronoun in 
the percentage of time to peak velocity, F (2,22) = 6.48; MSe = 12.85; p <.006, η2= 0.4. 
This measure consists of the normalized value of the time to reach wrist peak velocity, 
with respect to the total reaching time. As it can be seen in Figure 2, whereas AVs and IVs 
did not differ when preceded by the pronoun HE (48.5 % vs. 49%) and differed only 
slightly when preceded by I (49% vs. 51.7%), they clearly differed with the pronouns YOU 
(47% vs. 52%). These percentages correspond to a mean reach time of 720 ms and to a 
mean time to peak velocity of 356 ms.  
The data suggest that the effect of modulation occurs early during the actual 
movement and is evident in a range of 300-350 ms after stimuli presentation. Moreover, 
we know that peak velocity is the main parameter which is defined in movement planning 
and it is susceptible to be affected by the various factors (Dalla Volta, Gianelli, Campione, 
& Gentilucci, 2009, Gentilucci, Negrotti, & Gangitano, 1997) under which the movement 
is executed. Consequently, slower times in reaching this peak can be related to a greater 
influence of the stimuli in the very first stages of action planning and execution. The very 
fact that the modulation of the motor system due to the combination of pronouns and verbs 
occurs early suggests that the activation of the motor system is not a by-product but is part 
of the comprehension process.  
The results indicate a specific contribution of YOU in modulating kinematics 
parameters in the reaching component, whereas the I perspective does not modulate them 
in a significant way. The absent or little effect produced by HE confirms it as an “external 
perspective”, which differs from the others also from the point of view of its neural 
substrates. The specific pattern induced for AVs and IVs by YOU is consistent with an 
agent motor perspective, as activated in a conversational framework by the pronoun YOU. 
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In order to disentangle the specific contribution of the I and YOU pronouns we 
performed on the same parameters a 2x2 ANOVA in which the two Verbs (AVs vs IVs) 
and only two Pronouns (I vs. YOU) were considered as within-subjects variables.  
The significant effect of verb type in the acceleration peak confirms that responses to AVs 
require less time than to IVs, F(1,11) = 8.26, MSe= 46022.74, p<.015, η2=0.2. This 
confirms our hypothesis that the two kinds of verbs activate a different chain and encode a 
different goal. Notably, we also found a significant interaction in percentage of time to 
peak velocity: F (1, 11) = 1.33, MSe = 14, p<.007, η2 = 0.5). As revealed by post-hoc 
Newman-Keuls test, responses to IVs required less time than responses to AVs when 
preceded by YOU (p <.04). This interaction suggests that the perspective of the agent is 
entailed by the pronoun YOU, and it confirms the differential modulation of the two 
pronouns on the verbs. More specifically, it suggests that since the very first stages of 
movement execution, AVs imply focusing on the person which performs the action, 
referred to as YOU, whereas IVs imply focusing on the relation between agents. Thus, the 
modulation on the actual action does not rely on verbs or pronouns per se, but it 
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significantly depends on the combination of the two, as we predicted. 
 
Fig. 2 % of Time to peak velocity, effect interaction between perspective and verb type. Bars are SE. 
Grasping Component 
The ANOVA on time to maximal finger aperture, the time between finger opening 
and the maximal aperture before closing on the object to effectively grasp it, did not reach 
significance, (F(2,22) = 2,08, MSe = 3113, p =. 148). Consider that our main predictions 
concerned reaching rather than grasping. Namely, we did not expect grasping to be greatly 
affected by our stimuli, due to the fact that events such as maximal finger aperture occur 
later in time while we expected very early effects. Even if the ANOVA did not reach 
significance, Figure 3 clearly shows that AVs and IVs differ mostly when preceded by the 
pronoun YOU. 
In analogy with what we did while analysing the reaching also for the grasping 
component we performed a further ANOVA in which we eliminated HE and focused on 
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the role played by I and YOU in modulating AVs and IVs. This is allowed because the 
grasping component is less susceptible to be interfered by external components, such as the 
linguistic stimuli, since it is mainly dependent on object properties and it is under visuo-
motor control. The ANOVA on the time to maximal finger aperture revealed an interaction 
Verb-Pronoun, F (1,11) = 8.00, MSe = 777.19,  p<.016, η2= 0.2. As it can be seen in Figure 
3, the effect was mainly due to longer times of YOU (M = 491 ms) with respect to I (M = 
441 ms) with IVs (post-hoc p<.003). No difference was detected between I and YOU with 
AVs.  
This result reveals that the interplay between factors tends to modify in the time 
course of movement execution. Differently from the reaching component, in the grasping 
one the activation of different chains for AVs and IVs acquires relevance. To resume: in 
the analysis on reaching component we found that in percentage of time to peak velocity 
responses to AVs required more time than responses to IVs when preceded by YOU; in 
addition, AVs were faster than IVs. The pattern was exactly reversed in the analysis on the 
grasping component (see Figure 3). This is perfectly coherent with our predictions. 
Namely, the sequence related to AVs effectively ends with grasping, whereas the one 
related to IVs continues as it involves the interaction with another person. In this sense 
grasping is the final motor act for AVs, so that motor planning and execution is mainly 
focused on accomplishing it. On the contrary, grasping in IVs depends on another act (that 
of giving something to somebody else). Thus grasping has value just as an intermediate 
motor act which allows taking possession of the object in order to interact with another 
person. Further, consider that the modulation is present with the pronoun YOU, not with 





Fig. 3 Time to maximal finger aperture, effect interaction between perspective and verb type. Bars are SE. 
 
4.4 Discussion  
The results of the kinematic analysis in our study show the presence of distinct 
motor patterns as influenced both by the perspective elicited by the pronouns and the motor 
chains. Our results clearly indicate that the effect of linguistic stimuli is articulated and that 
it intervenes very early in movement execution. This confirms the kinematic data from our 
first study, and hence the hypothesis of a precocious and fundamental role for the motor 
system in language comprehension. Further, this effect of motor resonance is again showed 
to impact in particular on the motor programming of a response movement, as 
demonstrated by the different patterns of time distribution in the reaching and grasping 
component. As discussed in the previous chapter, the presence of these early effects on 
motor planning are unlikely due to processes of late motor imagery. In this specific case, 
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another point is in favour of the conclusion that motor processes are active before or at 
least together with language understanding. That is, as mentioned above, we hypothesised 
that the mechanisms through which we linguistically experience action and motor 
perspective relies but also partially differ from the ones of action observation. This can 
explain the reason why we found a clear modulation only for the YOU pronoun.  
The data on the reaching component allow us to disentangle the effect of the 
perspectives induced by the pronouns YOU, I and HE: the latter did not  modulate 
movement execution when combined with the two categories of verbs. This suggests that 
the perspective elicited while reading the pronoun HE is more abstract and external, so that 
the motor effects of language processing disappear. Interestingly, this seems to be true for 
the I perspective as well. Namely, the role of agent is taken when the YOU pronoun is 
used. In this condition it appears that the participant is called directly into action. 
The data on reaching and grasping confirm that, even if subjects performed the 
motor response always in the same way on the same objects, the two components are 
differentially modulated by linguistic stimuli. This shows that our sentences affect the 
entire motor planning. The way the motor planning is affected is undoubtedly interesting, 
since both perspective and chain organization are involved.  
In reaching execution, our data show a strong effect of the YOU perspective in 
modulating both action and interaction verbs, and this pattern is strongly present in all our 
subjects. The effect of the I perspective is still present in 9/12 of our subjects, however its 
magnitude seems weaker. The motor pattern activated by YOU both with AVs and IVs fits 
well our hypothesis about the organization of actions in motor chains. In fact, IVs have a 
shorter time to velocity peak, so that conversely the deceleration phase is longer. This is 
coherent (Gentilucci et al., 1997) with evidence on motor planning and control of a 
sequence of motor acts: an increasing accuracy in interaction with the object influences 
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arm velocity profiles by decreasing peak velocity and lengthening the deceleration phase. 
In this sense the current motor act is influenced by the requests of the successive act.  AVs 
do not imply any particular request of accuracy since there is not a second motor act to 
plan: namely, the action ends with the grasping of the object. This is not the case for IVs 
where more accuracy is requested in order to interact with the object: namely, the object 
should be grasped and given to somebody else. One could speculate that participants are 
particularly accurate also due to the fact that IVs do not simply involve a further motor act 
compared to AVs, but that they also involve a social dimension, guaranteed by the virtual 
presence of a recipient. However, our data do not allow us to definitively solve this issue. 
The specificity of YOU is substantially confirmed by the results in the grasping 
component. In fact, also in this case with IVs  the time to maximal finger aperture is longer 
with YOU than with I; probably due to a request of accuracy. This confirms that YOU 
mostly activates the perspective of the agent and a proper motor simulation: when reading 
YOU we are directly called into action, we are expected to be agents and we have to 
strategically understand what we are supposed to do or have done.  
The action is understood as the action having value for the agent, who is directly 
performing the action and hence has control on its organization. This is consistent with the 
previous studies where the strongest compatibility/facilitation effects (Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002) are obtained with sentences using YOU or with the infinitive form of the 
verbs, where the perspective activated is necessarily the one of the agent. One important 
theoretical implication of our work is that it reveals that the perspective induced by the 
pronoun strongly affects the motor system. That is, language affects the motor system 
activating a specific perspective. This could give us some hints to solve the long-standing 
debate on interference/facilitation in literature on language and motor grounding. Namely, 
some studies found evidence of an interference when the same effector used for the motor 
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response was implied by the sentence, others found facilitation (for a discussion see Dalla 
Volta, Gianelli, Campione, & Gentilucci, 2009). So far it has been argued that a possible 
solution to this problem can be found by analysing in detail the time course of language 
processing. Our results suggest that another possible explanation for contradictory results 
can be found taking into account the different pronouns used in sentence, and hence the 
perspective they activated. Namely, the pronoun YOU, which as we have seen leads to the 
adoption of the agent perspective, typically produced a facilitation effect , whereas an 
interference effect is typically found when the first or the third person pronouns are used. 
Overall, our results support our hypothesis that language comprehension activates 
an inter-subjective  framework. This suggests that the perspective elicited while reading 
the pronoun HE is more abstract and external, so that the motor effects of language 
processing disappear. Interestingly, this seems to be true for the I perspective as well. 
Namely, the role of agent is taken when the YOU pronoun is used. In this condition it 
appears that the participants is called directly into action and then they re-activate the 
motor pattern of an action from the point of view of the agent. “I” and “HE” constitute 
external and “observational” perspectives but at different degrees. In an inter-subjective 
framework, as for example in a conversation, the use of the pronoun I normally refers to 
the presence of a speaker who is reporting the action from his/her point of view, whereas 
we (i.e. the readers) are recruited as recipients of his/her speech. In the case of the pronoun 
HE, a radically external perspective is assumed. Consider for instance a situation in which 
we and another person are talking of the actions of a third person: his/her perspective does 
not involve us directly.   
To summarise: our study reveals that the perspective expressed by a sentence 
influences the kinematics parameters of an overt response movement. Importantly, the 
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adoption of a given frame of reference has a very precocious effect as it differently impacts 
even the very early stages of movements planning and execution.  
A further novelty of our results consists in suggesting that the chained organization 
that characterizes the motor system is translated by language. Namely, we found that, when 
the agent perspective was taken (with the YOU pronoun), motor programming was 
accomplished earlier with AVs than with IVs. This might be due to the different length of 
the motor chains related to the two verbs: compared to AVs, IVs imply a further motor act, 
that of giving somebody the object. 
To conclude, our results support the hypothesis that while comprehending language 
we activate an inter-subjective framework. The adoption of this frame of reference has a 
very precocious effect as it differently impacts even the early stages of movements 
planning and execution. The activation of a conversational framework has an interesting 
theoretical implication. Even if our study clearly shows that action organization (e.g., the 
motor chains) is reflected in language, language imposes its own constraints on the way 
actions are conceived, giving relevance to the YOU pronoun in taking the agent's 
perspective, at least in the specific experimental setting here used. It is probable that using 
other settings and adding more cues to define perspective would induce the activation of 
different points of view, mediated not only by pronouns but also by nouns and other 











4.5 Conclusions and general discussion  
The data from this second study confirmed that understanding simple sentences 
involves the motor system, affecting in particular the phase of motor planning and 
consequently the first stages of action execution. In addition, it gave us additional 
information on how goals are translated and coded in language.  
This study differed from the first for the way linguistic stimuli were composed: 
while in the first experiment we presented verbs in the infinitive form, here we presented 
simple sentence were an agent was implied (pronouns) and the verb was declined 
accordingly. In this sense, the first study presented verbs in a form which is probably less 
susceptible to induce fine-grained modifications on action kinematics. Specifically, 
modifications depending on how the action is internally construed and planned with 
respect to internal and external constraints. This is consistent with our proposal that 
different levels of verb meaning can be activated, hence influencing action execution. For 
instance, the infinitive form of verbs does not explicit who is the agent performing the 
action. Probably participants rely on their own perspective on action, so assuming their 
selves as directly the agents. Alternatively, another possible strategy could be for 
participants to assume  the action verbs from an external perspective, being the observers 
of that action. The data from the first study did not allow us to disentangle which kind of 
perspective was used. But presenting a pronoun directly establishes a point of view on 
action: our second study demonstrates that it is the perspective induced by YOU which 
produces effectively behavioural and kinematics effects. This finding has interesting 
implications: namely, in this light previous data from our and other study can be discussed, 
considering that the motor effects we obtain are dependent on the way we build up stimuli 
and present a context of interaction.  
Two major, unsolved, points remain: 
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- As regards to stimuli, all the sentences we used presented one agent and did not 
involve an explicit recipient. That is, no “me” sentences were included, for instance 
for IVs sentences where a YOU would be offering to ME, or a HE offering to ME. 
Of course the use of these sentences induces different interactional frameworks, for 
which it should be verified if the primacy of YOU perspective remains or not. A 
manipulation in this regard could allow studying to what extent language is capable 
to re-build perspective in a way that differs from the one of visual observation. Our 
last study partially covers this unsolved point, by comparing different types of 
transferring sentences. 
- As regards to the motor response, we used as in many other experiment, a strictly 
body-centred system of response. This likely induced the same self-centred setting 
also for the linguistic stimuli. A further development could be to manipulate the 
participant‟s position and/or their motor response in order to disentangle the effects 
of language when different spatial positions are implied – positions were the motor 
system of a potential agent is implied. For example, a simple manipulation could be 
to require participants a reach-to-receive responses: that is reaching the hand of 
another person in order to receive something that is being “offered”, “given” and so 
on.   
These elements could thus affect both the perspective elicited by pronouns and the 
motor effects they determine, supporting  the hypothesis of a differentiation between 
linguistic and “real” action observation and experience of action. This differentiation 
would mainly rely on the way the same processes are implied and used.  
In the study here reported the context and perspective on interaction is mainly given 
by the pronoun, supported by the fact that in Italian also the verb elicits the agent. 
Consequently, the re-activation of chains of motor acts depends on this perspective, since 
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we found a motor pattern coherent for the two types of verbs/actions only in the case of 
YOU. An open question remains whether the manipulation of motor-perspective taking can 
produce differential effects. For instance, which differences in performance would emerge  
if we present linguistically another agent (another pronoun, a name) or we just leave it 
supposed (as in our interaction-verbs sentences)? This is the aspect we will investigate in 










5. When perspective is not (completely) embodied  
 
In the previous study we demonstrated that activating a specific perspective on 
action (i.e. by means of pronouns) contributes to modulate a subsequent motor response. 
Interestingly, our study showed that pronouns articulate in a peculiar manner the structure 
of linguistic perspective, thus differing from action observation. 
Specifically, we suggested that only written sentences using YOU as pronoun 
directly involve the participants as agents, so inducing stronger motor effects. On the 
contrary, using different pronouns produced no or little motor effects, as happened using 
sentences with HE or I in the agent position. However, our data did not completely rule out 
the possibility that motor effects were present in the last two cases (mainly for I), but 
relying on a different, observational, framework  that our task was not capable to detect.  
To verify whether and how it is possible to manipulate motor-perspective taking we 
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5.1 Introduction  
Being the agent of an action is one of our basic experiences and this is intimately 
linked to our experience of having a perspective, a point of view on the world. However, 
quite often we are not allowed to have experiences in a first-person perspective, but only 
through „devices‟ that shift our point of view. Language provides a huge amount of this 
kind of devices, through which we can describe and observe actions stressing some aspects 
or neglecting others. Pronouns are a good example of our ability to shift perspective in a 
way that is very important for our social interactions. The more we are able to grasp 
different aspects of actions and situations, the more we are socially able to interact with 
other people. As stated before, hearing a sentence like “You gave him the book” remind us 
of the very simple action of giving, of movements we perform every day. We know the 
goal of the action, we know the final state (the book is passed from a person to another), 
we perfectly know how to perform that action. In a straight-forward view of motor 
resonance, this action would automatically activate the correspondent action, the effector 
hand, and probably the kinematics used to accomplish that goal. However, we have to take 
into account that processing some “motor” aspects is not enough to bring to detectable 
motor effects. As stated recently by Zwaan and colleagues (Taylor & Zwaan, 2008), other 
parts than the typical verbs, adverbs, can induce motor resonance, in acting to 
disambiguate the meaning of the action and hence of the sentence.  In this sense, a crucial 
role is assumed by the use of specific pronouns, or in other cases of nouns.  
We assume that pronouns are specialized linguistic devices used to activate a 
specific perspective on action. Try to read these two sentences “You gave him a book” and 
“Lisa gave him a book”. The two actions describe the same action of giving, and the 
effects are the same: a book was given by one person to another. But the role of the agent 
is taken by a different person, hence activating a different perspective. In the first case, the 
use of a personal pronoun, You, activates for the reader a more internal perspective, while 
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the use of a personal noun, Lisa, activates the perspective of an external agent. The issue of 
linguistic perspective has not been extensively investigated in the field of embodied 
cognition, whilst some linguistic studies have addressed this question (MacWhinney, 
2005). A recent study by Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, & Taylor (2009) 
investigated the issue of perspective as induced by pronouns, by using a picture 
verification task. Verbal stimuli consisted of descriptive sentences referring to events (e.g. 
“I am slicing the tomato”). Sentences were composed by a pronouns subject (I am, You 
are, He is), a verb (e.g. slicing, ironing, taping) and a direct object (the tomato, the pants, 
the package). Visual stimuli consisted of event images (four for each experimental 
description) depicting the same actions in four conditions: performed and seen from an 
external or internal perspective, not performed from an external or internal perspective. In 
each trial participants read a sentence and then had to verify whether a presented image 
corresponded or not with the previous action. Picture verification reaction times and 
accuracy were recorded. Results showed that description pronouns and picture perspective 
interacted: faster verification times for internal relative to external perspective when the 
descriptive sentence used the pronoun You or the pronoun I. In the case of He this effect is 
not replicated, then an external perspective is taken. In a second experiment sentences were 
preceded by a brief description aimed at contextualizing the sentences. Results in the 
verification task showed that in this case only sentences using You induced an internal 
perspective. Authors explain this effect with the fact that the ambiguity of sentences like “I 
am slicing the tomato” induced participants to use an internal perspective. When the 
ambiguity is clarified by the use of contextual descriptions, then the external perspective is 
adopted. They conclude, then, that only the use of You induces in readers an internal and 
embodied perspective.  
The fact that perspective is still an open issue for embodied approaches to language 
processing is confirmed by a recent statement by Zwaan (2009), who defined perspective 
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as a challenge for embodied theories of language comprehension. Our study moves from 
the same idea that it is not enough to demonstrate that “give” activates early the motor 
program of giving: we have to demonstrate how this effect is modulated by specific 
context, possibly taking into account that sentences are not produced alone, but they are 
part of our social interactions.  
This is not restricted to verbal language: quite often our gestures are body-centered 
with respect to the body of the speaking person. Interestingly, in the case of sign languages 
there is evidence that verbs are generally represented through signs that are gestured in 
reference to the body signer even if he is not the agent of the action. The only exception 
concerns transfer verbs that indeed have agreement with the agent of the transfer and are 
thus not sign in reference to the signer‟s body (see Meir,2002; Meir, Padden, Aronoff, & 
Sandler, 2007, who used Israeli Sign Language as an example). Interestingly, studies on 
anosognosia (Marcel et al., 2004, for a review see also Fotopoulou 2010) showed that 
presenting questions in the 1
st
 or in the 3
rd
 person perspectives influences the motor 
awareness of these patient and thus the way they report their motor abilities.  
Could we, then, manipulate perspective and modulate the motor effects of action 
sentences? To answer this question we decided to start from a well-known effect, probably 
one of the most tested effects of embodied cognition: the Action-sentence compatibility 
effect.  
This effect was first discovered by Glenberg and Kaschak (2002), who reported 
faster responses when direction embedded in a sentence was congruent with response 
movement direction, using sentences like “You gave the pizza to Andy” or “Andy gave 
you the pizza”.  This compatibility effect was induced in a strictly body-centred set up:  
participants responded with a movement to press a button away or towards their body. In 
this sense, the results suggest that participants read “giving” as “moving away from their 
body” in a context like “You gave the pizza to Andy”, and the contrary for the sentences in 
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which they were recipient of the action.  The effect has been then widely studied and 
reported in various conditions: written or auditory presentation (Borregine &  Kaschack, 
2006), with different tasks ( sensibility judgment, silent reading) and response devices 
(buttons, keyboards, knots as the in the paradigm of reading-by-rotation used in Zwann‟s 
group). A recent contribution to ACE paradigms has been introduced by Zwaan and 
colleagues (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006  Taylor & Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan, Taylor & De Boer, 
2010). In these studies the paradigm of reading-by-rotation has been introduced to test the 
so-called Linguistic Focus Hypothesis (LFH). According to LFH, motor resonance may 
arise in correspondence with any part of a sentence (not only a verb, but also pronouns, 
adverbs etc) which disambiguate the meaning of action (see chapter 2 for a detailed 
discussion). During these studies participants read sentences by turning a knob, being each 
sentence divided in segments. This allowed to verify which segment induced motor effect 
on the rotation movement. Zwaan and colleagues investigated, then, the emergence of 
compatibility effects with faster reading times (that is, rotating-reading is faster) in case of 
congruence between rotation direction (clockwise or counterclockwise) and movement 
direction embedded in sentence.  
Each of these studies stressed different aspects of the effect, but all confirmed that 
it emerges typically as a facilitatory effect, which appears early during or  immediately 
after sentence presentation(until 50 ms after sentence disappearance according to 
Borregine and Kaschask, 2006) and tends to reverse with later delays (500 ms, but not 
significantly according to the same authors). 
However, none of these studies has explicitly focused on perspective, both in 
sentences and in relation with the body-centred setting of experiments.  We assume that the 
emergence of the ACE effect is not independent not only from the task used but also from 
the specific setting we design to allow participants‟ response. Specifically, our idea is that 
what is fundamental is the interplay between the situation described by sentences (from a 
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specific point of view) and participants‟ position and hence their response direction. The 
position of the body of the participant(for example, compatible with giving or not) 
influences her ability to read sentences from a specific perspective. This study, by 
involving away and toward movements, is the only in my  thesis which allows to verify 
whether proximal or distal movements are differently affected by linguistic stimuli. 
Moreover, seen our data from chapter 4, we cannot take for granted that the participants is 
always and necessarily activating her perspective, hence positioning herself in the 
linguistic situation. We predicted that manipulating this body-self positioning in real and 
linguistic space would induce different motor effects during a typical ACE task, hence 
modifying the emergence of the compatibility effect itself.  
We can hypothesise at least two possibilities: first, participants could rely only on 
their body, being unable to take another perspective at a motor level, reducing or 
cancelling the ACE effect; second, participants could shift their perspective also at a motor 
level, thus reproducing the ACE effect. In the first case, the only body-self dissociation 
would be induced at an abstract level, with no or little involvement of motor areas, so not 
affecting motor responses (i.e., no ACE). Alternatively, body and self could be dissociated 
also at a motor level, so that the experience of being agent could be transferred and re-
activated just linguistically. In this sense, participants would have a linguist bodily 
experience of the sentence we are presenting, that is what would induce the ACE effect.  
To answer to these complex questions we performed three experiments.  
In the first experiment we aimed at replicating the ACE effect with French 
sentences, using transfer sentences similar to those originally used by Glenberg and 
Kaschack. The aim of this experiment was twofold: to confirm the ACE in French, since 
cultural independence of this effect is neither demonstrated nor obvious, and then to 
provide a baseline of the effect for the following experiments. As in the original 
experiment, all the sentences used the pronoun YOU, both as the agent or the recipient of 
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actions, thus directly involving the participants as being called into action . The 
participants‟ task, as in the original paradigm, required participants to evaluate the 
sensibility of the sentences by moving a joystick away or towards their body.  
The second experiment introduced a manipulation of perspective as mediated by 
nouns: we replaced YOU by the introduction of two external actors, Louis and Léa, 
proposed as the two actors of the sentences. We then asked participants to perform the 
same sensibility task by taking the perspective of one of the two actors depending on 
participant gender. This was supposed to induce a perspective shift, possibly modifying the 
ACE effect.   
A third experiment used the same sentences of experiment two, but adding more 
information about the two inter-actors, namely their spatial position. We expected that this 
additional information would facilitate motor perspective taking, thus favouring the 
emergence of an ACE effect, possibly in specific spatial positions.  
5.2 Experiment 1 
In this experiment we aimed at replicating the ACE using “YOU” as pronouns, a 
condition in which the participant is directly the agent or recipient and effectively called 
into a dyadic action. In addition, we verified the presence of the effect across a different 
linguistic structure, namely different dative constructions in French with respect to 
English.  
5.2.1 Methods  
Participants 
Thirty-two students of Lyon University participated in experiment 1. All 
participants were right-handed, native French speakers and reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the experiment and gave their 
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The original set of stimuli by Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) has been modified in 
order to identify the structure of sentences. We followed then the work by Borregine and 
Kaschak (2006), where a first selection of the stimuli was made (e.g. imperative sentences 
were eliminated). Stimuli consisted of transfer sentences, implying the action of 
giving/receiving something, either concrete or abstract (see “Appendix” for a complete list 
of stimuli). Sentences were composed by a noun/personal pronoun to indicate 
agent/recipient of action, a verb in the past tense and a noun to indicate the object 
transferred. The final set of stimuli in French comprised: 40 sentences in the form "You 
gave something to someone" (“Tu as donné quelque chose à Louis”) divided into 20 
abstract and 20 concrete sentences, and 40 sentences in the form "Someone gave you 
something" (“Louis t‟a donné quelque chose”), divided into 20 abstract and 20 concrete 
sentences. The set was completed by 40 non-sense sentences of the first form (abstract and 
concrete), and 40 non-sense sentences in the second form. The stimuli were presented in 
written form and were randomly repeated into 2 blocks, for a total of 320 trials.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a sound-attenuated room. Participants sat in front of a 
computer screen holding with their right hand a joystick in face of them. The distance 
between head of participant and the screen was of 70 cm.  
Each trial started with a fixation cross, then a sentence was presented until response 
of the participant, with a time limit of 5000 ms to start moving the joystick. Participants 
were instructed to read the sentence and to move a joystick (away or towards the body) to 
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respond as to whether the sentence made sense or not, as soon as they could. Each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of two possible conditions, starting with a 
response away for YES and towards for NO, or the reverse. The response was registered 
each time the participant reached a predetermined threshold of the joystick displacement, 
thus measuring the „reading time‟ (I.e., the time between sentence onset and beginning of 
movement, as in G & K‟s definition) and movement time (i.e., the time between the 
beginning and the end of the movement). The sentence disappeared once the threshold was 
passed. 
Data analysis 
Data on reading times for each participant were analyzed and times beyond ± 2,5 
standard deviation from average reading time were trimmed for each condition. Final 
movement direction was checked for each trial, to verify the accuracy of participants‟ 
movements (i.e. that they did not start moving in a direction and then change). We applied 
a repeated measures ANOVA to the mean reading times of the participants, with role in 
sentence (agent/recipient), type of verb (abstract/concrete), and movement direction 
(away/toward) as within-subject variables. The effect size was also calculated for each 
significant variable (η2). 
5.2.2 Results 
The data on reading times (RTs) showed a main effect of verb type, that is reading 
concrete sentences was significantly faster than abstract sentences ( F(1,31)=41.73, p 
<.0001, η2=0.7). Interestingly, a main effect of role in sentence was also present 
(F(1,31)=6.81,  p< .02, η2=0.1): when YOU was agent then reading times were slower 
compared to when it was recipient. Crucially, the interaction ROLE X MOVEMENT was 
significant (F(1,31)=4.52,  p < .042, η2= 0.1), that is the ACE effect was present. However, 
we observed a specific pattern of compatibility effect for French sentences. A Newman-
Keuls post hoc comparison confirmed that compatibility was not distributed along all 
 130 
 
conditions. In particular, the compatibility was significant for the AGENT condition (p < 
.04), where away responses were faster than toward ones. In addition, toward responses 
seemed to be more likely to be influenced by the sentence, since toward responses for 
recipient were significantly faster than those for AGENT (p < .005).  
In order to disentangle the contribution of concrete and abstract sentences, we 
performed additional analyses where each type of verb was evaluated separately. 
Differently from previous studies, where the separate analysis did not produce any effect, 
in our case the ACE effect was present and significant also when considering concrete 
verbs separately. Specifically, the ACE interaction (F(1,31)= 6.02, p < .020, η2= 0.2) relied 
on a compatibility effect for the AGENT condition, away responses being faster than 
toward responses. In addition, no effect was present for the recipient condition. A main 
effect of ROLE was also present, with AGENT sentences being generally slower. No 
significant effect was detected for the abstract sentences analysis.  
Summarizing, the ACE effect is generally confirmed with French sentences, but 
with a specific pattern of compatibility. The effect is significantly present only for the 
“receiving” condition, where YOU in sentence is receiving something and the movement 
of the joystick is toward the body. No or little effect is present for the other compatible 





Fig. 1 The pattern of the ACE effect in French as revealed by experiment 1. The arrows indicate sentence 
direction. The green arrows correspond to the compatible conditions, agent-away and recipient-toward. The 
red arrows correspond to the incompatible conditions.  
5.3 Experiment 2  
In the second experiment the sentences from experiment one were modified 
introducing the names of LOUIS and LEA as actors of a dyadic transfer interaction, in the 
form “Louis gives x to Léa”. We asked participants to change perspective (third person) 
and perform the task as if they were one of the two actors (Louis for males, Léa for 
females).  
5.3.1 Methods  
Participants 
Thirty-four students of Lyon University participated in experiment 2. All 
participants were right-handed, native French speakers and reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the experiment and gave their 






The set of stimuli of experiment 1 was manipulated, introducing two external 
actors, Louis and Léa. The pronoun YOU was then eliminated, so that the participant was 
no longer directly called into action and the perspective on action was modified. The 
structure and number of stimuli were otherwise unchanged, as well as the procedures. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in experiment 1. In addition, we asked participants 
to change perspective (third person) and perform the task as if they were one of the two 
actors.  
At the end of the experimental session each participant filled a questionnaire in order to 
self-evaluate their performance during the perspective-taking and sensibility judgment 
task. A list of 16 affirmations about the task were presented and each participant was 
required to indicate her agreement on a horizontal line, where the extreme left indicated “I 
do not agree at all” and the extreme right indicated “I completely agree”. The responses for 
each item were then transformed in a 1-10 scale and analyzed.  
Data analysis 
Data on reading times only for correct responses were analyzed for each participant 
and times beyond ± 2,5 standard deviation from average reading time were trimmed for 
each condition. Final movement direction was checked for each trial, to verify the accuracy 
of participants‟ movements (i.e. that they did not start moving in a direction and then 
change). We applied a repeated measures ANOVA to the mean reading times of the 
participants, with role in sentence (agent/recipient), type of verb (abstract/concrete), and 
movement direction (away/toward) as within-subject variables. The effect size was also 




5.3.2 Results  
The data from this experiment confirmed a significant effect of verb type, concrete 
verbs bringing to faster responses than abstract verbs (F(1,33)= 8.76, p<.006, η2= 0.6). 
However, the ACE interaction of ROLE and MOVEMENT was not significant(F(1,33)= 
3.043, p< .09). Since neither a main effect of ROLE or other factors were present, it 
appears clear that the absence of ACE-like compatibility effects was well distributed over 
all the conditions. It is worth noting, however, that there is a trend of an inverse pattern of 
the classical ACE: in fact, there is a trend to have faster responses for the RECIPIENT-
AWAY and AGENT-TOWARD conditions.  
As indicated both by the average RTs and by the self-report at the end of the 
experiment, participants correctly performed the perspective-taking tasks. With respect to 
the first experiment, in fact, RTs increased indicating that it took longer for participants to 
read the sentences because they were also performing the perspective taking task together 
with the sensibility judgment. No additional source for this delay was present. This is 
supported by the results of the questionnaire filled by participants. In particular, the crucial 
items for the perspective taking task indicate that participants correctly understood the task 
and performed it. We need to acknowledge that our questionnaire was not specifically 
designed to test the individual differences in the perspective taking task. Thus, we did not 
verify the strategy performed by each single subject to correctly perform the task. 
However, their final reports state that our participants correctly performed the task, or at 
least explicitly reported so. Indeed, future studies probably should rely on questionnaire 
more specifically designed to test the perspective taking attitude for each participant and 




Fig.2 Absence of the ACE effect in experiment 2. Conventions as in experiment 1.  
5.4 Experiment 3  
The first experiment confirmed the ACE in French, with a major sensitivity for the 
„toward‟ movement direction. The second experiment revealed no significant ACE when 
participants were required to take a third person‟s perspective. These findings suggest that 
motor effects of language processing are constrained: dissociating the spatial position of 
the participant from her third person perspective actually makes the ACE disappear. This 
finding opens the question of the possible role played in ACE by the space-related, in 
addition to agency-related information. Following this rationale, we next tested the 
hypothesis that adding spatial information to the perspective-taking manipulation would 











5.4.1 Methods  
Participants 
Thirty-four students of Lyon University participated in experiment 3. All 
participants were right-handed, native French speakers and reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the experiment and gave their 
informed consent to the experiment that was approved by the Inserm Ethics Committee.  
Stimuli 
The set of stimuli of experiment 2 was maintained. In order to induce perspective 
taking also from a given spatial point of view, each trial started with the presentation of the 
spatial position of Louis and Léa, as shown in figure 3, which was left visible on the screen 
for the entire block. The names “Louis” and “Léa” were presented within a circle on the 
right or on the left of the sentence. The circle position on the screen was task irrelevant. . 
The left position was supposed to induce the frame of “giving”, the right position of 
“receiving”. Stimuli were divided into four blocks, which randomly presented one spatial 
position R-L or L-R for Louis/Léa and one of the two directions of movement. The final 
design comprised then 2 spatial positions (left/right), 2 roles in sentence (agent/recipient), 
2 verbs (abstract/concrete), and 2 movement directions. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in experiment 2. Participants were instructed to pay 
attention to the spatial position of Louis/Léa, which appeared before the sentence, and then 





Fig. 3 Procedure used in experiment 3, adding the spatial position of the two actors 
 
Data analysis 
Data on reading times only for correct responses were analyzed for each participant and 
times beyond ± 2,5 standard deviation from average reading time were trimmed for each 
condition. Final movement direction was checked for each trial, to verify the accuracy of 
participants‟ movements (i.e. that they did not start moving in a direction and then change). 
We applied a repeated measures ANOVA to the mean reading times of the participants, 
with spatial position (left/right), role in sentence (agent/recipient), type of verb 
(abstract/concrete), and movement direction (away/toward) as within-subject variables. 
The effect size was also calculated for each significant variable (η2). 
5.4.2 Results  
The data from reading times confirmed a main effect of verb type, with concrete 
verbs generally faster than abstract verbs (F(1,33)=32.53, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.5). No other 
significant main effect was detected. Spatial position (right/left) revealed a marginally 
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significant effect (F(1,33)= 3.63, p< .066, η2 = 0.1), right spatial position tending to be 
associated with faster reading times. Crucially, the interaction SPATIAL POSITION X 
ROLE X MOVEMENT was significant (F (1, 33) = 4. 08, p <.033, η2 =  0.05 ). Newman-
Keuls post hoc test revealed a compatibility effect in the case of RIGHT spatial position. 
Specifically, in the AGENT condition, away responses were faster than the toward ones (p 
< 0.01). This confirms the stronger compatibility effect for agents compared to recipient 
we found in the first experiment. For the LEFT spatial position, an inverse pattern was 
observed. Whilst the compatibility disappears for the AGENT condition, it was significant 
for the recipient, but with an inversion: away movements were faster than toward ones (p< 
0.002). In addition, also the toward movement confirmed itself as more sensitive, since it 
was significantly faster for agent than for recipient (p <.002). Across the two spatial 
positions, only RECIPIENT – toward responses differed significantly (p<.004), with faster 
reading times in the right than in the left position. 
Data from the questionnaire confirmed that participants report to have correctly 
understood and performed the perspective taking task. With respect to the spatial position 
of the two actors, participants did not report to be actually influenced by this additional 
cue. More specifically, participants did not report an explicit preference for the left or right 
spatial position to perform the perspective task: this supports the idea that the effect we 
obtain is not a by-product of an explicit strategy performed by participants. The potential 
criticism about the fact that we did not verify the perspective taking strategy for each 
participant may be the same as discussed above. However, the fact that we did not find any 
significant report of an explicit preference between left and right positions allows us to 
discuss our results in terms of how the motor effects of language are constrained by a 
successful perspective taking task. Future studies, however, should test more specifically 
for the individual differences and maybe transfer our task into specific populations with 




Fig. 4 Presence of the ACE effect on RTs in the left and right spatial position in Experiment 3. Conventions 
as in figures 1 and 2.  
 
5.5 Discussion  
The data from the three experiments we performed give us different insights on 
how a classic compatibility effect, the ACE, can be modulated through different tasks. 
Overall, our results suggest that the effect is not as much as automatic and mandatory as it 
was supposed to be, but rather a flexible effect, which crucially depends on the 
interactional context that sentences describe. 
The aim of the first experiment was to firstly replicate the presence of ACE using 
French sentences. This was confirmed, and the findings additionally showed a specific 
pattern for French sentences.  The compatibility effect was present only for the AGENT 
condition, with away responses faster than the toward ones. In addition, our data show 
significant differences between the away and toward movement, with toward responses 
being more sensible to the action embedded in sentence. This suggests that proximal and 
distal movements are differently sensitive to the modulation offered by linguistic stimuli. 
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A further analysis showed that these effects are mainly due to the contribution of 
concrete verbs. This is confirmed by the main effect of verb type, that we obtain differently 
from the original study by Glenberg and Kaschack (2002). Overall, the effect we obtained 
for the concrete verbs was stronger than the original one for these conditions. This suggests 
that the elaboration of concrete sentences is different from the abstract ones, possibly 
because they rely on different strategies of reading to understand whether the sentence 
makes sense or not. It is possible that the French structure for donation (“Louis t‟a donné 
quelque chose” vs “Tu a donné quelque chose à Louis”) influenced reading times in this 
sense. However, data on the presence of the ACE effect on abstract verbs are still 
controversial, so it is possible that both a differential effect of concrete verbs, strongly 
embodied and experience-related, and a specific effect of sentence form in French is 
present. A similar explanation, based on the syntactic structure of donation in English, has 
been advanced by Fisher & Zwann (2008), precisely to explain the ACE effect on abstract 
sentences. The fact that we do not confirm this effect for abstract sentence in French 
supports this idea. In the second experiment we asked participants to shift perspective by 
introducing two external actors and asking them to perform the task “as if they were” one 
of the two. Our aim was to test whether the presence of the ACE can be modulated 
depending on the perspective assumed during the sensibility judgment task. We reasoned 
as follow: the use of pronoun HE is supposed to produce no motor effects (see our Chapter 
4), and using the names of two actors is comparable to inducing a third person perspective. 
However, it is possible that the motor effects could be re-instantiated by asking participants 
to shift their perspective and take the point of view of another actor during the experiment. 
Our results ruled out this possibility, since the motor effects and namely the ACE were 
absent when perspective was manipulated alone. The data suggest that the first-person 
perspective is necessary to induce an ACE effect, so that the mere presence of two actors 
does not induce an action framework compatible with participant‟s position. Perspective-
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taking did not occur at a motor level, since participants were unable to shift their bodily 
position in the space of action created by the sentence. This suggested that the ACE effect 
could be again induced by adding supporting spatial information that allows each 
participant to take a „spatial‟ perspective at a motor level: this was the aim of the third 
experiment.  
Data from this experiment effectively confirmed that by adding a spatial anchor to 
perspective taking can affect the motor level, producing an ACE similar to that obtained in 
experiment one for French sentences. Interestingly, our data additionally show a different 
pattern for the right and left spatial position.  
In the case of the right perspective, the pattern of the ACE as present in experiment 
1 is reproduced.  On the contrary, the left perspective was associated with an inverse ACE 
pattern. This is undoubtedly an interesting and intriguing data, since we show not only that 
we can manipulate participant‟s perspective inducing an ACE effect, but also that this 
tends to vary with the spatial location.  
One possible explanation can be found in the study by Borregine and Kaschak 
(2006), where it has been already documented that timing is crucial to obtain the ACE 
effect as we know it: already 50 ms of delay can make it disappear, and then tend to 
modify or reverse it. Since reading times were numerically, although not significantly, 
slower for the left position, it is possible that the ACE is actually modified in reason of a 
delay in the response. However, this would not explain why the effect is reversed. A 
further explanation could be that the left position is effectively considered as a “giving” 
position and this interferes with the actual movement execution instead of facilitating it. 
Again, this could explain a right-left difference in reading times, but does not clarify why 
this does interact with the role in sentence.  
Considering our previous data, we can hypothesize that we re-install a first-person 
perspective only in the right condition, whereas the perspective in the left condition 
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remained an external one, where we cannot induce a first-person perspective taking, This 
would explain the interference pattern present in the reverse effect we observe. In this 
sense, the presence of another actor on the left did induced a stronger third person-
perspective frame, so that it interfered instead of facilitating, and did not produce any 
effect for the role in sentence. This could be due to a specific right-left bias (Chatterjee, 
2002; Maas, Suitner, Favaretto, & Cignacchi, 2009) according to which we tend to 
attribute agency to actors placed on the left. As confirmation, the reversed effect is 
significantly present only for the object role (both with abstract and concrete verbs), which 
is unrelated to the left spatial position. On the contrary, the left position is strongly 
associated with agency, in this case an external agency which is hard to interfere. 
In this sense, the right perspective is easier to be manipulated, since participants can 
first change their perspective and place their body in the space of interaction described by 
the sentence, and then perform the task as if they were effectively someone else. This 
induced the ACE effect, with exactly the same pattern of the basic version of the 
experiment.  
Overall, our data show that even a simple and well acknowledged effect such as the 
ACE is really quite flexible. This suggests that the motor effects of language processing 
are constrained by the perspective of a specific agent with a specific body position in 
space. When the body of the participant is the only reference for movements, then simple 
perspective taking does induce no motor effects. By adding a spatial anchor to perspective 
taking the motor effects reappear (under specific constraints) suggesting that spatially 
localizing ourselves allows to embody somebody else‟s perspective.  
5.6 Conclusions and general discussion  
In this study we focused on perspective and its motor effects during linguistic 
comprehension. The results confirmed that the presence of the pronouns YOU induces 
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directly and strongly a first person perspective on action, depending on the interactional 
and inter-subjective framework that is activated. This confirms previous data on the action-
sentence compatibility effect, but adds information highlights in more detail the specific 
relevance of language itself in manipulating perspective with respect, for instance, to 
action observation. Our study shows that it is ispossible to manipulate perspective by 
introducing external actors and adding to a sensibility judgment a perspective-taking task.  
Interestingly, it is not sufficient to introduce external actors and ask participants to 
perform actions as if they were one of these actors, in order to induce a motor effect. In this 
sense the roles of agent and recipient in our sentences are nothing but syntactical roles that 
need to be filled in order to produce motor effects. In the case of simple perspective-taking 
this does not happen and our participants rely on more abstract strategies to perform the 
task. They cannot act as someone else because their perspective on action is too external 
and no reference is present to place themselves in the space of the action described by the 
sentence. In this sense, this condition is equal to the one of simple linguistic observation of 
actions, where the focus is not on the agent, but probably on the effect of the action as 
interaction between two agents.  
What is fundamental in our data is that this no-effect is not stable and given: we can 
manipulate third person perspective in order to reproduce a typical ACE effect. This is 
made possible by adding a spatial anchor to the perspective taking task, thus allowing 
participants to take their own motor perspective on the action described in sentences. This 
confirms that sentence with a third person perspective can induce, under specific 
constraints, motor effects. This is of great importance in our general discussion about the 
social and functional aspects of motor resonance. Simply inducing motor resonance each 
time there is YOU in a sentence, and inducing nothing with HE, would be just an 
automatic and rather unspecific effect. On the contrary, showing that the effect depends on 
the context of interaction and on perspective, suggests that this motor resonance adapts 
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itself to the ongoing (social) situation. In this sense perspective can be activated together 
with other motor aspects of action: motor chains in our second study, motion direction and 
the relation with another person in the third study.  This contributes to what I defined in my 
first study as the “deep” understanding of action, which is a crucial aspect of our social 
ability to interact with others. Language supports this ability, by being highly flexible and 
capable to translate very fine-grained aspects of action organization. Crucially, this last 
study showed also that language re-articulates perspective and other aspects of action 





































6. General Discussion  
The general aim of the thesis was to investigate how and to what extent action 
organization can be translated in language, and consequently which aspects of action 
interact with overt motor behavior. .This issue is still very debated in literature, mainly as 
far as the specific contribution of motor processes to language understanding – or better to 
linguistic understanding of action. – is concerned. .Large part of the studies did not 
systematically focus on specific aspects of action organization in order to investigate their 
translation in language, being more interested in low-level motor effects such as effector-
relatedness of action. Furthermore, they mainly relied on the hypothesis of a similarity of 
involvement of motor processes during language and observation/execution, thus not 
investigating whether language has its own peculiar way to “describe” action or not. Even 














6.1 Experimental evidences on the linguistic translation of action 
 
The first study was designed in order to disentangle the time course of the motor 
effects produced by linguistic stimuli, namely action verbs with different goals. In 
addition, the aim was to investigate whether overt actions with different degrees of 
complexity are differently affected by linguistic stimuli depending on the aspect they share 
or not with the linguistic actions (e.g. effector, goals, kinematics). The results of previous 
neurophysiological and behavioral studies suggested that processing of verbs related to 
different bodily effectors relies on corresponding somatotopic activations in motor cortex. 
The present behavioral study aimed at further investigating this issue by determining 
whether and, in affirmative case, at which stage of motor planning and execution effector-
related action verbs influence different actions executed with either the same or a different 
effector.   
Three kinematics experiments were performed aiming at investigating whether and, 
in affirmative case, at which stage, of motor planning and execution effector-related action 
verbs influence different actions executed with either the same or a different effector.  
Results demonstrate that  the goal of an action can be linguistically re-activated, 
modulating a motor response. Moreover, the action goal, expressed by language, seems to 
influence early motor planning and just marginally action execution. This study 
demonstrated also that other aspects of actions – such as for example the effector – can be 
similarly activated depending on the context, the task and the kind of motor response. In 
this sense, different levels of linguistic action understanding affect an overt action, 
depending on the aspects activated in a specific context. 
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Our results suggest that the involvement of the motor system during language 
processing is at least double-folded and is connected to the possibility to linguistically 
translate aspects of action organization.  
At a first level, the involvement can be on a more superficial understanding of 
action verbs: at this level it can be linked for instance to the effector typically used to 
perform the action described by a verb.  
The relationship between motor areas controlling the effector (i.e. hand or foot) 
emerges at a semantic, but rather unspecific level. That is, activating the effector clearly 
involves part of the semantics of an action, but does not disentangle other aspects. For 
instance, it does not rely on how we commonly perform actions using that given effector. 
At this level, hand-related verbs emerge for difference with respect to foot-related verbs.  
Furthermore, writing or cooking are similar in involving the hand as effector, but 
they largely differ for the use of that hand. However, we know well that they are inherently 
different, so that writing involves specific muscles and cooking others. In this sense, we 
can identify a deeper semantic level, where different kinds of hand-actions differ for their 
goals, and consequently for the way we perform those actions and coordinate movements 
in order to accomplish our aims and produce some effects on the world. At this level we 
can also consider the social modulation of goals, thus considering how social interactions 
can be described by (action) language, for instance depending on action sequences 
implying the presence of others. This deeper understanding is often crucial from the point 
of view of social interaction: as stated before, “observing” an action linguistically implies 
processing different aspects of an action, depending on the context, on our goals, on our 
needs to perform (actually or linguistically) other actions to respond. In this sense, the 
activation of motor areas contributes to this full understanding, thus leading to comprehend 
the goal of the actions, and their final effects depending on the way the action is 
performed. In addition, this process is definitely fast and occurs at the very first stages of 
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language processing. In this sense, it is unlikely a by-product of other processes, but it is 
effectively part of them.  This confirms it as a process with a social function and relevance, 
since it occurs depending on the context of interaction, for example the context in which a 
verb is used. .Furthermore, our stimuli were simple verbs in the infinitive form: they are 
unlikely to induce very fine grained processes of motor imagery, since we did not provide 
an agent, and object, a context to deeper interpret the verb. That is why we hypothesized 
that the typical goal and motor program associated with a verb in our motor repertoire is 
activated. Moreover, the motor program is activated from the perspective of an agent, since 
no other element was provided to discriminate this aspect. This makes our stimuli very 
different from an image or a video, which provide an external observation of an action, 
condition that probably induces a different activation of motor processes, in being more 
locally constrained. The same can be said for the lack of a direct object: the presence of an 
object would have likely induced the activation of more specific kinematics depending on 
the characteristics of the object. In this case probably other phases of movement could 
have been affected.  
Our data suggest that, together with the goal of an action, the motor programs to 
perform that action are activated. This is not in contrast with our proposal that what is 
linguistically translated is the goal of the action. In fact, even if the goal is hierarchically 
more general than the kinematics of action, the way (how) we perform an action is crucial 
to pursue a specific goal. As said before, the actions of writing with a pen or with a 
keyboard share the goal to “write a letter” and the effector we use, but how we 
accomplished that goal is different. In this sense, the kinematics aspects of action are 
fundamental to identify the goal, and this is part of our bodily experience of being the 
agents of an action and having this action in our motor repertoire. Nevertheless it is part of 
our social (linguistic) experience. This is certainly true for the simple actions described in 
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the verbs from this study, and for all the stimuli used in this thesis. We all share the basic 
experience of grasping or of writing. However, in our everyday life we often perform very 
complex and skilled actions, starting from different degrees of ability. We can experience 
just linguistically actions we‟ve never performed, as we are able to understand different 
aspects of that action, but probably not the fine-grained kinematics of the way to perform 
it. Think of a situation in which a friend is describing her last match as kick-boxer 
describing and naming her single moves, and you never performed it and maybe neither 
saw a match. She can linguistically describe her experience so that you can at least 
partially understand. The contrary is true as well: we can have the bodily experience of an 
action, hence of its kinematics, but we have not the linguistic experience of it – since our 
language does not provide an exact verb to describe it. In some cases other linguistic 
devices (i.e. adverbs) or constructions (paraphrases) allow us to communicate and explain 
that action. Alternatively, we can refer to other languages in which the exact term is used.   
Summing up, in all the situations described above we have experiences, bodily 
experiences, in which our body and brain is continuously involved in interaction with other 
actors, humans or not, and this leads constantly to a redefinition of what is experience and 
what is “action” for us. Language contributes in modeling our experience, and in being 
modeled by experience itself, in a process of translation from the one to the other. For this 
reason, other aspects than goals can be stressed and become more relevant: this is the case 
of perspective,  issue discussed in chapter 4 and 5. 
In chapter 4, I presented a second study performed with the aim to examine the 
interplay between the role of motor perspective (agent) and action organization in motor 
chains, verifying its behavioral effect on an overt actions required as response. This second 
kinematics study aimed at deepening how goal can be translated in language, using as 
stimuli simple sentences composed by a pronoun (I, You, He/She) and a verb. The basic 
assumption is that language encodes goals at different levels: not only at the very general 
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level of goals as abstract entities, but at the specific level of goals as concrete entities 
relying on sequences of motor acts or simple actions. Results showed that the perspective 
activated by the pronoun You reflects the motor pattern of the “agent” combined with the 
chain structure of the verb. These data suggest that the motor system is early modulated by 
linguistic elements inducing a specific perspective,: the one of the agent. The data from 
this second study confirmed that understanding simple sentences involves the motor 
system, affecting in particular the phase of motor planning and consequently the first 
stages of action execution. In addition, it gave us additional information on how goals are 
translated and coded in language.  
This study differed from the first for the way linguistic stimuli were composed: 
while in the first experiment we presented verbs in the infinitive form, here we presented 
simple sentence were an agent was implied (pronouns) and the verb was declined 
accordingly.  
In this sense, the first study presented verbs in a form which is probably less 
susceptible to induce fine-grained modifications on action kinematics. Specifically, 
modifications depending on how the action is internally construed and planned with 
respect to internal and external constraints. This is consistent with our proposal that 
different levels of verb meaning can be activated, hence influencing action execution. For 
instance, the infinitive form of verbs does not state explicitly who is the agent performing 
the action. Probably participants rely on their own perspective on action, so assuming their 
selves as directly the agents. Alternatively, another possible strategy could be for 
participants to assume  the action verbs from an external perspective, being the observers 
of that action. The data from the first study did not allow us to disentangle which kind of 
perspective was used. But presenting a pronoun directly establishes a point of view on 
action: our second study demonstrates that it is the perspective induced by YOU which 
produces effectively behavioural and kinematic effects. This finding has interesting 
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implications: namely, in this light previous data from our and other study can be discussed, 
considering that the motor effects we obtain are dependent on the way we build up stimuli 
and present a context of interaction.  
In the study here reported the context and perspective on interaction is mainly given 
by the pronoun, supported by the fact that in Italian also the verb elicits the agent. 
Consequently, the re-activation of chains of motor acts depends on this perspective, since 
we found a motor pattern coherent for the two type of verbs/actions only in the case of 
YOU. Our results suggest that while comprehending language we activate an inter-
subjective framework. The adoption of this frame of reference has a very precocious effect 
as it differently impacts even the early stages of movements planning and execution. The 
activation of a conversational framework has an interesting theoretical implication. Even if 
our study clearly shows that action organization (e.g., the motor chains) is reflected in 
language, language imposes its own constraints on the way actions are conceived, giving 
relevance to the YOU pronoun  in taking the agent's perspective, at least in the specific 
experimental setting here used. It is probable that using other settings and adding more 
cues to define perspective would induce the activation of different points of view, mediated 
not only by pronouns but also by nouns and other linguistic devices. This will be discussed 
in detail in the following study.  
An open question remains whether the manipulation of this interactional framework 
and hence of motor-perspective taking can produce differential effects. For instance, which 
differences in performance would emerge if we present linguistically another agent 
(another pronoun, a name) or we just leave is supposed (as in our interaction-verbs 
sentences)? This is the aspect investigated in chapter 5.  
In chapter 5, the issue of perspective is specifically investigated, focusing on its 
role  in language comprehension. In particular, this study aimed at determining how a 
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specific perspective (induced for example by a personal pronoun) modulates motor 
behaviour during and after language processing. A classical paradigm to induce a 
compatibility effect (the Action-sentence compatibility effect) has been used to this aim. In 
three behavioural experiments we investigated how the ACE is modulated by taking first 
or third person perspective. Results from these experiments showed that the ACE effect 
occurs only when a first-person perspective is activated by the sentences used as stimuli. 
This is true when using the pronoun YOU (experiment 1), but not when using an external 
actor in sentences, even asking participants to take the perspective of that actor 
(experiment 2). However, the first-person perspective is re-activated, and hence the ACE, 
when a spatial perspective is given. This suggests that the motor effects of language 
processing are constrained by the perspective of a specific agent with a specific body and 
position in space. If no other additional frames of reference are present, then, subjects are 
unable to take effectively (on a motor level) another perspective on action and they 
probably rely on more abstract processes for language comprehension.   
The results confirmed that the presence of the pronouns YOU induces directly and 
strongly a first person perspective on action. This further corroborated previous data on the 
action-sentence compatibility effect. However, it is possible to manipulate perspective by 
introducing external actors and adding to the sensibility judgment a perspective-taking 
task.  
Interestingly, introducing an external actor does not induce motor effects and it is 
not sufficient to ask participants to perform actions as if they were one of these actors. In 
this sense the roles of agent and recipient in our sentences are nothing but syntactical roles 
that need to be filled in order to produce motor effects. In the case of simple perspective-
taking this does not happen and our participants rely on more abstract strategies to perform 
the task. They cannot act as someone else because their perspective on action is too 
external and no reference is present to place themselves in the space of the action described 
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by the sentence. In this sense, this condition is equal to the one of simple linguistic 
observation of actions, where the focus is not on the agent, but probably on the effect of 
the action as interaction between two agents.  
What is fundamental in our data is that this no-effect is not stable and given: we can 
manipulate third person perspective in order to reproduce a typical ACE effect.  This is 
made possible by adding a spatial anchor to the perspective taking task, thus allowing 
participants to take their own motor perspective on the action described in sentences. This 
confirms that sentence with a third person perspective can induce, under specific 
constraints, motor effects. This is of great importance in our general discussion about the 
social and functional aspects of motor resonance. Simply inducing motor resonance each 
time there is YOU in a sentence, and inducing nothing with HE, would be just an 
automatic and rather unspecific effect. On the contrary, showing that the effect depends on 
the context of interaction and on perspective, suggests that this motor resonance adapts 
itself to the ongoing (social) situation. In this sense perspective can be activated together 
with other motor aspects of action: motor chains in our second study, motion direction and 
the relation with another person in the third study.  This contributes to what we have 
defined in our first study as the “deep” understanding of action, which is a crucial aspect of 
our social ability to interact with others. Language supports this ability, by being highly 
flexible and capable to translate very fine-grained aspects of action organization. 
Overall, the studies I presented suggest that language has a peculiar manner to re-
articulate action organization. This process contributes to define language itself as a form 
of action: our words and sentences produce concrete, motor effects on the people we are 
interacting with. We use some aspects of action to act linguistically, by activating 
effectors, action goals, and perspectives. In this sense, language is crucial in its function to 
help us to share actions with other people, not at the level of abstract cognitive 
representations, but at the level of the motor experience. 
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Interestingly, I suggested throughout the thesis that probably the idea of a similarity 
between action observation and linguistic actions processing should be revised. 
Specifically, the investigation of the role played by introducing and or manipulating 
perspective-related aspects of linguistic processing showed that language acts in a peculiar 
way to articulate points of view on action. This is a crucial point: static pictures or videos, 
and certainly direct observation as well, directly convey a specific perspective, using the 
body of the “observer” as reference. Language opens two possibilities: first, to use 
linguistic devices to convey perspective (e.g. pronouns); second, to use these devices to re-
articulate perspective just linguistically. “I” is not strictly a fist person perspective, “You” 
can be a first person as well depending on the way reading/listening are located into a 
specific interaction. The same distinction between external and internal perspectives fails 
to give a complete account of how language can build up perspectives. Furthermore, it fails 
in giving account of how we can embody our motor perspective from different points of 
view. 
In conclusion, the data from this work suggest that a further investigation of how 
language translates actions should take into account that it is not a perfect translation, but a 











Open questions and future research 
 
Overall, the data from our thesis contribute to disentangle several aspects of how 
action organization is translated in language, and then reactivated during language 
processing producing detectable motor effects. This constitutes a new contribution to the 
field, adding lacking information on how specific aspects such as goal and perspective are 
linguistically described. In addition, these studies offer a new point of view to understand 
the functional implications of the involvement of the motor system during language 
comprehension, specifically from the point of view of our social interactions. In particular, 
I suggest to revise the role of language not as a poor description of actions, but as an active 
form of action itself. However, I am aware of the fact that the effective functional role of 
the motor system needs to be investigated more deeply and with other techniques to build 
up a more general and coherent definition of the contribution of the motor system to 
meaning processes.  
I believe that an approach considering the translation between different aspects of 
action through various domains (execution, observation, language) can be very fruitful. A 
point in favour of this approach is that assuming different translations at different levels 
necessarily implies the assumption that not one, but several areas contribute to this 
translation. This prevents to assume a reductionist approach in which separate areas 
contribute to separate and independent functions. That is, it is unlikely that the single M1 – 
relatively low-level area – contributes to language understanding, but it is surely plausible 
that other areas (premotor cortex, Broca‟area, probably parietal sectors connected to motor 
chains) which normally contribute to action representation are active also during language 
processing.  This is plausible given also the fact that normally we do not process single 
verbs or sentences, but entire dialogues or longer descriptions or narrations, as we do not 
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observe single grasping actions separated by an interactional context. Indeed, since I 
proposed also a revision of the respective positions of language, action execution and 
observation, also these processes of translation need to be reconsidered.  
This approach in terms of a productive translation is undoubtedly new and useful to 
discuss the open issues in the study of the involvement of the motor system during 
language processing, as detectable through motor effects or not. To conclude, I will briefly 
summarize some open questions that future research could focus on.  
1. Is even processing action verbs or simple sentences influenced by 
the social context in which their processing occurs? That is, may the presence of 
other people (supposed or real) induce a modulation of language processing due to 
a differential involvement of the motor system?  An effective modulation would 
imply a stronger functional link between activation of the motor system and social 
understanding of language. A point in favour of this functional link is given by the 
fact that we already showed that language is capable to manipulate the perspective 
assumed by a listener/reader. Understanding a sentence is critical as part of our 
social interactions, then an hypothesis is that the motor system plays a crucial role 
in enhancing our social comprehension of language. Of course, a definitive 
demonstration would come by extending these results to more complex descriptions 
or narrations as involved in more ecological contexts.  
2. Does processing of more complex narrations and descriptions rely on 
the same processes elicited by simple sentences and single components such as 
verbs? Our hypothesis is, of course, that the same processes are active in all these 
cases. However, I have already demonstrated that not only verbs but also other 
aspects of linguistic actions are connected with a specific activation of the motor 
system. More, I demonstrated that this activation can be modulated and is not 
completely automatic. In this sense, it is plausible that during complex language 
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processing – that is, the everyday processing -  these processes rely on a principle 
of economy in which the motor activation is modulated in relation with other 
concurrent tasks. Specifically, this could be connected to the exact timing of this 
activation: an early activation of the motor system during narration or dialogue 
processing would make it very plausible an effective contribution of the motor 
system to understanding processing, that is giving a strong confirmation of our 
previous results. It is in fact implausible to explain similar results in terms of motor 
imagery post-understanding. A critical point is then to elaborate paradigms capable 
to detect the language-motor system relations using complex linguistic stimuli.  
3. Does manipulating the syntax of real/linguistic actions modulate the 
activity of the motor system? That is, may we manipulate the general level of 
syntax that logically precedes the fulfilment of its empty roles (with goals, agents, 
subjects, object, effectors, etc), hence manipulate how the successive stages are 
elaborated? This manipulation would be possibly really fruitful in comparing 
different linguistic or motor expertises (technical language, specialized language, 
infants vs adults, etc) and to assume a cross-cultural comparative approach. In fact, 
it is possible that languages implying a different order of the syntactic roles imply a 
different manner of processing these elements. Perspective itself could be 
influenced by languages presenting the personal pronoun or not, or presenting the 
agent at the end of the sentence and not at the beginning (as partially discussed for 
the ACE). In addition, it would be useful to compare different languages, verbal 
language  gestures but also music or visual language, to detect if a similar syntax is 
used. The involvement of the Broca‟s area in several tasks related to these domains 
seems to confirm this hypothesis, which however needs to be clarified and 
deepened.  
4.  Which are effectively the neural substrates of these processes?  
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In the introduction I suggested that a strong candidate to be the neural substrate of 
effects of motor resonance and/or simulation could be the mirror neurons system. This 
position assumed a continuity among execution, observation and language, but I 
nevertheless introduced a note of caution being when discussing the position of some 
authors stating a complete overlap of these  three situations. 
The studies I presented showed that language actively translates (into) action, 
manipulating for instance perspective in a way that partially differs from actual action 
observation. That is, motor processes are still active, but the cues activating them seem 
to differ and seem to differ according to a specific intersubjective framework, being the 
framework in which language is developed. For these reasons, a further investigation is 
needed to clarify whether and how the motor processes and areas involve in action 
language are the same or differ from the ones involved in observation and execution. A 
possibility is that the same areas are involved, but in different networks which 
determine the behavioural patterns. For example, it is possible that language needs to 
rely more the action observation on the first perspective, on the perspective of the self. 
Future studies will investigate this aspect. A consequence of these results is that we 
need to reconsider the potential role of mirror mechanism active in motor resonance 
and simulation. Indeed, we should reconsider the definition of motor resonance itself. 
In fact, we showed that – at least in some specific cases – the motor resonance does not 
act as it would have been expected depending on studies on action observation. In fact, 
on the basis of these studies one could predict that all the perspectives on action share 
the same motor processes. This was clearly not true, and we found that a proper motor 
simulation is present only when the reader is directly called into action as an agent. 
These results induce to reconsider both the relationship between language and action 
observation and the nature of motor resonance itself. Further research should 
investigate how aspects such as the self-other distinction may play a role and which are 
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the effective neural processes underlying the behavioural effects we observed. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 




EXPERIMENT 1 – 
Finger Opening 
HAND VERBS  FOOT VERBS 
 
Time to Finger Peak 
Velocity 78,66 78,07 
 
Grasp Time  546,52 537,74 
Time to Maximal Finger 
Aperture  258,28 246,66 
Maximal Finger Aperture  
 93,70 95,02 





EXPERIMENT 2 – 
Reaching-grasping  
HAND VERBS  FOOT VERBS 
 
Reach Time  655,831 641,4073 
Time to Arm Peak Velocity  
 245,4051 253,831 
Maximal Finger Aperture 
 90,69137 90,36716 
Arm Peak Velocity 
 1112,527 1126,797 
 
TRB 391,5092 405,2377 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 – 
Effector lifting 
HAND VERBS – 
HAND RESP 






– HAND RESP 
 
Time to Peak 
Velocity 252,03 285,16 217,76 271,49 
 
Maximal Effector 
Height  0,07114 0,125456 0,07496 0,13025 
Time to 
Maximal Effector 
Height    
  
Peak Velocity 
 439,51 426,652 494,7355 451,2515 
TRB 






































CHAPTER 5  










































Tu as adressé un courrier à Léa 
Tu as cédé ta place à Léa 
Tu as chanté une chanson à Léa 
Tu as communiqué le message à Léa 
Tu as confié ton secret à Léa 
Tu as consacré du temps à Léa 
Tu as déclaré son amour à Léa 
Tu as délégué ses tâches à Léa 
Tu as dispensé ses conseils à Léa 
Tu as donné sa chance à Léa 
Tu as écrit une lettre à Louis 
Tu as envoyé un baiser à Louis 
Tu as exposé ses raisons à Louis 
Tu as exprimé son amitié à Louis 
Tu as jeté un sort à Louis 
Tu as lancé une idée à Louis 
Tu as présenté sa démission à Louis 
Tu as raconté une histoire à Louis 
Tu as transféré la responsabilité à Louis 
Tu as transmis les consignes à Louis 
Louis t'a adressé un courrier 
Louis t'a cédé sa place 
Louis t'a chanté une chanson 
Louis t'a communiqué le message  
Louis t'a confié son secret 
Louis t'a consacré du temps 
Louis t'a déclaré son amour  
Louis t'a délégué ses tâches 
Louis t'a dispensé ses conseils  
Louis t'a donné une chance  
Léa t'a écrit une lettre 
Léa t'a envoyé un baiser  
Léa t'a exposé ses raisons 
Léa t'a exprimé son amitié  
Léa t'a jeté un sort 
Léa t'a lancé une idée 
Léa t'a présenté sa démission  
Léa t'a raconté une histoire  
Léa t'a transféré la responsabilité 
Léa t'a transmis les consignes  

















































Tu as cédé son nez à Léa 
Tu as chanté une cuisine à Léa 
Tu as communiqué la prison à Léa 
Tu as confié ses seuils à Léa 
Tu as consacré du tempête à Léa 
Tu as déclaré son mouvement à Léa 
Tu as délégué ses phrases à Léa 
Tu as dispensé ses villages à Léa 
Tu as donné une race à Léa 
Tu as écrit une viande à Louis 
Tu as envoyé un genou à Louis 
Tu as exposé ses maisons à Louis 
Tu as exprimé sa chemise à Louis 
Tu as jeté un cinéma à Louis 
Tu as lancé une église à Louis 
Tu as présenté sa cheminée à Louis 
Tu as raconté une fille à Louis 
Tu as transféré la boussole à Louis 
Tu as transmis les résidents à Louis 
Louis t'a adressé une vague  
Louis t'a cédé son nez 
Louis t'a chanté une cuisine  
Louis t'a communiqué la prison  
Louis t'a confié ses seuils  
Louis t'a consacré du tempête  
Louis t'a déclaré son mouvement 
Louis t'a délégué ses phrases  
Louis t'a dispensé ses villages  
Louis t'a donné une race 
Léa t'a écrit une viande  
Léa t'a envoyé un genou  
Léa t'a exposé ses maisons  
Léa t'a exprimé sa chemise  
Léa t'a jeté un cinéma  
Léa t'a lancé une église  
Léa t'a présenté sa cheminée  
Léa t'a raconté une fille  
Léa t'a transféré la boussole  
Léa t'a transmis les résidents  
Tu as apporté une bouteille à Louis 
Tu as assené un coup à Louis 
Tu as attribué une médaille à Louis 
Tu as confié la clé à Louis 
Tu as consigné un message à Louis 
Tu as donné un livre à Louis 

















































Tu as fourni les draps à Louis 
Tu as lancé la balle à Louis 
Tu as légué son appartement à Louis 
Tu as livré une pizza à Léa 
Tu as montré une photo à Léa 
Tu as offert un cadeau à Léa 
Tu as passé le plateau à Léa 
Tu as porté des fleurs à Léa 
Tu as prêté sa voiture à Léa 
Tu as rendu sa veste à Léa 
Tu as servi du thé à Léa 
Tu as vendu des cigarettes à Léa 
Tu as versé de l'eau à Léa 
Léa t'a apporté une bouteille  
Léa t'a assené un coup 
Léa t'a attribué une médaille  
Léa t'a confié la clé  
Léa t'a consigné un message  
Léa t'a donné un livre  
Léa t'a envoyé un paquet  
Léa t'a fourni les draps  
Léa t'a lancé la balle 
Léa t'a légué son appartement  
Louis t'a livré une pizza  
Louis t'a montré une photo  
Louis t'a offert un cadeau 
Louis t'a passé le plateau 
Louis t'a porté des fleurs  
Louis t'a prêté sa voiture 
Louis t'a rendu sa veste 
Louis t'a servi du thé 
Louis t'a vendu des cigarettes  
Louis t'a versé de l'eau  
Tu as apporté une nation à Léa 
Tu as assené un canard à Léa 
Tu as attribué une honte à Léa 
Tu as confié la cohérence à Léa 
Tu as consigné un retard à Léa 
Tu as donné un livre à Léa 
Tu as envoyé un appartement àLéa 
Tu as fourni la lune à Léa 
Tu as lancé le crocodile à Léa 
Tu as légué sa nature à Léa 
Tu as livré un ciel à Louis 
Tu as montré un rêve à Louis 































Tu as passé la bouche à Louis 
Tu as porté des déserts à Louis 
Tu as prêté sa naissance à Louis 
Tu as rendu son courage à Louis 
Tu as servi du remord à Louis 
Tu as vendu des doutes à Louis 
Tu as versé de l'obéissance à Louis 
Léa t'a apporté une nation  
Léa t'a assené un canard  
Léa t'a attribué une honte  
Léa t'a confié la cohérence  
Léa t'a consigné un retard  
Léa t'a donné une intelligence  
Léa t'a envoyé un appartement  
Léa t'a fourni la lune  
Léa t'a lancé le crocodile  
Léa t'a légué sa nature 
Louis t'a livré un ciel  
Louis t'a montré un rêve  
Louis t'a offert une conscience 
Louis t'a passé la bouche  
Louis t'a porté des déserts  
Louis t'a prêté sa naissance  
Louis t'a rendu son courage  
Louis t'a servi du remord 
Louis t'a vendu des doutes  
























































Louis a adressé un courrier à Léa  
Louis a cédé sa place à Léa  
Louis a chanté une chanson à Léa  
Louis a communiqué le message à Léa  
Louis a confié son secret à Léa  
Louis a consacré du temps à Léa  
Louis a déclaré son amour à Léa  
Louis a délégué ses tâches à Léa  
Louis a dispensé ses conseils à Léa  
Louis a donné une chance à Léa  
Louis a écrit une lettre à Léa  
Louis a envoyé un baiser à Léa  
Louis a exposé ses raisons à Léa  
Louis a exprimé son amitié à Léa  
Louis a jeté un sort à Léa  
Louis a lancé une idée à Léa  
Louis a présenté sa démission à Léa  
Louis a raconté une histoire à Léa  
Louis a transféré la responsabilité à Léa  
Louis a transmis les consignes à Léa  
Léa a adressé un courrier à Louis  
Léa a cédé sa place à Louis  
Léa a chanté une chanson à Louis  
Léa a communiqué le message à Louis  
Léa a confié son secret à Louis  
Léa a consacré du temps à Louis  
Léa a déclaré son amour à Louis  
Léa a délégué ses tâches à Louis  
Léa a dispensé ses conseils à Louis  
Léa a donné une chance à Louis  
Léa a écrit une lettre à Louis  
Léa a envoyé un baiser à Louis  
Léa a exposé ses raisons à Louis  
Léa a exprimé son amitié à Louis  
Léa a jeté un sort à Louis  
Léa a lancé une idée à Louis  
Léa a présenté sa démission à Louis  
Léa a raconté une histoire à Louis  
Léa a transféré la responsabilité à Louis  
Léa a transmis les consignes à Louis  
Louis a adressé une vague à Léa  
Louis a cédé son nez à Léa  
Louis a chanté une cuisine à Léa  

















































Louis a confié ses seuils à Léa  
Louis a consacré du tempête à Léa  
Louis a déclaré son mouvement à Léa  
Louis a délégué ses phrases à Léa  
Louis a dispensé ses villages à Léa  
Louis a donné une race à Léa  
Louis a écrit une viande à Léa  
Louis a envoyé un genou à Léa  
Louis a exposé ses maisons à Léa  
Louis a exprimé sa chemise à Léa  
Louis a jeté un cinéma à Léa  
Louis a lancé une église à Léa  
Louis a présenté sa cheminée à Léa  
Louis a raconté une fille à Léa  
Louis a transféré la boussole à Léa  
Louis a transmis les résidents à Léa  
Léa a adressé une vague à Louis  
Léa a cédé son nez à Louis  
Léa a chanté une cuisine à Louis  
Léa a communiqué la prison à Louis  
Léa a confié ses seuils à Louis  
Léa a consacré du tempête à Louis  
Léa a déclaré son mouvement à Louis  
Léa a délégué ses phrases à Louis  
Léa a dispensé ses villages à Louis  
Léa a donné une race à Louis  
Léa a écrit une viande à Louis  
Léa a envoyé un genou à Louis  
Léa a exposé ses maisons à Louis  
Léa a exprimé sa chemise à Louis  
Léa a jeté un cinéma à Louis  
Léa a lancé une église à Louis  
Léa a présenté sa cheminée à Louis  
Léa a raconté une fille à Louis  
Léa a transféré la boussole à Louis  
Léa a transmis les résidents à Louis  
Louis a apporté une bouteille à Léa  
Louis a assené un coup à Léa  
Louis a attribué une médaille à Léa  
Louis a confié la clé à Léa  
Louis a consigné un message à Léa  
Louis a donné un livre à Léa  
Louis a envoyé un paquet à Léa  
Louis a fourni les draps à Léa  
Louis a lancé la balle à Léa  

















































Louis a livré une pizza à Léa  
Louis a montré une photo à Léa  
Louis a offert un cadeau à Léa  
Louis a passé le plateau à Léa  
Louis a porté des fleurs à Léa  
Louis a prêté sa voiture à Léa  
Louis a rendu sa veste à Léa  
Louis a servi du thé à Léa  
Louis a vendu des cigarettes à Léa  
Louis a versé de l'eau à Léa  
Léa a apporté une bouteille à Louis  
Léa a assené un coup à Louis  
Léa a attribué une médaille à Louis  
Léa a confié la clé à Louis  
Léa a consigné un message à Louis  
Léa a donné un livre à Louis  
Léa a envoyé un paquet à Louis  
Léa a fourni les draps à Louis  
Léa a lancé la balle à Louis  
Léa a légué son appartement à Louis  
Léa a livré une pizza à Louis  
Léa a montré une photo à Louis  
Léa a offert un cadeau à Louis  
Léa a passé le plateau à Louis  
Léa a porté des fleurs à Louis  
Léa a prêté sa voiture à Louis  
Léa a rendu sa veste à Louis  
Léa a servi du thé à Louis  
Léa a vendu des cigarettes à Louis  
Léa a versé de l'eau à Louis  
Louis a apporté une nation à Léa  
Louis a assené un canard à Léa  
Louis a attribué une honte à Léa  
Louis a confié la cohérence à Léa  
Louis a consigné un retard à Léa  
Louis a donné un livre à Léa  
Louis a envoyé un appartement à Léa  
Louis a fourni la lune à Léa  
Louis a lancé le crocodile à Léa  
Louis a légué sa nature à Léa  
Louis a livré un ciel à Léa  
Louis a montré un rêve à Léa  
Louis a offert une conscience à Léa  
Louis a passé la bouche à Léa  
Louis a porté des déserts à Léa  




























Louis a rendu son courage à Léa  
Louis a servi du remord à Léa  
Louis a vendu des doutes à Léa  
Louis a versé de l'obéissance à Léa  
Léa a apporté une nation à Louis  
Léa a assené un canard à Louis  
Léa a attribué une honte à Louis  
Léa a confié la cohérence à Louis  
Léa a consigné un retard à Louis  
Léa a donné une intelligence à Louis  
Léa a envoyé un appartement à Louis  
Léa a fourni la lune à Louis  
Léa a lancé le crocodile à Louis  
Léa a légué sa nature à Louis  
Léa a livré un ciel à Louis  
Léa a montré un rêve à Louis  
Léa a offert une conscience à Louis  
Léa a passé la bouche à Louis  
Léa a porté des déserts à Louis  
Léa a prêté sa naissance à Louis  
Léa a rendu son courage à Louis  
Léa a servi du remord à Louis  
Léa a vendu des doutes à Louis  
Léa a versé de l'obéissance à Louis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
